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Abstract 
There is a strong case to insist that the major Australian political parties 
have an obhgation to the electorate to select tiieir candidates for public 
office democratically. That obhgation may arise if the Austrahan party 
system demonstrates restricted electoral competition and if the Austrahan 
pohtical parties are, in some ways, pubhc property. Comj)etition between 
candidates representing political parties is usually regarded as a central 
feature of a liberal democracy. Where competition between parties fails to 
provide the pubhc with an effective choice of candidates, the real 
competition between candidates is displaced to a competition for party 
endorsement within particular parties. If the real pohtical competition 
occurs within the parties, it may be argued that the same standards of 
democratic practice as apply in general elections, should apply to the 
parties. They may even have an obhgation to submit their selection 
processes to extemal scrutiny. 
If the major Austrahan parties are, however, wholly private associations, it 
may be difficult to insist on the imposition of pubhc standards of 
performance. There may be risks to the freedom of association currentiy 
enjoyed by the parties, should extemal standards apply. A compromise is 
to provide for extemal scmtiny of the parties, without insisting on 
particular standards of behaviour. 
These arguments rely on an analysis of electoral competition in Austraha, 
of the status of Australian parties and of the current perfonnance of the 
parties in the selection of candidates. Each of these is analysed and the 
evidence is presented. An improved democratic performance on the part 
of the parties may improve competition between the parties and preserve 
the greatest sti-ength ofthe present party system—its stability. 
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vu 
Territory (NT). In the references additional abbreviations are, Victoria (V),
Queensland (Q), Western Australia (WA), South Australia (SA) and Tasmania (T).
viii
Chapter 1 
The Party Monopoly on Members of Parliament 
Seven hundred and three men and women were elected to the Australian House of 
Representatives in the period between 1941 and 1998. Of these, only seven were not 
nominees of a major political party.' In 1941, the Australian Labor Party formed a 
govemment in its own right during the sixteenth Parliament and in the ensuing 
twenty-three Parliaments only the Ausfralian Labor Party or the Liberal Party of 
Ausfralia in coalition with the National (Country) Party of Ausfralia has govemed 
Ausfralia. No Member of Parliament who was not a member of these three parties has 
ever been a part ofthe thirty-one Ministries formed during the period. The situation in 
Ausfralia's second chamber, the Senate, is marginally different in as much as a larger 
number of non-party candidates and a larger number of representatives of minor 
parties were elected. The electoral system for the House of Representatives consists of 
single-member constituencies and requires an absolute majority of the constituency 
for election. The Senate electoral system is a multi-member constituency requiring a 
quota of only one seventh of the constituency for election. The Ausfralian 
combination of electoral systems has helped to achieve a stable party duopoly in the 
House of Representatives, where govemments are formed and representation by other 
parties and individuals in the Senate, where there is scope for a considerable degree of 
review of govemment actions. The system's price, however, appears to be a 
monopoly by the major parties over the vital role of the gatekeepers to Parliament. 
That no new party has held government since 1941, despite the fact that hundreds of 
new parties have been formed in that period,^  suggests that there is an insurmountable 
barrier to new enfrants. Some argue that the solution lies beyond the two-party 
* Excludes those who resigned from their party while in parliament, and those who subsequently stood 
as an independent. Department of the Parliamentary Library, 1999. Parliamentary Handbook of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, 28* edition. Canberra: Department ofthe Parliamentary Library. 586fiF. 
^ For a regular half-Senate election. In the event of a double dissolution, all seats are contested and the 
quota is one thirteenth. 
^ Jaensch, D and DS. Mathieson, 1998. A Plague on Both Your Houses: Minor Parties in Australia. 
Sydney: Allen and Unwin. 
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system,"* a change to the electoral system and the encouragement of a diversity of 
minor parties. The prospects for such change seem remote and if they did occur, may 
produce a less favourable outcome. Perhaps there is a remedy to the major party 
monopoly that preserves the stability of the system and enhances the competition 
between the parties. 
Electoral Stability and Enhanced Competition 
Bartolini and Mair's^ discussion of the history of European electorates over the last 
century develops the theme of two confradictory tendencies—electoral stability and 
electoral volatility. They argue that both of these elements are present where there is a 
healthy competition between parties, but within a given set of rules and vsith steady 
allegiances to the major parties. The Downsian^ concept of the competition for 
political space suggests that parties will expand or confract the scope of their 
membership or policies to respond successfiilly to the electorate. In a closed political 
'space', the number of parties and the breadth of their appeal will satisfy a majority of 
the electorate at equilibrium. The simple economic theory of democracy has little 
regard for parties as institutions in thefr own right. They are assumed mere ciphers for 
the electorate's demands. Critics of party-based representative democracy suggest that 
a democratic equilibriimi may not be reached as the market dictates. Parties are 
associations of individuals who are to some extent autonomous actors in the political 
landscape. Parties may successfully conspire to close competition from other 
sources, so the 'equilibrium' may in fact be an oligopoly. Further, even in the liberal 
democracy^ neither everyone nor every view is heard, especially minority opinion. 
Nor does it guarantee a level of participation by the electorate beyond that of 
spectator. Then again, party competition may be imstable, of which the volatile Italian 
party system is a clear example. 
Marsh, I. 1995. Beyond the Two Party System: Political Representation, Economic Competitiveness 
cmd Australian Politics. Melboume: Cambridge University Press. 
' Bartolini, S. and P. Mair, 1990. Identity, Competition cmd Electoral Availability: The Stabilisation of 
European Electorates 1885-1985. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 4flF. 
* Downs, A. \951.An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row. 
' Panebianco, A. 1988. Political Parties: Organisations and Power. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 273. 
* Katz, R. S. and P. Mair, 1995. 'Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: the 
Emergence ofthe Cartel Party.' Party Politics 1(1): 5-28. 
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Australia has achieved political and electoral stability based on a particular form of 
competition between the major parties. Although it does not offer the opportunities 
for participation which instruments for dfrect democracy provide,'° it has shown an 
ability to account for the needs and demands of minorities,'' and it does not suffer the 
volatility or instability of some systems. When the present offers so much, the 
possible gains from reforming the current level of party competition should not be 
overstated. The very fact that political parties are the most successful organisations at 
having people elected for public office should not be dismissed lightly. Perhaps they 
are good at thefr job. At the very least, their success does mean that the competition 
for the right to wear the party label is as much a part ofthe democratic process as the 
election itself In practice, there is no other way to enter Parliament than by the 
endorsement of a major party. The tendency to oligarchy manifested in the lack of 
new parties in govemment and the major parties' monopoly on entry to Parliament are 
sfrong grounds for investigation. If a few powerful individuals confrol the major 
parties, the participative base of the entire electoral system may be very narrow 
indeed. 
The particular contribution that parties make to democracy is thefr ability to produce 
binding agreements between elected representatives. Such agreements enable the 
electorate to choose between the policies on offer in the knowledge that the prospects 
for their delivery are realistic. Furthermore, the parties succeed or fail based on their 
policy offers and thefr delivery. The ability to aggregate voter demands and formulate 
policy into binding agreements substitutes for the probable altemative—a trade 
among 'independent' representatives in the policy of interest groups, which outcome 
may be neither predictable nor apparent to voters. Under these conditions, voters do 
not have a sound basis for choosing candidates in the next round of elections. They 
9 
Carter, A and G. Stokes, 1998. 'Introduction.' la Liberal Democracy arui its Critics, eds. A Carter, 
and G. Stokes. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
'° Williams, G. and G. Chin, 2000. 'The Failure of Citizens' Initiated Referenda Proposals in Australia: 
New Directions for Popular Participation?' Australian Jcntmal of Political Science 35(1): 27-48. 
" The most significant Federal rights-orientated legislation lies in the area of anti-discrimination 
legislation. Commonwealth legislation includes the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cwlth), the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cwlth) and the Disabiiiiy Discrimination Act 1992 (Cwhh). These Acts 
operate throughout Australia and are enforced, to the extent possible given the separation of powers in 
the Austrahan Constitution, by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (Act 1986). 
There are equivalent statutes in each State. 
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cannot be sure of what they will receive from the candidate they choose. The party as 
an institution is able to deliver choice to the electorate because the career 
advancement of party politicians rests on their performing in that institution as a team 
player, albeit as a fierce competitor within the team. As the Hon. Leo McLeay MHR 
rather candidly stated, 'You got in the queue and you got rewarded ... that's how they 
kept the political party together'.'^ The competition for power within parties is thus 
intimately connected to, and is an essential part of, the competitive party system. 
Internal party democracy may be one way of compensating for the parties' monopoly 
over the selection of Members of Parliament. In his analysis of the issue. Ware asks, 
'would intemal democracy in parties provide for more, or less, effective competition 
between them?''^ The answer is conditional on the degree of democracy achieved 
within the party. Competition between parties may be weakened if parties become so 
intemally democratic that they cannot reach agreement in a practical and cost-
effective way. Less effective parties make for less effective competition. Conversely, 
where power is held by very few, the scope of any agreements may be narrow and the 
extent of scmtiny by, and accountability to, members is less. Ware'"* argues that 
internal party democracy will not destabilise party competition if the parties remain 
essentially undisturbed in their ability to operate collectively, but competition may be 
enhanced where the contest for the right to represent the party is more open and 
accountable, at least among party activists. 
Assessing the Major Parties 
The rationale for assessing the competition for power within Ausfralia's major 
political parties is based on three aspects of political parties. The first concems the 
party system and requfres evidence of a lack of competition between the parties. The 
monopoly by the major parties over the selection of candidates for Parliament consists 
of, a duopoly by the Labor and the Coalition parties in the House of Representatives, 
and the prominence in the Senate of the only other major party, the Ausfralian 
Democrats. The competition is restricted to certain players only. The second. 
'^  Cumming, F. \99\. Mates: Five Champions ofthe Labor Right. Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 242. 
'^  Ware, A 1979. The Logic of Party Democracy. London: Macmillan, 9. 
'" Ware, 1979. The Logic of Party Democracy, 31. 
The Party Monopoly on Members of Parliament 
concems party status and requires evidence of the ovmership of the parties and the 
rights that such ownership generates. In other words, who has the right to scmtinise 
the actions of parties? If parties are purely private associations, the right of scmtiny 
presumably falls exclusively to the party members. Nevertheless, the parties may fail 
to represent their members in any meaningful way if the members have no say in the 
affairs of the association. In which case, it may be possible to raise the prospect of 
extemal scmtiny of the intemal affairs of the parties. If the parties receive public 
fiinds or rely heavily on a historical legacy for their success against new parties, the 
rights of the wider electorate to scmtinise parties may be clearly justified. The third 
element concems party integrity. It relies on the successful rationale for the scmtiny 
of parties. Party integrity refers to the way in which parties, as free associations of 
individuals, behave in their role of candidate selection. The concept ofthe status of a 
party as a private association will be used to guide the discussion on the issue of 
scmtiny. It has a normative element, which is the rationale for choosing a particular 
standard of behaviour. The concept of a party as an association of free individuals has 
an empirical element, which is the measurement of the performance of the parties. 
The three elements, system, status and integrity, combine to generate three essential 
questions. Is democratic preselection by political parties essential for democracy? If 
so, how is party democracy to be defined and who is to judge the mles and the 
performance ofthe parties? 
There is a prima facie case that a particular form of party monopoly exists over the 
selection of Ausfralian Members of Parliament. As a result, part of the competition 
between the parties actually takes place within the parties. It is beyond the direct 
reach ofthe electorate. The democratic chain linking the electorate and the parties and 
govemment does not rest entirely on inter-party democracy. To some extent, it rests 
on the legitimacy of the parties to imdertake the task of goveming. Part of that 
legitimacy, in particular producing political leaders, rests on the integrity of the 
parties. Thefr integrity may well be called into question if they no longer consist of 
the number or type of activists upon which thefr reputations are built, or if they no 
longer fimd themselves. They may no longer be the parties upon which their 
reputation and role were based. 
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The remarkable part of the process of representation by parties is that, while parties 
consist of activists who almost never represent all elements of the electorate, parties 
in competition with each other may well between them represent the electorate. The 
Labor party'^ will tend to represent the wage and salary eamers ofthe city, the Liberal 
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party the self-employed of the city, the National party the interests of primary 
producers and the regions and so on. The Ausfralian Democrats, the only other party 
of any influence, represents those middle-class voters with a tendency to have 'post-
materialist' values, such as the protection ofthe environment and human rights.'* The 
original political cleavages in Australia along class lines were a major force in the 
establishment ofthe three major parties. To some extent, the Democrats are proof that 
these lines are beginning to blur. Similarly, the major parties at least maintained a 
presence in the electorate. Certain classes of people joined, they funded their own 
activities or at least sought fimds from supporters. The three major Ausfralian parties 
have largely each suffered a decline in membership either in absolute terms or relative 
to their vote in recent years. Bean'^ estimates that the parties' membership in 1967 
was 250,000 or 4% of tiie electorate and in 1996 was 235,000 or 2% ofthe electorate. 
Considering tiie Labor party. Ward reports, '|T|n 1939, 53 in every 1,000 Ausfralians 
was an ALP member: now [1990] less than three in every 1,000 is'.^° Since 1984, the 
parties have received public fimding for federal elections. The funding constitutes 
aroimd one third of the entire fimds available to them.^' In addition, there is 
Childe, V.G. 1964. How Labour Govems: A Study of Workers' Representation in Australia. 2°^ ed. 
London: Melboume University Press. Crisp, L.F. 1978. The Austi-alicm Federal Labour Party, 1901-
1951. Sydney: Hale & Iremonger. 
West, K. 1968. The Australian Liberal Party. Melboume: Longmans. Simms, M. 1982. A Liberal 
Nation: The Liberal Party and Australian Politics. Sydney: Hale and Iremonger. 
Ellis, U. 1963. A History of the Australian Country Party. Melbourne: Melboume University Press. 
Costar, B. and D. Woodward, eds. 1985. Country to National: Australian Rural Politics and Beyond 
Sydney: Allen and Unwin. 
Wariiurst, J. 1997. ed. Keeping the Bastards Honest: The Australian Democrats First Twenty Years. 
Sydney: Allen and Unwin. 
' Bean, C. 1997. 'Parties and Elections.' In New Developments in Australian Politics, eds. B. Galligan 
et al. Melboume: Macmillan, 110. See also Nelson, H. and L. Watson, 1969. 'Party Organisation.' In 
Australian Politics: A Second Reader, ed. H. Mayer. Melboume: Cheshire, 286. Stewart, G. and I. 
Ward, 1996. Politics One. 2°^  ed. Melboume: Macmillan, 150. 
°^ Ward, I. 1991. 'The Changing Organisational Nature of Australia's Political Parties.' The Jounml of 
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 29(2): 156. 
'^ Private conversation with Gary Gray, ALP National Secretary, March 1997. See also Horvarth, S. 
1999. The ALP and LPA are Evolving into Cartel Parties. Honours Thesis, Department of 
Government, University of Queensland, 56. Horvarth calculates that election funding between 1994 
andl997 constituted 19.3% and 14.9% respectively of Australian Labor Party and the Liberal Party of 
Australia declared receipts. 
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evidence^^ to suggest both a long-term decline in the level of partisan attachment to 
the parties and a long-term decline in their share of the vote. The vote share by the 
three major parties averaged 97% for the 1949 and 1951 elections, and 82.8% for the 
1996 and 1998 elections. ^ ^ Despite the decline in the vote, their hold over the share of 
the Members elected remains very solid. Nevertheless, the forces that helped create 
the parties are no longer as distinct and powerfiil as they were. 
The parties would argue that they perform important roles in recmiting and fraining 
prospective Members and in aggregating public preferences, and in this way meet 
their obligations to the electorate. It could be argued that elements of the Ausfralian 
system, such as compulsory voting and public fimding, create an additional obligation 
on the parties to select their candidates in a democratic manner. Parties are, of course, 
bovmd in the broadest sense to perform their important task to the satisfaction of the 
public and do so in return for the public's vote. A great deal of this 'confract' between 
the voter and the party is taken on tmst. If significant elements of the legitimacy of 
political parties are no longer present, then the system may be somewhat hollow, in a 
sense 'nmning on empty'. Ausfralian parties are less present in the electorate, less 
representative of the old class-based cleavages, less self-supported than was once the 
case. The three major parties are corporate entities with a label based on a significant 
historical presence and performance, and consequentiy have an enormous head start 
on any other rivals. What is more, the electorate are paying for the privilege. The 
parties still have obligations to their membership and to the electorate, but thefr 
obligations to the electorate may require that they perform their obligation to their 
members in a particular way—namely, that they are intemally democratic. 
A fundamental element of a liberal democracy is not simply the competition between 
parties, but the competition between parties as free associations of activists. One 
element of free association is the ability of members to influence the decisions of the 
group, which implies a degree of democracy. A breach of the principles of free 
association would, by implication, be a breach ofthe wider democracy. Parties do not 
" McAlUster, I. and C. Bean, 1996. Ix)ng Term Electoral Trends and the 1996 Election. 1-24. 
Unpublished. 
" Department of Parliamentary Library, 1998-99. 'House of Representatives Elections: Australia 
1949-1998.' In Federal Elections Results 1949-1999. Research Paper no. 8. Parliament of Austraha. 
http://www.aph.gov.aU/library/pubs/rp/1998-99/99rp08.htm#Major 
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operate on a basis of universal suffrage, they may choose whom they want to belong, 
and this is fundamental to thefr freedom of association. As de Tocqueville '^' observed, 
'[i]n democratic coimtries, the science of association is the mother of science; the 
progress of all the rest depends upon the progress it has made'. An association that 
allows members to belong who have no idea why they joined, or no idea even that 
they are members, brings into question the integrity of the association. An 
association that restricts the rights of members to the extent that the competition for 
power is entfrely imequal would also sfretch the boimds of integrity. 
Who is to remedy unethical behaviour, like signing-up members without their 
knowledge or consent, in a political party? In a private association, it is clearly the 
association itself The parties' defence against outside scmtiny as a remedy for 
tmethical behaviour is to argue that those dissatisfied with the organisation are free to 
voice their opinion or to leave. If sufficient members leave, then the organisation is 
weakened and may be punished electorally for its behaviour. The limits of tolerance 
of bad behaviour in a party may vary enormously. The well-educated middle-class 
members may be more able to articulate their demands, they may have the time and 
resources to pursue them. A poorly educated and poor worker or farmer may be more 
likely to defer to those presumed to govem on thefr behalf No simple or single set of 
mles or norms would hope to satisfy the different propensities for members to be 
offended sufficiently to protest at the actions of their leaders, or indeed their fellow 
members. Nevertheless, private associations are by definition self-governing and, in 
that sense, the only rules that count are the ones that sustain the organisation in the 
political milieu in which they operate. Clearly, in the first instance, the membership 
must scmtinise the actions of their own associations. Failure to so do may have 
adverse electoral consequences and in this sense, the electorate is the final arbiter of 
party behaviour. The influence of a voter in a single-member constituency, however. 
'^* de Tocqueville, A [1840] 1953. Democracy in America. New Yoric: Alfred A Knopf, vol. D, 110. 
^' Hon Anidrew Thompson MHR, LPA NSW, requested a police investigation after leaming that a 
woman in one of his branches in the seat of Wentworth had been enrolled without her knowledge. 
Sydney Moming Herald, 27 May 2000. 
The Queensland Liberal party president was reported to be moving for an early preselection contest 
in Moncriefi^  triggered by the retirement of long-time incumbent Hon Kathy Sullivan MHR, LPA Q. 
The result would deny eligibility to vote to a number of recently joined members. Sullivan remarked, 
'It would be a great pity if the powers-to-be were to make arrangements for preselection that appear to 
fevour one potential candidate over others.' The Courier-Mail, 31 May 2000. 
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is highly consfrained. The choice is largely to vote for the party nominee or the 
opposition, take it or leave it. 
Where an organisation lacks integrity because it contains those who have no idea why 
they joined, or where the mles are so uncompetitive that they allow a few to nm it for 
their own purposes, members are entitled to 'blow the whistle' on such behaviour. 
Non-members, though, have no right to interfere in such an association. There is a 
special burden, however, where such organisations fumish candidates for public 
office. Furthermore, where a lack of integrity is coupled with a loss of the status of 
private association, such as when a political party receives public funds, the claim of 
the wider electorate to scmtinise the means by which candidates are chosen for public 
office is sfrengthened. Who should scmtinise the actions of the parties imder the 
cfrcumstances where political parties are as much public property as private? 
If intemal party democracy is a possible remedy for the monopoly of Ausfralia's 
major parties over the selection of candidates for parliament, and if there are groimds 
for investigating the behaviour of the parties, the question is, do Ausfralia's major 
political parties use democratic processes to select their candidates for public office? 
The dismissive attitude of the leadership of one of Ausfralia's newest parties to its 
members suggests not. David Ettridge, former national dfrector of One Nation 
(registered as a private company), publicly defended the allegation that his party is 
imdemocratic by stating 'there are times when people use democracy to desfroy'.^ ^ To 
some extent, there has been a working assumption that the major parties intemal 
processes, in particular the selection of candidates for public office, are by and large 
democratic.^ ^ Then again, some see them as highly suspect organisations upon which 
to base a democracy, precisely because of thefr intemal behaviour. The issue is to 
test if the major parties have achieved what One Nation has not, and what Michels' 
'fron Law of Oligarchy'^ ^ suggests they carmot—a degree of accountability by the 
party leaders to the membership. 
" The Austi-alicm, 4 July 1998. 
*^ Overacko". L. 1968. Australian Parties in a Changing Society: 1945-67. Melboume: Cheshire, 
305flf. 
^' Jaensch, D. 1994a. Power Politics: Australia's Party System. Sydney: Allen and Unwin., 244. 
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Like all private associations, it is clear that the major parties have a responsibility to 
their membership. A breach of faith with the membership of a party constitutes a 
break in the democratic link between the electorate and the leaders selected by the 
party. The limits to the amoimt of intemal democracy are easily recognised, each 
party member cannot expect to have a vote on each decision of cabinet, or all parts of 
the party platform or the selection of every candidate. The cost of providing the 
opportunity for each member deciding each issue would be so great as to diminish the 
purpose of the association. The same cost of decision-making applies to the wider 
electorate; not every elector can be involved in each decision of govemment. Rules 
and procedures have been established by the major parties for the fafr conduct of 
public elections. From these publicly acceptable rules it should be possible to 
constmct some tests of fair process and measures of competitive party preselections. 
To paraphrase Schattschneider,'' preselection of candidates not only provides a 
vantage point from which to observe the competition for power within parties, it also 
provides a vantage point to observe the integrity ofthe competition. 
There has been no reported attempt to assess the democratic integrity of the intemal 
practices ofthe major parties in Ausfralia. Understanding the behaviour ofthe parties 
requires an audit of the rules and electoral stmctures goveming the preselection of 
candidates for the Commonwealth Parliament for all of the major parties. This is a 
contribution to the further irnderstanding ofthe behaviour of political parties and thefr 
impact on the political system. My study establishes some standards and measures of 
party democracy using formal and measurable criteria. It incorporates evidence from 
interviews to confirm the efficacy of the approach. It is argued that the parties are 
obligated to their members and to the wider electorate to choose candidates for public 
office by fair means. Any failure invites debate about a form of extemal scmtiny of 
the parties. Such scmtiny may have some positive consequences in modifying some 
ofthe practices ofthe parties, although it risks interference with the parties' freedom 
of association. It may be possible to have a public scmtiny of the parties' mles as a 
fiirther tool in the democratic process and avoid the more formal exercise of legal 
scmtiny ofthe parties as occurs in some other democracies. 
^ Michels, R. [1915] 1958. Political Parties: A Sociological Study ofthe Oligarchical Tendencies of 
Modem Democracy. Trans. E. and C. Paul. Glencoe, Illinois; Free Press, 393. 
'^ Schattschneider, E. 1942. Party Govemment. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 64. 
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Outline of the Thesis 
The object ofthe discussion in Chapter 2 is to decide whether democratic preselection 
is essential for democracy. A number of arguments are raised in support of the 
proposition that the major political parties should conduct themselves in a democratic 
fashion. These include: the closed nature ofthe party system and historical barriers to 
entry to other parties and individuals; the semi-public nature ofthe parties; the claim 
by the parties to be democratic; and the heightened awareness of the rights of 
members and their new-found access to legal remedies. Once the grounds for party 
democracy are established, it remains to test whether the parties are democratic. 
In Chapter 3, a framework is established to test the integrity of the preselection 
processes of the parties. The concept of integrity is developed as a broad test of 
democratic practice because the processes within the parties are fimdamentally 
different to those experienced in the electorate at large. Infra-party activity occurs 
within the confines of a free and private association, and the special consfraints of 
association need to be taken into accoimt when designing measures of democratic 
integrity. The research is designed to audit the processes of preselection used by the 
parties, which serve as gatekeepers to the Commonwealth parliament. The audit takes 
into accoimt the constraints ofthe parties' needs to operate in a practical and efficient 
manner. The audit is based on certain democratic principles derived from public 
elections and uses the rules of the parties as the data. It suggests that the mles are a 
powerful tool of analysis ofthe formal and the informal elements of preselectioa 
In Chapter 4, the results of the audit of the rules and procedures of the parties are 
reported. The audit is designed to measure the competitive nature of the candidate 
selection panels and the faimess of various election processes. The audit produces 
results which form the basis of a discussion of the weaknesses in the many different 
systems of preselection present in the major Ausfralian parties, and suggests that there 
are ranges of areas in the parties' performance that are undemocratic. 
The object of the discussion in Chapter 5 is to capture the totality of the integrity of 
association of the parties. It uses evidence from a number of case studies, as well as 
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the party rules. In particular, it analyses the ways in which candidates and groups 
within parties seek to gain advantage in a preselection and the impact that these ways 
have on competition, fair processes and the free association of members ofthe parties. 
It seeks to extend the analysis beyond the formal mles and the formal processes, and 
suggests that a different democratic ethos is at work in different parties. 
The first five chapters establish the need for the scmtiny of party democracy. They 
design various tests of democracy and report the results of the tests. The audit 
establishes that in various ways the parties' processes are undemocratic. The 
consequence of this result is the need to decide who should make good the 
madequacies. It is essential first to enqufre whether the parties intend to provide for a 
fair contest, and if so, why and how, as the results ofthe audit suggests, they fail. 
In Chapter 6, an analysis ofthe parties' recent record of self-scmtiny is reported. The 
constant stmggle for advantage within the parties is intimately bound up with that of 
the need to establish fafr mles of play. This area of party management is central to 
establish thefr bona fides as democratic organisations. The analysis reveals that the 
parties expend a considerable amount of energy to keep the competition fair. This is 
an important insight because, to some extent, it belies the results of the audit. It 
restores some faith in the concept ofthe parties as competent private associations able 
to provide for a fair contest for political power. 
Political parties are not, however, the sole determinants of their own destiny. Chapter 
7 presents a survey of the extent of external scmtiny of Australian parties, in 
comparison with some other nations. The survey notes fimdamental differences in the 
degree of extemal scrutiny of political parties in different democracies. These 
differences are, to some extent, a reflection of the trust that the society has placed in 
political parties to fulfil their task. The less trusted the parties, the less private they are 
and the more they are subject to extemal scmtiny. The survey ofthe private status of 
Australian parties reveals that while they are among the least constrained or 
scmtinised, there is an increased likelihood of intemal party disputes being settled in 
the courts. 
The discussion in Chapter 8 seeks to reach some policy conclusions from ti^ie audit of 
the parties, the survey of their competence as managers of their own affairs and the 
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extent to which the legal worid is moving to change their freedom to do as they 
please. The implications for each policy option are set out. The preference is for a 
policy of the public regisfration of mles. The object is to maintain the tension that 
exists in the current mix of private and public scmtiny, with a view to placing a 
premium on party democracy and preserving the right of parties to manage their own 
affairs within certain confines. 
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Is Democratic Preselection Essential for Democracy? 
Michels' dictum, that '[tjhe mass will never rule except in abstracto\^ is a reminder 
that democracy can be taken too literally. Even participatory democrats^ acknowledge 
that someone has to organise politics and that that role has frequently fallen to 
political parties. Parliamentary politics in Ausfralia, as elsewhere,' are almost 
inconceivable without political parties, such are their dominance of political life. To 
the extent that elections provide electors with a meaningfiil choice'' between 
altemative policies and programs for govemment, political parties play a cmcial role. 
The parties organise elections, assemble policies on which electors make their 
judgements and select candidates from whom the electorate choose their 
representatives for public office. Parties also counteract majority recycling, which can 
lead to endless reformulations of coalitions among various interests,^ they provide the 
principal counter to special interest groups on behalf of the general interest^ and to 
populist politics,^ and they enjoy a near monopoly ofthe recruitment and guidance of 
members of parliament. 
' Michels 1958, Political Parties, 419. 
^ Pateman, C. 1970. Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
42. Bachrach, P. 1969. The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique. London: University of London 
Press, 100. 
^ Lipset, S. 2000. 'The Indispensability of Political Parties' Joumal of Democracy 11(1): 48-55. 
* Budge, I. and H. Keman, 1990. Pctrties and Democracy: Coalition Formation arui Govemment 
Functioning in Twenty States. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 203. 
' Brennan, G. 1995. 'AustraUa's Parliamentary Democracy: One Cheer for the Status Quo.' Policy 
(Centre for Independent Studies) Autumn: 20. 
* Ware, A. 1988. Citizens, Parties ami the State. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 56. 
' Lipow, A. and P. Seyd, 1996. 'The Pohtics of Anti-partyism.' Parliamentary Affairs 49(2): 283. 
Is Democratic Preselection Essential for Democracy? 
A minimum requfrement for the achievement of a representative democracy is 
political competition,* a common element of which is competition between political 
parties. There are theoretical grounds to argue that democratic intemal processes of 
political parties are not a necessary requirement of a representative democracy. The 
Downsian economic theory of democracy requfres, among other things, that there be a 
sufficient number of parties in the competition, that the parties are free associations 
and that there are no substantial barriers to entry for new parties.^ These assumptions, 
however, are readily overtumed where there is evidence that the competition between 
the parties for votes may be 'oligopolistic'"' or 'closed'," or if parties are conceived 
as 'public utilities','^ or are a 'service organised by the state''^ where the result is a 
closed competition for votes among semi-public parties. If parties are closely aligned 
to, or dependent on the state, or if their presence in the electorate or their 
organisational vitality''' has diminished, or if parties see it as vital to their legitimacy 
to provide a democratic forum for their members, then the simple economic theory of 
democracy seems inadequate to accoimt for political competition. These are important 
issues as 'the greater the legitimacy, authority and power of established party elites, 
the greater the time available for the vital bargaining and compromise which allows 
democracies to solve problems in an orderly and peaceful fashion with the largest 
possible degree of general consent'.'^ It would be an exaggeration to suggest that a 
healthy set of parties and a healthy party system are tantamount to a healthy 
democracy, but because the role of parties is so cenfral to the way democracy operates 
in Ausfralia, neither can these elements ofthe parties be ignored. 
The importance of party democracy for the wider democracy, particularly the 
preselection of candidates, can be explored in three dimensions. The party system, 
which entails the analysis ofthe amount of competition between the parties; the status 
* Railton, P. 1983. 'Judicial Review, Ehtes and Democracy.' In Liberal Democracy, eds. J. Pennock 
and J. Chapman. New York: New York University Press, 155. 
' Ware, 1979. The Logic of Party Democracy, 35. 
"* Ware, 1979. The Logic of Party Democracy, 51. 
" Mair, P. 1997. Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
211. 
"Ware, 1979. The Logic of Party Democracy, 171. 
'^  Mair, P. with R. Katz, 1997. 'Party Organisation, Party Democracy, and the Emergence ofthe Cartel 
Party.' In Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations. P. Mair. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
115. 
"* Webb, P. D. 1995. 'Are British Political Parties in Dechne?' Party Politics 1(3): 302. 
15 
Is Democratic Preselection Essential for Democracy? 
of parties, which entails an analysis of the role that parties play in society; and the 
integrity of the parties, which entails an analysis of their competence to fulfil their 
role. The first two are explored in this chapter and provide the essential rationale for 
party democracy in Ausfralia's major parties. The third is explored in subsequent 
chapters. 
The Party System 
Does the Ausfralian party system show sufficient competition to exclude the need for 
parties to be intemally democratic? Mair'^ suggests three tests of electoral 
competition between parties to form govemments. Each of these tests: the extent to 
which there is altemation of parties in government, the extent of change in the 
goveming 'formula', that is, the irmovation or familiarity in the combination of parties 
which form govemment, and the enfrance to govemment of new parties, are used to 
analyse the Ausfralian party system. 
There are three conceivable pattems of altemation of parties in govemment. There is 
wholesale change of parties which then form govemment, a partial altemation so that 
some of the parties form and re-form in a different combination to form govemment, 
or no altemation at all. Ausfralia has exhibited either wholesale altemation in 
govemment or non-altemation across the entire modem period. The three major 
parties— t^he Labor party or the Liberal party with its coalition partner the National 
(Country) party—have formed every federal govemment since 1941. For a significant 
period, however, there was no altemation in govemment, with the Liberal/Country 
parties ruling from 1949 until 1972. There was a less extensive period of Labor 
govemments, from 1983 until 1996. For nearly 60 years the same two groups have 
been present, and for a long period there was no altemation at all. If the test is 
altemation of parties in govemment, then competition for govemment throughout the 
period has been constrained. 
" Budge, I., I. Crewe and D. Fariie, eds. 1976. Party Identification and Beyond: Representations of 
Voting and Party Competition. London: John Wiley and Sons, 3. 
'* Mair, 1997. Party System Change, 206. 
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There has been no new goveming formula in the sense of a new combination of 
parties in the period. Labor or the Coalition has govemed alone on each occasion, 
which suggests that there has been no innovation in the system. Apart from name 
changes for the Country party, which became National Country in 1975 and National 
party in 1982, the successfiil parties have been unchanged and have been entirely 
familiar. Only in the Senate, where govemments are not formed, has there been some 
innovation. Since the infroduction of proportional representation in 1949,'^ a 
govemment Senate majority has been rare. The Democratic Labour Party (DLP) held 
the balance of power in the Senate for much of the period 1955 to 1974.'* The 
Ausfralian Democrats have, since 1981, held the balance of power and taken over 
from the DLP as the party with which the govemment and opposition have had to deal 
on most occasions in order to pass, amend or reject legislation. Irmovation has been at 
the level of negotiation over legislation and has never been at the level of joint caucus 
or party machinery arrangements. 
One reason for the apparent lack of irmovation in the system is that while the major 
parties 'represent the cleavage stmcture ofthe formative period''^ they do so only in 
the sense of their historical origins. The shift from representing their ideological and 
class origins became clear as the ideological distance between the parties narrowed 
during the era of the Whitlam Labor govemments of 1972-74^^ and the Labor 
ascendancy of 1983-96. '^ This argument is often as much a critique by the Left of its 
preferted party (Labor) 'selling out' to an allegedly conservative agenda, as it is an 
argument about the narrowing of the ideological gap between the parties. The Left 
critique is an accusation that the Labor party label, in particular, is no longer accurate. 
It imposes a large historical burden on Labor and, by implication, the other major 
parties, and implies that they should either retum to earlier stances or change their 
name. Either course would risk electoral defeat. It is just as plausible to suggest that 
*' Department ofthe ParUamentary Library, 1993. Parliamentary Hcmdbook ofthe Commonwealth of 
Austi-alia. 26* Edition. Canberra: AGPS, 492. 
'* Department of Parhamentary Library, 1996-97. Federal Elections 1996. Background Paper No. 6, 
Canberra: ParUamentary Research Service, 83. 
' ' Jaensch, D. 1994a. Power Politics, 71. 
°^ Catley, R. and B. McFarlane, 1974. From Tweedledum to Tweedledee: The New Labor Govemment 
in Australia: A Critique of its Social Model. Sydney: ANZ Book Company. Catley has since recanted 
his ideological position ofthe tune. See his, 2000. 'The Knowledge ofthe World is the En«ny of God.' 
Quadrant 366(5): 15. 
Maddox, G. 1990. The Hawke Govemment and Labor Tradition. Ringwood: Penguin Books. 
Jaensch, D. 1989. The Hawke-Keating Hijack: the ALP in Transition Sydney: AUen and Unwin. 
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the ideological gap nartowed with the overwhelming acceptance in the electorate of 
the legitimacy of the free market and the welfare state. In the climate of the 
constraints ofthe acceptable parameters for successful electoral prospects, the parties' 
recent policies arise as much from electoral positioning as ideological differences. In 
other words, although they may have started out as ideological, the parties are office-
seeking. This flexibility has allowed them to ward-off newcomers and survive 
electorally, despite the policy ground shifting beneath them. 
The labels of the major parties in Ausfralia are historical brand names, both in the 
sense that the parties have been in existence for a great many years, and because a 
very large proportion of the electorate is loyal to the major parties. As McAllister 
notes, '[vjiewed comparatively, the levels of partisanship in Australia are exceptional, 
and set it apart from many (sic) other advanced industrial democracy'.^^ The premium 
that the label provides the preselected candidate is considerable. In a sense, a party 
lives off its inheritance, at least among some ofthe voters, and the judgement ofthe 
voters at any given election rarely desfroys the premium of the party label. The long-
term frend in polling^^ suggests that, while there is still sfrong support for the major 
parties, the party loyalists are in decline. The implication of this frend is that at some 
point the party labels may begin to lose thefr holding power over the electorate. At 
present, however, the electoral system and brand loyalty conspfre to leave the major 
parties in a commanding position. A vital role of parties is to endorse candidates by 
awarding thefr label to one person and not another. A poor choice may have adverse 
electoral consequences and in turn diminish the value of the label. An inability to 
reach a decision amicably may also prove damaging. '^' The very history ofthe parties 
and the stability of the loyalty of voters raise a significant barrier to entry for new 
rivals. Only rarely, in systems that are comparable with Australia, is a label desfroyed 
by current policy choices. An example was the Progressive Conservatives in Canada 
in 1993,^ ^ when voters broke the 'cartel' of the major Canadian parties. Party 
democracy arises in the shared ownership by party members of the frack record as 
^ McAUister, I. 1997. 'Austraha.' In Passages To Power: Legislative Recruitment in Advanced 
Democracies, ed. P. Norris. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 17. 
^^  McAlUster and Bean, 1996. Long Term Electoral Trends. 
^* The 1996 loss ofthe National party seat of Murray to the Liberal party foUowing the retirement of 
former Deputy Leader Bruce Lloyd was blamed on a preselection row. Malcohn Feam, State Director 
ofthe NPA V. Interview, 30 April 1998. 
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well as the promise ofthe future performance ofthe party. So in terms ofthe lack of 
innovation in the party system and its implications for party democracy, the right of 
scmtiny that is suggested by the 'ideological sleight of hand' argument rests with 
party members as much as the electorate. 
Mair's third test is whether there have been new enfrants to the party competition. No 
new parties have crossed the threshold of federal govemment in Ausfralia in the 
modem era. The Democratic Labour Party, the Ausfralian Democrats, the Greens and 
One Nation—each of which has held (or holds) seats in the parliament—^have not held 
executive office. They have only succeeded, by and large, in having members elected 
to the Senate. Myriad smaller parties have failed to gain any representation at all.^ ^ 
Australia's system of single-member electorates and preferential voting^^ has ensured 
that all but one of 148 Members elected to the 39th House of Representatives was a 
party nominee. Electoral and party stability in Australia ensure that the outcome ofthe 
competition between the parties for the majority of seats is predictable.^* The 
percentage of seats with 60% or more ofthe preferred vote was 54% in 1955^^ and 
40% in 1998, though the percentage of seats considered safe for the major parties 
based on them never having been lost was 55%.^ ° 
In a single-member electorate system, the cost to the partisan voter of overtuming a 
candidate is considerable. An altemative candidate from the same party does not 
usually appear on the ballot. There are cases where the party supporters in the 
electorate have not supported the party's choice of candidate. For example, following 
the retirement of Prime Minister Bob Hawke in 1992, Labor lost the safe seat of Wills 
to an Independent. The Labor candidate was considered in Labor party cfrcles '^ to be 
an important factor in that loss and the foUovmig election. There are cases where 
party supporters in the electorate have supported a disendorsed sitting member, as was 
" Maclvor, H. 1996. 'Do Canadian PoUticaJ Parties Form a PoUtical Cartel?' Canadian Joumal of 
Political Science 29(2): 320. 
*^ Jaensch and Mathieson, 1998. A Plague on Both your Houses. 
^ PauUne Hanson (One Nation) would have won the seat of Blair at the 1998 election on a first-past-
the-post system. 
*^ Mackerras, M. 1996. General Election, 2 March 1996: Statistical Analysis of the Results.l-24. 
UnpubUshed, 2. 
^Jaensch, D. 1994a. Power Politics, 103. 
'" Austrahan Electoral Commission, 1998a. Electoral Atlas: House of Representatives—Electoral 
Status Two Party Preferred, http://www.aec.gov.au/pubs/atlas/summary/stat2.htm 
'^ Observation by the author who was MHR for Petrie and involved in the campaign. 
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the case in the recent spate of independent victories in Westem Ausfralia (Rocher, 
Filing and Campbell in the 1996 Federal election), but largely the defeat of an 
endorsed candidate in a safe electorate is rare indeed. The party supporters' veto over 
an unacceptable party choice for member is an instrument so rarely used and so blunt 
as to be an ineffective tool to regulate the parties. Gaining a major party label virtually 
ensures a candidate election in a safe seat, and by implication fransfers electoral 
competition from between parties to within parties. The electorate takes an endorsed 
candidate on trust. In a sense, the electorate chooses half the parliament and half is 
chosen by the party and confirmed by the electorate. Even in the Senate, where the 
proportional representation system allows new parties a chance to be elected, it also 
assures the major parties 66% of the safe positions. For example, at the half Senate 
election the quota per Senator in a state is 14.3% ofthe vote. The two major parties 
(Labor and Coalition) are assured of two seats because each is unlikely to receive less 
than 28.6% of the first preference vote. This guarantees four of six seats. While the 
electorate is free to choose Senate candidates from a party list, nearly 95% of voters at 
1998 election^^ followed the party list exactiy.^ ^ Where the party provides the electors 
with a choice of candidates, it seems that the issue of how the candidates came to be 
on the list in a particular order stiU arises. 
Party Status 
The status of parties refers to the ownership and confrol of parties and the role they 
play in society, their relationship with the state and with civil society. Whether they 
are owned and confrolled by thefr members or whether the public have rights of 
scmtiny over thefr affafrs has a significant bearing on whether they should, especially 
in the circumstances of an oligarchic form of party competition, be intemally 
democratic. These issues have implications for their legitimacy as private associations 
of individuals, including their freedom from the scmtiny of those outside the parties. 
McAllister^" argues that in Australia 'political parties have gone to some lengths to 
^^  Australian Electoral Commission, 1998b. 1998 Election Results: Use of Group Voting Tickets. 
http://www.aec.gov.au/results/1998/taUy_room/saiate/group_voting.htm 
^^  Voters may either indicate their preference by marking the baUot paper in each square. However, as 
the number of candidates is frequently quite large, voters most often choose the option of marking only 
one square in a way that indicates that they wish to foUow their party's preferred Ust of preferences. 
^^  McAUister, I. 1992. Political Behaviour: Citizens. Parties and Elites in Australia. Melboume: 
Longman Cheshire, 203. 
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ensure the openness of tiieir recmitment procedures'. This assertion needs to be 
tested, as the issue of 'openness' or competitiveness is central to the issue of 
democracy. But is it a question for the public or for members of political associations? 
Does the legitimacy of parties have a bearing on their internal behaviour, or does their 
public performance alone suffice? To some extent the answer lies in the nature ofthe 
association ofthe parties. 
The incentive for parties to be intemally democratic may vary with their purpose, 
depending on whether, for example, they are vote-, office- or policy-seeking.^ ^ Such 
is the electoral success ofthe major Ausfralian parties that a case could be made that 
they are 'office-maximising' and regard intemal democracy as a low priority. The 
evidence that they clearly intend to select candidates democratically confradicts such 
a conclusion. For example, the NSW division ofthe Liberal party produces a guide 'to 
... inform and educate the public on how the Liberal Party operates... '^ ^ At the 1997 
Queensland State Conference of the Labor party. Senator John Hogg stated, 'One of 
the roles of the Rules Committee is to clean up the rorts that people keep thinking 
up'.''^ Clearly, the parties regard the business of intemal democracy seriously and, 
presumably, they do so in order to satisfy not only the needs of their members but also 
to convince the electorate at large that they are good political citizens. 
Mair's discussion ofthe history ofthe organisation of political parties in the Westem 
democracies^* indicates that parties have re-invented themselves numerous times. 
Typically, though not exclusively, parties emerged as elite or cadre organisations 
representing the interests of a small class, often of property owners, and, to use 
Duverger's delightfiil description, consisted of a 'grouping of notabilities for the 
preparation of elections'.^' The demise ofthe property franchise and the institution of 
universal suffrage together with the emergence of an industrialised workforce created 
the conditions for a transition to mass parties based on the class stmcture of the 
society they represented. Typical was the French Socialist Party whose aim, according 
' ' Strom, K. 1990. 'A Behavioural Theory of Competitive PoUtical Parties.' American Joumal of 
Political Science 34(2): 577. Harmel, R. and K. Janda, 1994. 'An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and 
Party Change.' Joumal of Theoretical Politics 6(3): 260. 
'* LPA NSW, 1998. Selection Guide, WooUoomooloo: NSW Division, 3. 
^^  Note made by author, 8 June 1997. 
'* Mair with Katz, 1997. 'Party Organisation', 93ff. 
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to Duverger, was 'the political education of the working class, at picking out from it 
an elite.... The members therefore are the very substance ofthe party'.''^ A critical 
distinction between an elite and a cadre party is the nature, not just the number ofthe 
membership. Duverger suggests, 'if we define a member [of a political party] as one 
who signs an undertaking and thereafter regularly pays his subscription, then cadre 
parties have no members'."" 
The sentimental attachment to the mass party, '[w]e may yet come to regret the 
passing...of the class-mass party...''^^ was to an extent based on the notion of 
ownership by the members, particularly the members of a social class. As Bartolini''^  
argued, however, the role of the mass parties was, by World War Two, somewhat 
overestimated. They had, largely by that time emerged, in Kirchheimer's terminology, 
as catch-all parties no longer exclusively tied to a firm ideological line. Further, many 
continued to develop as electoral-professional parties in Europe, and in Ausfralia"^ 
with essentially parliamentary membership and head office organisers.''^  An element 
of the electoral-professional incamation is the substitution of the work of the 
membership with the capital and knowledge of non-party professionals. The 
substitution effect is even more pronounced in the latest incamation, the cartel party, 
where the need for capital is satisfied by the state, and decreasingly by the 
membership. The cartel theory, although much contested,''^  is allied to the critique 
that the parties' traditional role of providing a link between the society and the state"*^  
has changed. The dependence of parties on the state raises the issue of the nature of 
the parties as private associations. The significant changes in the parties are reflected 
^' Duverger, M. 1959. Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activity in the Modem State. Trans. B. 
and R. North. 2"^  Eng. ed. London: Methuen, 64. 
'" Duverger, 1959. Political Parties, 63. 
"' Duverger, 1959. Political Parties, 64. 
^^  Kirchheimer, O. 1966. 'The Transformation ofthe Westem European Party Systems.' In Political 
Parties cmd Political Development, eds. J. LaPalombara and M. Weiner. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 200. 
'*^  BartoUni, S. 1983. 'The Membership of Mass Parties: The Social Democrat Experience 1889-1978.' 
In Westem European Party Systems: Continuity cmd Change, eds. H. Daalder and P. Mair. Califomia: 
Sage. 
'" Panebianco, 1988. Political Parties, 273. Ward, 1991. 'The Changing Organisational Nature', 153. 
'*' Wdjb, 1995. 'Are British Pohtical Parties in DecUne?', 311. 
'^ Katz and Mair, 1995. 'Changmg Models of Party Organization', 5-28. Ware, A 1995. 'Party 
Systems in the 1990's: A Decade of Transformation?' Government and Opposition 30(3): 312-26. 
Maclvor, 1996. 'Do Canadian PoUtical Parties Form a PoUtical Cartel?', 317. Koole, R. 1996. 'Cadre, 
Catch-AU or Cartel? A Comment on the Notion ofthe Cartel Party.' Party Politics 2(4): 507-23. 
'*' Katz, R. 1990. 'Party as Lmkage: A Vestigial Function?' European Joumal of Political Research 18: 
158. 
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in the major Ausfralian parties. Each has passed through one or more of these stages. 
None can any longer lay claim to an exclusive ideology, or to represent a class to the 
exclusion of other classes, or to be supported by a large membership or not to be 
losing their sfrong support base in the electorate or not to be run by professionals''* or 
not to be beholden to state fimding. Each is less able to stand alone as an exclusively 
private organisation with deep roots in the commimity. These matters raise significant 
doubts about the autonomy ofthe parties and their right to govem their own affairs, or 
least to govem them without some overseeing. 
Mafr's argument that 'the state ... has become unquestionably important for the 
survival of political parties, both in terms of the legitimacy which public office 
confers, as well as in terms ofthe resources and capacities which are either offered by 
or regulated by the state''*' moves beyond the old distinction of the party in the 
electorate and the party in government. It suggests that the parties may have an 
obligation to the state— t^hat is, that they may have shifted from being autonomous 
private actors to being public property. At the same time, in a study of factors 
affecting candidate selection, Gallagher concludes that party behaviour is not 
absolutely determined by their environment: 'parties do have some autonomy'^ ^ 
which suggests that they are not mere ciphers for thefr supporters in the electorate. If 
parties have a life of their own, it is likely that their autonomy is enhanced where they 
are 'a state sponsored service to the electorate'.^' This view appears to sustain 
Sartori's^^ thesis: 'parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win 
elections to formulate policies,' that parties are able to operate somewhat 
independently of their electoral base and exhibit some confrol over thefr environment. 
With the advent of public funding, such independence may well be enhanced since 
Sartori made his conclusions on the behaviour of parties. This means that the party 
leadership may be free from the members' confrol and in possession of considerable 
public fimds to be used for election purposes, but operate as if they have no particular 
obligation to the public, which is their benefactor. 
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Ward, 1991. 'The Changing Organisational Nature', 170. 
Mair, 1997. Party System Change, 140. 
'° GaUagher, M. and M. Marsh, eds. 1988. Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective: the Secret 
Garden of Politics. London: Sage, 265. 
*' Katz and Mair, 1995. 'Changing Models of Party Organization', 22. 
" Sartori. G. 1976. Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. Vol. 1, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 325. 
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The Ausfralian parties, as largely were those in the UK and tiie USA^^  for example, 
were founded as private associations. The Labor party grew out of the desfre of the 
frade union movement for political representation and has a local branch stmcture for 
the participation of members.^ The Liberal party was formed by the parliamentary 
leader Robert Menzies, with the intention of building a mass-based party of the 
middle classes, following the failure ofthe essentially cadre United Ausfralia party. ^ ^ 
It also has a local branch structure for the participation of members. The Coimtry 
(National) party was formed from and for the protection of rural producer interests.^ 
It now has the most extensive local membership of the major parties in at least three 
States. The Australian Democrats were formed by former Liberal party minister Don 
Chipp^ ,^ has a modest branch stmcture and is the only one of the major parties to 
allow for the direct election by members ofthe parliamentary leadership. 
The stability of the electorate coupled with the electoral system has provided the 
parties with a significant buffer against new enfrants. However, the state always had a 
hand in their success. Australia has one ofthe most highly regulated electoral systems 
in the world, with the 'Australian' ballot (the secret ballot confrolled by the state) and 
compulsory voting^* which is in effect compulsory exhaustive preferential voting. ^ ^ 
The declining sfrength of presence in the electorate, however, whether through 
ideological convergence or declining partisanship^ in the electorate, has left the 
parties with weaker bases in the electorate. At the same time as this declining 
presence, the technology of electioneering has requfred more for funds for 
campaigns.^' The shift to elecfronic electioneering may have even enhanced the 
decline in membership as the most common role of members as foot soldiers during 
" Ostrogorski, M. [1902] 1964. Democracy and the Organisation of Political Parties: Volume 1: 
England. Garden City: Anchor Books, 62. Ostrogorski, M. [1902] 1964. Democracy and the 
Organisation of Political Parties: Volume 2: The United SXuXes. Garden City: Anchor Books, 3. 
''* McKinlay, B. 1979. A Documentary History ofthe Australian Labour Movement 1850-1975. 
Melboume: Dmmmond, 5. 
" Starr, G. 1980. The Liberal Party of Australia. Melboume: Drummond/Heinemann, 75. 
^ Aitkin, D. 1912. The Countiy Party in NSW: A Study of Organisation and Survival. Canberra: ANU 
Press. 
" Warhurst, 1997. Keeping the Bastards Honest, 51. 
'* Introduced in 1925. Gow, N. 1971. 'The Introduction of Compulsory Votmg m the AustraUan 
Commonwealth.' Politics 6(2): 201. 
' ' Johns, G. 1998. 'Does Compulsory Votmg Distort Electoral Outcomes?' Agenda 5: 367. 
^ McAUister and Bean, 1996. Long Term Electoral Trends, 4. 
*' Ward, I. 1991. 'The Changing Organisational Nature', 159. 
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election campaigns declined. The reliance on the state for funds was driven by the 
new technology of electioneering, but it was enhanced by the fact that there was no 
culture of large private-sector donations in retum for state largesse such as private 
sector contracts^^ in Australia. Further, there were few spoils of office so that 
pafronage was not a large factor, especially as the welfare state played a more 
powerfiil role in looking after people than may once have been the case in the old 
pafronage system, even though some remnants remain in the ethruc base ofthe Labor 
party.^ ^ The parties came to rely on the state for cash to nm campaigns. Public 
election fimding and party labelling on the ballot paper were infroduced for 
Commonwealth elections in 1984^ and have made the parties both dependent on the 
state but also independent of thefr members. The parties created laws suited to their 
own needs. At the same time they are reluctant to open themselves to any scmtiny 
when it comes to the selection of candidates. The use of public power by the parties is 
asymmetric; pubhc assistance does not beget public scmtiny. 
With their transformation in the last half-century or so, are parties uniformly, and in 
all aspects, either private or public? For example, a party may remain a private 
association despite receiving state support, or it may become public because of it. A 
party may become public and receive littie or no state support. Public support implies 
public ownership but it may not give the public a legal right to scmtinise the parties 
other than in the strict terms in which moneys are dispersed for election purposes. 
Then again, a legal system may provide a right of scmtiny to the public because of 
public fimding or it may simply allow members of parties a right to a hearing in a 
court of law, in which case matters intemal to the party can become public 
knowledge. 
*^  Johns, G. 1996. 'Divided Loyalties: Party and Conscience.' In Accountability and Corruption: 
Public Sector Ethics, eds. G. Clark E. Prior Jonson and W. Caldow. Sydney: AUen and Unwin, 76. The 
extent to which private sector donations played a part was severely curtaUed as noted above when 
Labor forced disclosure of donations, wttch in tum made the conservative parties more wUhng to 
accept pubUc funding. 
*^  Zappala, G. 1997. Four Weddings a Funeral and a Family Reunion: Ethnicity cmd Representation in 
Austi-alian Politics, Department ofthe ParUamentary Library: Commonwealth of Austraha, 120 and 
165. Allan, L. 2000. 'Ethnic Recmitment or Ethnic Branch Stacking?: FactionaUsm and Ethnicity in 
the ALP.' People and Place 8(1): 29. 
^ Botii introduced m 1984, see Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918. 
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65 Because of the registration of Australian parties for public election funds and, in 
66 
some instances, incorporation under state legislation, intemal party disputes have 
been opened to the legal process. Legal intervention could have a democratic impact 
by fransferring power from the leaders to the members. It could make the parties 
vulnerable to a level of scmtiny inconsistent with thefr successful competition for 
power. To date, statutory and judicial intervention in Ausfralian parties have been 
limited and may well remain so despite recent changes to party status and despite calls 
for public intervention. Nevertheless, the recent successfiil actions by Ralph Clarke 
Aft 
MHA in the Supreme Court in South Ausfralia have had a considerable impact on 
the dispute-resolution procedures ofthe Labor party nationally, and probably the other 
parties as well. In this way the intemal disputes of private associations become public 
knowledge and exposure is a powerfiil weapon for asserting the rights of members, 
and often completely at odds with the experience of those who run parties. An 
electorate may decide to make its parties subject to extemal scmtiny, thereby in effect 
making them public entities, or it may choose to leave them as private associations. 
Where private disputes can be afred in public and be subject to determination by 
courts of law, a society, which may make no conscious decision to do so, may 
nevertheless find its parties becoming public entities. 
The parties' relationship to civil society and to the state, as well as their private or 
public status, may be a reflection, perhaps even a consequence of, competition from 
interest and single-issue groups. To a degree, the parties have been in refreat, 
overtaken by new ways of organising politics.^^ Katz and Mair^ ^ report tiiat, in 
*' Federal registration entities a pohtical party to receive election funding for its endorsed candidates 
who obtain at least 4% of the formal first preference votes. Each State or Territory branch or division 
ofthe party regardless of whether they are separately registered or not, are required to comply with the 
ftinding and disclosure provisions of the Commonwealth Electoral Act. Parties are subject to routine 
compUance audits by the AEC. AustraUan Electoral Commisaon, 2000a. Federal Registration of 
Political Parties 1999. Section 6. http://www.aec.gov.au/disclosure/federal_registration/main.htm 
** Sievers, AS. and R. Baxt, 1984. 'The Rights of Members of an Un-Incorporated Association.' 
Company and Securities Law Joumal 2(Vj: 3-12. 
*' Senator Andrew Murray, AD Q, wants the AustraUan Electoral Commission to conduct the baUots 
for party preselection. See his 1998 submission to Senate Fmance and PubUc Admmistration 
Committee on Electoral and Referendum BUI (No.2), June. In the wake ofthe Criminal Justice 
Commission Inquiry into electoral fraud. Premier of Queensland Peter Beattie has sought to convince 
the ALP Q ofthe need for the AEC to conduct party preselections. The Courier-Mail, 3 December 
2000. 
** Clarke v ALP (SA Branch), Huriey & Ors & Brown. SASC 365 (2 September 1999). Clarice v ALP 
fSA Branch), Hurley & Ors & Brown. SASC 415 (24 September 1999). 
Though not so much as was predicted by many, for example, Lawson, K. and P. Merkl, 1988. When 
Parties Fail: Emerging Altemative Organisations. Princeton; Princeton University Press. 
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Europe, people have been leaving parties. In Ausfralia, the total number of members 
of the four major parties is around 100,000 and as a proportion of the voting 
population has been falling for several decades.'' It may not be that the number of 
people who are politically active is in decline, but rather that they are finding other 
ways in which to become politically active. Perhaps this is because some 
associations, political parties included, 'have simply failed to meet the needs of a 
better-educated, more discriminating public and have paid the price'. New forms of 
activity are begirming to take the place of the old. In some respects, there is a 
revolution of political activity occurring. Non-govemment organisations provide 
citizens with vehicles for the exercise of 'private initiative in pursuit of public 
purposes'. Thefr growth in recent times has been such as to constitute a 'global 
associational revolution', reflecting 'new enthusiasms on the part of citizens to engage 
more directly in public problem-solving'.^'' 
For example, interest groups are now so prominent in Ausfralia that the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics has categorised them as an industry. Groups include organisations 
mainly engaged in promoting the interests of employers or self-employed persons, 
employees and other community interests. They include business and professional 
organisations, chambers of commerce, industrial or frade unions, consumer 
associations, automobile associations as well as political parties. At 30 June 1996, 
there were 3,737 organisations employing more than 47,000 persons in the interest 
groups industry. In addition, there were more than 100,000 persons working in the 
industry on a volunteer basis.'^ Clearly, the scale of interest-group politics dwarfs that 
of party politics. 
To some extent the apparent frend of a decline in parties' membership relative to 
population may be no more than a reflection of a more general decline in volunteer 
™ Katz, R. and P. Mair, 1992. 'The Membership of European parties in European Democracies 1960-
1990.' European Joumal of Political Research 22: 329. 
' ' Stewart and Ward 1996, Politics One 120, 150. 
^ Richardson, J. 1995. 'Interest Groups and Representation.' Austi-alian Joumal of Political Science 
30:61. 
' ' Rich, P. 1999. 'American Voluntarism, Social CapitaUsm, and PoUtical Culture.' The Annals ofthe 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 565: 15. 
'"* Salamon, L. and H. Anheier, 1996. The Non-Profit Sector: A New Global Force. Working Paper 21, 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Institute for PoUcy Studies. 
" AustraUan Bureau of Statistics, Interest Groups, Austi-alia, 1995-96 (8639.0). 
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activity across the entire volunteer sector m Ausfralia. Political parties alone do not 
hold the key to a healthy democracy. As Putnam^' has claimed, a rich 'civic culture' 
is a prerequisite for a sfrong democratic political system and for continuing economic 
prosperity, especially as it appears that people who belong to non-profit associations 
are far more likely to participate in the political process.'* 
Conclusioii 
The diminution in the private status of parties suggests the question, to what extent 
should the parties any longer be the arbiters of thefr own destiny? Panebianco's view 
on the future of electoral-professional parties, operating as they are in a political 
environment 'which is far less respectfiil and subordinate to pohtical elites,' was that 
they may well be a 'fransitory and comparatively short-lived phenomenon'. '^ The 
evidence in Australia is that the major parties have made the transition from private to 
semi-public status with very little loss of electoral success. Their future prospects 
appear reasonably assured, except for the prospect that they may face more intense 
scmtiny of their intemal behaviour. Moreover, they may even welcome it. 
While the Ausfralian parties have chosen to remain private organisations, they have, 
when it suited thefr purposes, slowly inched their way along the road toward public 
status. In doing so, they placed themselves in a position where it is difficult to see 
them as other than public organisations with a responsibility not only to their 
membership but also to the electorate. Thefr reliance on the state has created the 
position where the status of the parties in Ausfralia has changed from exclusively 
private to semi-public. Whether the parties will seek to re-balance thefr freedom to 
act, derived from their historic status as private and successful associations, with thefr 
new dependence on the state is another matter. They may seek to prove their intemal 
democratic credentials as a means of appealing to voters at a time when the voters are 
less than enamoured with the parties. The anti-politician threat to the major parties 
'* Lyons, M. 1999. 'Special Article—AustraUa's Nonprofit Sector.' ABS Austi-alia Now: A Statistical 
Profile (YearBook Austi-alia) http://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/OpenView. 
Putnam, R. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modem Italy. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 172. 
Verba S., K. Schlozman and H. Brady, 1996. Voice and Equality, Civic Volunteerism in American 
Politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
" Panebianco, 1988. Political Parties, 273. 
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noted in Katz and Mair's*^ analysis was demonsfrated at the 1998 Ausfralian Federal 
election with a new 'anti-politician' party. One Nation, receiving ahnost 10% ofthe 
national vote. The exfraordinaiy allegations, revealed in the Shepherdson Inquiry*' 
(Queensland Criminal Justice Commission), of electoral fraud by Labor party 
members for preselection purposes, may mean that the intemal democracy of parties 
will always be assumed to be a public issue. 
The four major Ausfralian parties are all clearly membership-based. Each party's rules 
specify that the means of entry to the party and the right to vote in a preselection be 
by way of payment of dues. Each major party, however, has developed into a 
professional machine with head offices and organisers and receives donations fix)m 
non-members. Each receives public fimds and is to some extent reliant on the state. In 
these regards, the parties are in the hands of thefr membership, but have a degree of 
freedom from the membership by way of professional advice and non-member 
sources of fimds. The implications of this mixed progeny for the issue of intemal 
democracy and its scmtiny are that irtespective of the degree of competition between 
the parties, the parties' status has changed to the point where thefr history— 
ideological, mass-based, a large presence in the electorate and self supporting—^belies 
thefr current role. The present parties are brand names with a nominal presence in the 
electorate where the market for political activism has shifted to interest groups and 
where they are supported by the state. Thefr new status is senu-public and the lack of 
competition between the parties means that, while they should be beholden to the 
public both electorally and in a more direct proprietorial manner, they may in fact be 
beholden neither to their membership nor to the electorate. The means to address the 
deficit is to ensure that thefr selection procedures are democratic both in the eyes of 
the electorate and the membership. 
The heightened awareness of the rights of members and their new-found access to 
legal remedies means that it is more likely that there will be demands for democratic 
processes. This combined with the intention of the parties to be democratic, means 
that assessing the performance of the parties would, if for no other group, be a 
valuable exercise for the membership. More broadly, assessing the democratic 
*° Katz and Mair, 1995. 'Changing Models', 24. 
*' At the time of writing, the Inquiry has not reported hs findings. 
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performance of the parties would be a valuable exercise not only for the parties and 
the membership, but also for the electorate at large. The next task is to devise suitable 
measures of their performance. 
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Measuring Party Democracy 
Previous studies of Ausfralian preselections have tended to describe the formal rules 
alone' or, as part of a broader study of party processes, describe the preselection 
system.^  Only two have analysed the preselection system in operation^ with a view to 
making judgements on the nature of the party processes. One reason for this paucity 
of study may be the difficulties in gaining access to the sort of information that could 
explain party behaviour. Another may be disagreement on what aspects of 
preselection are important. 'When there are good numbers of acceptable people 
offering, and when factional fixes do not corrupt the process to favour mediocrity, the 
actual mechaiucal artangements are not of vital importance ... [since] responsible 
party members acting independently will usually take their fimdamental purpose 
[choosing a candidate for Parliament] very seriously'.'' This statement has some 
validity, but it also raises more questions than it answers. Is it responsible to choose 
the candidate who is likely to be most loyal in a crisis or the one who decides an issue 
on the merits? Should all of the members vote in a plebiscite or just delegates? 
Should a powerfiil cenfral body that claims to act in the best mterests of the party be 
able to overturn other views? What are the best interests of the party? What is acting 
independently, and independently of whom? What is a factional fix? In fact, all other 
things being equal, many of the critical elements of the preselection contest are 
precisely the ones assumed away. 
' Gould, F. 1969. 'Pre-selecting the Candidates.' In Australian Politics: A Second Reader, ed. H. 
Mayer. Melboume: Cheshire. 
^ Parkin, A and J. Warhurst eds., 1983. Machine Politics in the Australian Labor Party. Sydney: 
George AUen and Unwin. Warhurst, J. and A Parkin, eds. 1999. The Machine: Labor Confronts the 
Future. Sydney: Allen and Unwin. Jaensch, D. 1994b. TTte Liberals. Sydney: AUen and Unwin. Costar, 
B. 1996. 'The Future ofthe National Party.' In TTie Paradox of Parties: Australian Political Parties, 
ed. M. Simms. Sydney: AUen and Unwia 
^ McAlUster, I. 1992. Political Behaviour, 211fiF. Sunms, M. 1994. 'Party Stmctures and Pre-selection 
in AustraUa: Selectorates, FederaUsm and the "Ideal" Member of Parhament.' Paper presented at the 
16* Worid Congress ofthe Intemational Political Science Association, BerUn, Germany. 
* Graeme Starr former director LPA NSW, in the Australian Financial Review, 20 Febmary 1995. 
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The recruitment of candidates by political parties 'raises significant normative 
concems about how the process should operate according to rival conceptions of 
democracy, and empirical issues about how the process does operate in practice'.^ 
The normative issues are in fact three-fold. The threshold normative issue, whether 
the major parties in Ausfralia should select candidates democratically, has been 
determined. They should do so. Pomper has explored the second normative issue of 
rival conceptions of democracy.^ He makes the point that a particular party may 
promote a particular set of democratic values. Parties will pursue goals that may not 
lend themselves equally to a similar pursuit of intemal democracy. It is essential to 
allow that there is no ideal party type, and therefore no ideal set of democratic mles. 
Some studies of candidate selection concenfrate solely on 'the appropriate division of 
power between party leaders and grass roots members'* or 'the extent to which party 
members ... are able to govem the decisions of their party'^ in their pursuit of 
democratic rules. However, there is more to democracy than simply this division of 
power. Taking a broader concept, the competition for power in a liberal democracy 
assumes that competition should provide for a real contest. It also requires that the 
contest should take place within guidelines considered fair and agreed to by the 
competitors. The challenge in measuring party democracy is to find a standard of 
democracy which is sufficiently robust not to be unduly restrictive or naive in its 
conception, nor so bland as to overtum the threshold assumption that the process 
should indeed be democratic. The remaining normative issue is how the process 
should operate within the confines of a private association. When a contest takes 
place within the bounds of a private association, the freedom of association of 
members must be respected. Certain conditions, such as the right of an association to 
set its own rules, and to resolve its own disputes, satisfy the freedom of association. 
' Norris, P. 1997. 'Introduction: Theories of Recruitment.' In Passages To Power: Legislative 
Recruitment in Advanced Democracies, ed. P. Norris. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 8. 
* Pomper, G. 1992. Passions and Interests: Political Party Concepts of American Democracy. Kansas; 
University Press of Kansas, 131. 
' Strom, 1990. 'A Behavioural Theory', 577. Harmel and Janda, 1994. 'An Integrated Theory', 260. 
^Norris, 1997. 'Introduction', 8. 
' Gibson R. and R. Harmel 1998. 'Party FamiUes and Democratic Performance: ExtraparUamentary vs. 
ParUamentary Group Power.' Political Studies XLVI: 635. 
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What to Measure 
Ausfralian parties manage preselections without reference to any extemal body or set 
of mles, save for some recent, rare examples where disputes in the parties have come 
before the courts. As a result, there are no ready-made standards by which to judge 
the behaviour ofthe parties. There are, however, some obvious starting points. Where 
one or two powerfiil figures who are not responsive or responsible to the party 
members confrol preselection in a party,'° the contest will be uncompetitive because 
of a considerable stmctural imbalance in the distribution of power in a party. Where 
preselection ballots are rigged," then the contest is clearly unfair. Where contests are 
won by the massive recmitment of new members, many of whom know notiiing ofthe 
piuposes for which they are recmited,'^ the result may exploit the integrity of the 
association. These problems of competition, fair processes and integrity of association 
are cenfral to measuring party democracy. They arise in any contest involving the 
expression of preferences among members of an organisation. They are particularly 
important in a political party because where the contest for candidate selection is anti-
competitive, or unethical, or breaches the integrity of a free association, the electorate 
may be denied the choice of voting for the duly elected party candidate. 
These three examples of behaviour in the selection of candidates suggest three 
distinct areas of concem. The first is the competitive or anti-competitive stmcture of 
the panels of party members who preselect the candidates. The issue is whether there 
is a real contest among candidates for preselectioa The second area of concem is 
whether the rules for the conduct of preselections provide for fair procedures, 
including procedures to appeal against the breach of a rule. The third area of concem 
is the integrity of the freedom of association of the membership, that is, whether or 
not the freedom ofthe association of members been preserved or exploited. 
'" For example, according to Rod Sawford, this is the situation presoitly in Ac ALP SA. Interview 23 
September 1997. 
" Senator Hon Michael Beahan, ALP WA has aUeged that he was defeated in his 1994 preselection for the 
Senate because of a rigged baUot. The aUegation is contained in his submission to tiie ALP National 
Executive, 31 March 1995. (Mimeo) 
'^  2,000 new members were signed up and had their membership fees paid on theu- behalf to the ALP 
SA, on AustraUa Day 1999. Reported in The Austi-alian 23 July 1999, 6. 
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The three concems form the basis of three tests of democratic behaviour, and may be 
applied to the preselection of parliamentary candidates in the major Ausfralian 
parties. In particular, the tests need to be applied in the context of the competing 
objectives and strategies of the candidates and of the parties. The competition for the 
party label takes many forms and is handled by the Ausfralian parties and the 
candidates in different ways. Competitors, or groups of competitors, or factions, may 
seek to confrol the factors that will determine the outcome of a preselection. The way 
in which the contestants seek to confrol, exploit, or take advantage of elements ofthe 
contest can affect the outcome. 
Measuring the integrity of the preselection process requires an understanding of the 
interplay of the desire of the preselection candidates to win preselection and of the 
party to win the election. What the preselection candidates need and what the party 
needs may not be the same. The imperative for the party managers is to conduct the 
contest in a manner that ensures the integrity ofthe organisation. Party managers will 
also be contestants, or support contestants from time to time, and this may increase 
the risk of undemocratic behaviour on the part of the managers. It does not, however, 
eliminate the party's need for survival. The result is a framework to measure the 
democratic integrity of party preselections from the perspective ofthe parties. 
Diagram 3.1 sets out the three tests of democracy chosen for the measurement ofthe 
democratic integrity ofthe Ausfralian parties. These are competition, fair process and 
freedom of association. These are placed within the competing objectives of the 
contestants and the party as a whole. That context recognises that there may be 
conflicting ideas about what constitutes a valid test of democratic integrity. 
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Diagram 3.1: Three Tests ofthe Democratic Integrity of Party Preselections 
Individual or Group 
Objective: 
Win and or maintain 
confrol of 
preselections through 
recruitment strategies, 
favourable rules, or 
favourable 
interpretations of 
mles. 
Competition: 
Is there a real contest 
among the candidates, 
branch, faction leaders 
or executive? 
Fair Process: 
Do party rules pass a test of 
fair process? 
Party Objective: 
Provide a forum 
and agreed mles for 
the contest 
consistent with its 
extemal objectives, 
including party 
unity. 
Freedom of Association: 
Has the outcome exploited 
the freedom of association 
of members? 
Source: Author. 
How to Measure Democratic Performance 
Measuring the performance ofthe parties in the three categories of behaviour needs to 
account for both the formal and informal processes of preselection. It needs also to 
recognise that behaviour may not be able to be observed directly. Perhaps only the 
results of a contest, such as who wins and who loses, may be observable. However, 
results may prove very little about the democratic performance. 
Some measures of party democracy purport to measure whether the candidates 
selected for a given party, at a given time, are a tme reflection of the desires of the 
party membership. This measure depends on a preconceived notion of outcome. 
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which in tum is based on a preferred model of legislative recmitment '^  A party may 
want to select people who are party loyalists, or it may want to select people who it 
thinks the electorate will prefer. It may want to select people who represent the key 
demographic qualities of the electorate. While the channels for recmitment into the 
parliamentary ranks need to be open, and are indeed a vital part of democracy, the 
outcome or make-up of the elite does not necessarily reflect on that opermess.''* A 
party's membership is most unlikely to reflect the class composition or gender ofthe 
electorate. As Norris and Lovenduski'^ found in a study of candidates in Britain, in 
addition to ambition and talent, the key determinants of the supply of candidates are 
'time and a good income'. These characteristics accounted for the lack of women in 
parliament in Britain. The same applies to working-class men, those of non-English 
speaking background, the young and the old. 
For a party's rank-and-file membership to select candidates who reflect the 
composition ofthe electorate requires the acceptance, and possibly the imposition, of 
a particular value judgement. For example, the Labor party in NSW has a mle to 
weight the vote of women candidates until they are elected in numbers that satisfy the 
party's goal of affirmative action. The difficulty with such a mle is that it is 
contingent on the values inherent in an affirmative action program; that the party 
should represent a particular demographic profile, and the party should compensate 
for a 'fault' which lies in the job of politics. The job requires of the contestants a 
great deal of time and a good income. From the point of view of establishing rules for 
democracy, this is a problem. Ranney's comment on his role in the US Democratic 
(Party) Reform Commission captures the point: 'We contended that requiring 
representation of biological characteristics was at odds with the commissioners' other 
objectives of open access and representation of preferences. The party could provide 
for a fair fight or it could provide for a guaranteed result, ... but it could not provide 
for both'.'^ Clearly, an outcome measure of democracy is heavily contingent on a 
'model of recruitment' argument and is not a robust or enduring measure of 
'^  Norris, p. and J. Lovenduski, 1993. 'If Only More Candidates Came Forward: Supply Side 
Explanations of Candidate Selection hi Britam.' British Joumal of Political Science 23: 373. 
''* See discussion of eUte recmitment, McAUister, 1992. Political Behaviour, chapter 9. 
' ' Norris and Lovenduski, 1993. 'If Only More Candidates Came Forward', 406. 
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democratic practice. Recording the parties' use of 'weighted' votes would be a valid 
measure of democracy only if the affirmative action values are accepted. An outcome 
measure of democracy is therefore not advisable; more universal measures are 
required. 
In addition to the limitations of using results as a measure of democracy is the vexed 
issue of formal mles and informal behaviour. Obviously, a study of democratic 
practice needs to capture and measure the real behaviour, not simply the fa9ade. One 
ofthe most enduring observations of political parties is Osfrogorski's, 'the procedures 
laid down by the rules for the selection ofthe candidate ... are simply a formality 
which just puts the finishing touch on the work of the wire-pullers'.'^ Similarly, 
Appleton's case study of the intemal behaviour of French parties begins with the 
proposition that 'a set of informal mles will emerge to circumvent the restraints upon 
behaviour [of party members] infroduced by the formal rules, or prohibitions, of party 
organization'.'* It seems that informal procedures may provide the best guide to 
performance. Then again, Dmcker observes that the practices of the British Labour 
party are embodied 'in written, often detailed, rules', whereas the Conservative party 
'has proceeded until very recentiy on the basis of accepted practice rather than formal 
rules'.'^ Dmcker's observations have their parallel for the Australian parties. The 
Labor, Liberal and Democrats parties in Australia have highly sophisticated sets of 
rules, with the National party less prone to be mle-bound. 
In some instances, the rules of a party may act as an accurate guide to behaviour, in 
other cases less so. Further, it is tantamount to a pre-judgement to assume that only 
the work of wire pullers is significant. The wire pullers may have won a fair contest 
and are getting on with the business of managing the party. The influence ofthe wire 
pullers may operate in a completely formal way, the mles may allow for it, they may 
even determine it. 
'* Ranney, A 1975. Curing the Mischiefs of Faction: Party Reform in America. Berkeley: University of 
CaUfomia Press, 114. 
•' Ostrogorski, 1964. Vol 1, 209. 
'* Appleton, A 1994. 'The Formal Versus Informal Rules of French PoUtical Parties.' In How Political 
Parties Work: Perspectives From Within, ed. K. Lawson. Westport, CT: Praeger, 24. 
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Putiiam^^ observes how mutual trust and mles are developed in a competitive and 
even poisonous atmosphere in political parties. This observation is important in two 
respects. The development of mles is as much a part of the measurement of 
democracy as is the participants' apparent desire to circumvent them. In the case of 
the advocates for affirmative action, despite no doubt a great deal of negotiation and 
debate over the concept, the instrument for implementing affirmative action was a 
mle. The mle carried into effect the policy. Rules may provide a good guide to 
behaviour. Second, the preselection process may be perfectly democratic but produce 
a career path for a winner, which lacks the appearance of democracy. There will be 
winners and losers. The membership of a party may exhibit a degree of party 
discipline, which also appears to be imdemocratic. Some may agree to stand aside 
from a contest in retum for support at a later ballot. This is not necessarily 
undemocratic. 
There are limits to the extent of intemal party democracy.^' The need to balance 
forces in a party is never ending, as is the necessity for some centralisation of power 
for the purposes of practical management. Sometimes democratic reforms, for 
example, Tony Benn's at the 1981 Labour Conference in Britain^^ and the post-1968 
Democrat Convention in the USA, may ensure that the party serves different masters 
but it may not ensure a more democratic party. Political activity may not conform to 
an ideal outcome in the face of the need to accumulate power in few hands to better 
serve group interests. For example, general elections facilitate an accumulation of 
power in the hands of the few in order to serve the interests of the many. They are 
also govemed by mles written to achieve, as near as possible, a fair contest for the 
accumulation of power. Rules will govem voting procedures and constitutional 
elements like the electoral system and number of legislative chambers. As 
unsatisfactory elements of competition or constitutional architecture are discovered, 
mles are changed. Rules therefore are not simply a static part ofthe game, concemed 
*' Dmcker, H. 1979. Doctrine and Ethos in the Labour Party. London: George AUen and Unwin, 2, 17. 
Putnam, 1993. Making Democracy Work, 166ff. 
'^ Ware, 1979. The Logic, 31. 
^ OUver, D. 1981. 'The Constitutional ImpUcations ofthe Reforms ofthe Labour Party.' Public Law 
Summer, 151. 
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only with policing errant behaviour. In many respects, the contest over the mles is the 
game. 
In many cases, formal mles establish the boundaries for informal behaviour. 
Members are the currency of preselection politics, so membership recmiting takes 
place among those who are most valuable, those who have been given special voting 
rights. A paucity of mles leaves a party open to improper practices and unable to 
respond adequately. A lax set of mles can lead to electorally costly disputes. In 1995, 
the National party lost a previously safe seat, partly because of a preselection dispute. 
The incident caused a senior member of the party to observe 'we're haunted by 
Murray, it revealed all ofthe fi^gilities ofthe scheme'. Even in the non-mle bound 
National party, the limits of poor behaviour were reached and rule changes ensued. 
There are usually mechanisms, such as appeals and tribunals, for the resolution of 
disputes. Even where the rules for these mechanisms are vague there may come a 
time when the limits of informal negotiation based on either goodwill or the force of 
numbers are reached and mles have to be made or amended. The rules of the major 
parties may indicate the ways and means by which groups or individuals take 
advantage in a contest. Moreover, they may indicate the very grounds for maintaining 
group solidarity within a party. The starting point in measuring the parties' 
democratic behaviour should be the mles that the parties have themselves woitten. 
As to the questions of wire pullers and how they operate, how can these things be 
measured? Appleton suggests that those who have a material advantage or status 
outside the party will use it to seek to determine the outcome inside the party. He 
implies that the result of a contest for party endorsement between candidates who 
bring with them outside influence is imdemocratic. Such a judgement may not be 
warranted. Penalising a preselection candidate who, for example, has spent many 
years building a profile in a primary producers' group, or chamber of commerce or a 
trade union where these attributes would be welcome respectively in the National, 
Liberal and Labor parties would be positively harmfiil to the parties' prospects in the 
electorate. To regard an outside influence as inherently undemocratic is to assume 
^ Hon Peter McGauran MHR, NPA V. Interview, 19 November 1997. 
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that all candidates must be equally suitable or capable or novices. As with the 
outcome measure of performance, it is highly contingent on the values a party, or an 
observer, wishes to impose on the process. Michel's 'fron law of oligarchy', which 
suggests that any concenfration of power or exertion of influence is tantamount to 
anti-democratic behaviour needs to be tempered by the view that the accumulation of 
power is not synonymous with the subversion of democracy. The way in which power 
is accumulated and maintained, however, may be. 
Appleton's search for a politics without informal advantage can become an endless 
search for faimess as equality. The mles themselves may allow for anti-competitive 
behaviour, for example, in the stmcture of the panel of party voters assembled for a 
preselection. Nevertheless, the degree of competition may be observed and measured 
in the advantages and disadvantages that the mles create. Anti-competitive behaviour 
may sometimes be in breach of the rules, so the parties' ability to resolve these 
matters becomes paramount. On the other hand, some activities may not breach the 
mles but call into question the integrity of the free association of the membership— 
for example, if a large number of outsiders are recruited to the party at short notice. 
The rules of the j)arties are not simply a mlebook of fair play and of agreed stmctures 
and processes. They are veritable archaeological sites of the battles to confrol the 
parties. The formal mles offer an enormously rich insight into what parties regard as a 
competitive panel, what they regard as fair mles, what constitutes a breach and what 
does not. 
There is, no doubt, significant behaviour that cannot be observed through the rules. 
The 'wire-pullers' are alive and well in Ausfralian parties. Mostly they are the senior 
officers or politicians in a party. In some parties they are known as heads of factions. 
Factions, where tiiey exist in the Ausfralian parties are groups of party members or of 
the parliamentary caucus whose primary allegiance to the group often outweighs that 
to the party as a whole. They are often more stable than mere shifting alliances. As 
McAllister's study of Ausfralian party factionalism indicates, 'political competition in 
liberal democracies may be less a matter of competition between political parties than 
40 
Measuring Party Democracy 
of competition between organised groups within parties'.^" Indeed, 'organised 
competition between party factions ... replaces intra-party rivalry, personal intrigue, 
and their ultimate consequence, party fragmentation'.^^ In fact, it may be that infra-
party rivalry and intrigue are not so much replaced by the factions as chaimelled by 
them. As Neal Blewett observed ofthe Labor party, '[tjhe young aspiring politician 
tended to be inducted early into a faction and within it he or she fashioned his or her 
political career'."^ ^ Factions are an example of a formalisation of practices of the 
accumulation of power in a party, but the existence of factions does not mean that 
they invented anti-competitive behaviour. Factions channel competition into narrow 
confines, in order that players may compete at the next highest level within the party. 
The proof of their influence on competition and faimess and integrity has to be 
assessed against the criteria set out for all contestants, factional or not. 
McAllister's view on factionalism in the Ausfralian party system is that they are 
'political parties in miniature'.^^ Factions in parties, just as parties do within the 
electorate, seek to represent those of similar interest or background. The two parties. 
Labor and Liberal, which in their own right seek, or aspire to a majority of the 
parliament, mcorporate factions. The factions are devices that enable broad parties to 
remain intact. Much of the work of the party is thus taken up in the negotiations 
__ '?ft 
between factions. The Labor party has formal factions, the Liberal party has 
'tendencies'.^^ The Labor factions are formal, not in the sense of being recognised by 
party mles, but in the sense that party members will join a faction, often pay a fee for 
the privilege and meet in absolute exclusion of any other faction or faction member. 
The source of formal Labor factionalism is the affiliation of frade unions. These are 
an example of a captive and organised membership where 'that organization may then 
^* McAUister, I. 1991. 'Party Adaptation and FactionaUsm withui the AustraUan Party System.' 
Americcm Journal of Political Science 35(1): 225. 
" Bean, C. and I. McAlUster, 1989. 'Factions and Tendencies in the AustraUan PoUtical Party System.' 
Politics 24(2): 93. 
^^  Blewett, N. 1999. A Cabinet Diary: A Personal Record ofthe First Keating Govemment. Adelaide: 
Wakefield Press, 66. 
"McAUister, 1991. 'Party Adaptation and FactionaUsm', 209. 
^ Lloyd. C. and W. Swan, 1987. 'National Factions and tiie ALP.' Politics 22(1): 100-10, 22(2): 103-
4. 
^' Senator-elect Brett Mason, LPA Q. Interview, 13 July 1998. Former Senator Christopher PupUck, 
LPA NSW. Interview, 8 December 1998. 
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be able to get the resources to support a lobby'.^° Further, the ability of affiliated 
unions to have their entire delegation vote as a bloc is the very essence of their power. 
In this way, the affiliation mles are both the source of and the proof of their power. 
The other major parties have no equivalent organisations affiliated to their 
organisational wing and therefore no such base for factionalism. 
The Liberal party 'tendencies' are popularly described as factions, more because of 
the dominance of debate in the media about the Labor party than any characteristics 
of the Liberal party. The Liberal party has fewer formal meetings and fewer fonnal 
conditions for membership of their groups than does Labor. Nevertheless, there are 
identifiable groups in all divisions of the Liberal party, but less so at the national or 
Federal caucus level. The Labor party's factions are ever-present, at national, 
divisional and caucus levels. There is no evidence in the literature or in news reports 
ofthe existence of factions or tendencies in the National party '^ or the Democrats. ^ ^ 
The reason may be that these parties do not aspire to a majority position in the 
electorate, so the views of their membership may not be as broad as the Labor and 
Liberal parties. In addition, compared with the Labor and Liberal parliamentary 
caucuses, their numbers are small, perhaps too small to sustain factions. This is not to 
suggest there will not be, from time to time, a series of shifting alliances among party 
members. 
Considering rules and factions together, the Labor party in each of its State divisions 
has the most sophisticated set of rules and the most formal membership of factions. 
The Liberal party has also sophisticated rules in its divisions, though less formal 
membership of factions. The National party has the least sophisticated set of rules and 
is free of factions. The Democrats have a sophisticated set of national rules and no 
formal factions. There is no clear relationship between rules and formality, at least as 
suggested by the presence of factions. 
°^ Olson, M. 1971. The Logic of Collective Action. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 133. 
" Senator Hon Ron BosweU, NPA Q. Interview, 22 February 1999. Gary Nehl MHR, NPA NSW. 
Interview, 18 November 1997. 
^^  Senator John Woodley, AD Q. Interview, 14 December 1998. 
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The tiiree tests of party democracy outlined in Diagram 3.1—competition, fair 
procedures and the integrity of the free association of the membership—will each 
contribute to the overall assessment of the performance of the parties. Further, the 
rules of the parties provide a clear basis for evaluating some aspects of the 
competition and the procedures in the parties. The mles may shed light on both the 
formal and informal aspects of behaviour. Additional aspects of behaviour, those 
where the rules do not provide a sufficient guide to behaviour, will be analysed by 
means of case studies of individuals involved in preselections. These matters are 
discussed below, in the section on method. 
Competitive Selection Panels 
The major Ausfralian parties preselect thefr parliamentary candidates by using panels 
of party members. The party deems these members to be qualified to vote for the 
candidates. How they come to be chosen, the sections ofthe party they represent, and 
the way in which their votes are combined, constitute the formal stmctures that 
govem preselection. Ideally, a competitive selection panel will be a panel that 
consists of all members. However, this may be cumbersome and costly. A reasonable 
limit to competition should be determined by the rules of cost-efficient voting.^ ^ Cost-
efficient voting suggests that the cost of decisions rises with the number of persons 
involved and the time taken to decide. The cost of decision-making needs to be 
balanced against the cost bome by those who disapprove of the decision, the losers. 
High costs result in the loss of members. Parties therefore need to establish the 
acceptable limits to competition, while preserving discipline and freedom of 
association—in Hirschman's renowned phrase, to find 'the elusive optimal mix of 
exit and voice'.^'' As unanimity is too expensive, some form of majority needs to be 
agreed in advance. Hirschman's analysis implies a self-correcting mechanism in the 
parties. A party that condones rough play will be punished by a loss of members. The 
purpose is not to judge the optimal mix of forces or to ponder the degree of 
^' Mercuro, N. and S.G. Medema, 1997. Economics and the Law: from Posner to Post-modemism. 
Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 88. 
34 Hrschman, AO. 1970. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 120. 
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provocation that may cause some members to leave. Democratic decision-making in a 
party does not require a perfectly dispersed voting process. 
Fiuthermore, competition between members requires a reasonable 'expression of 
pressures from below',^^ that is, between members and leaders in the selection of 
candidates. In this instance, there should be some balance between the various formal 
elements of a party membership. For example, branch members in the constituency, 
branch members in other constituencies, affiliated unions, and members of the 
executive and so on. The test of reasonable competition within the confines of cost-
efficient voting will be the weight of votes of various elements ofthe party present in 
the panels. The measure is designed to find anti-competitive panels. Such panels 
prevent a formal 'group' from expressing their opinion by way of voting and have a 
realistic chance of effecting an outcome favoured by them. Informal 'groups' and 
their impact on competition will be infroduced at a later point in the analysis. 
Although there are only four major parties, the federal nature of Ausfralian politics 
means that each is comprised of State and Territory divisions, each with its own 
constitution and rules. In addition, each may be registered separately with the 
Ausfralian Electoral Commission.^ ^ The two largest parties, the Labor party and the 
Liberal party^^ successfiilly stand candidates in each State and two Territories (16 
cases), the Nationals run candidates successfully in predominantly rural areas in 3 
States (3 cases) and the Democrats for the Senate only (1 case, national rules). The 
parties do not uniformly adopt a single type of selection panel. The design of the 
panels is the preserve of each party division. This means that each party in each 
division will have a different set of rules, in particular, rules that govem their panels. 
In Table 3.1, all of the panels used by the major Australian parties are listed. 
Gallagher and Marsh's^* typology of selection panels is adapted and used to provide a 
guide to the types of panels, and the number of preselection contests which take place 
under each panel type is recorded. 
" Sartori, 1976. Parties and Party Systems, 283. 
^ Austrahan Electoral Commission, 2000a. Federal Registration of Political Parties, 7.1. 
" The Country Liberal Party (Northem Territory) Member's caucus with either the Liberal or National 
parties, but the CLP is an autonomous party. 
GaUagher and Marsh, eds. 1988. Candidate Selection, 237. 
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The Table is arranged with the most dispersed form of preselection panel to the left, 
through to the most aggregated to the right. The number of candidates selected to 
contest House of Representative and Senate seats in 1996 is distributed along the 
table. Type-one panels consist of a plebiscite of all eligible party members in the 
constituency. There were 67 contests for endorsement for the House of 
Representatives and 6 for the Senate determined by the four major parties using this 
type of panel. Type-two panels consist of local party delegates only and applied to 17 
House of Representatives and 3 Senate major party endorsements. 
Table 3.1: Voting Panels Used by Major Parties for Candidate Selection, 1996 
1 1 
Plebiscite 
of Local 
Branch 
Members 
67(6) 
2 
Vote of 
Local 
Party 
Delegates 
17(3) 
3 
Local 
Plebiscite 
and 
Central 
Panel 
93(3) 
4 
Local 
Delegates 
and 
Central 
Panel 
133 
1 ' 
\ Central 
Panel and 
other 
Delegates: 
Senate 
1 (26) 
6 
Union and 
other 
Delegates: 
Senate 
Sources: 
ModeUed after GaUagher and Marsh, eds. 1988. Candidate Selection, 237. 
For number of endorsed candidates. Department of ParUamentary Library, 1996-97. Federal Elections 
1996, Table 2, page 4 and Table 14, page 55. 
For types of panels, mles of the major parties (Labor, Liberal, National, Democrat) m the study as 
referenced. 
Note: 
Numbers refer to the preselections for the House of Representatives and (Senate) m that type of panel. 
Type-three panels consist of a combination ofthe local plebiscite and a cenfral panel 
of delegates from other constituencies, including peuty officers and parliamentary 
leaders. Ninety-three endorsements for the House of Representatives and 3 for the 
Senate took place using this type of panel. Type-four panels consist of a combination 
of local delegates and a cenfral panel. One hundred and thirty three endorsements for 
the House of Representatives and none for the Senate used this type of panel. Type-
five panels are found in the Liberal and National parties for the endorsement of 
Senate candidates (where the seat represents the entire party division, that is, tiie State 
or Territory). Delegates from all areas combine with the central panel, wWch consists 
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of the party executive and parliamentary leaders. Twenty-six Senate candidates were 
endorsed using this type of panel. Type-six panels are found in the Labor party for the 
endorsement of Senate candidates and consist of a central panel in which the 
affiliated unions have a predetermined proportion of the vote. Twenty Senate 
candidates were endorsed using this type of panel. 
The Democrats have a central panel with local consultation for House of 
Representative endorsements; otherwise, there is a postal plebiscite of all eligible 
members in the division. The reason for the former is the very small number of party 
members. The party is virtually without a branch presence in most electorates. Labor, 
the Democrats and the Liberals allow an appeal to be heard and decided by their 
respective National Executives but these do not constitute a selection panel in the first 
instance. 
There are dangers in being too dogmatic about the degree of competition allowed for 
in a particular panel. It would be difficult to conclude that only a plebiscite of eligible 
members in a particular district constitutes the most democratic outcome. For 
example, in the Labor party, party members in other districts and union affiliates may 
have a legitimate view about the district and its candidate. The stmcture of panels has 
much to do with the contest over different views of the quality of the candidate and 
sharing power between local and State or national interests. It also has much to do 
with other motives. Witness, Leo McLeay MHR, 'There's always been a desire by 
party officers ... to have a cenfralised preselection system ... That gives people in the 
party office a whole lot more power. They might say it's about having better 
candidates, but it's about them having more power'. 
As Bob Hogg, former National Secretaiy ofthe Labor party, argued 'it is possible the 
good results [wiiming elections] are due to the informal process as much as being a 
result ofthe preselection system. However, some systems are so designed that they do 
not in a stmctural sense bring about the creative tension that forces people to talk 
across the board and give consideration to nationaiystate-wide interests and 
' ' Cumming, \99\. Mates, 227. 
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responsibilities as well as local interests'.'*^ In other words, some stmctures are so 
anti-competitive as to encourage questionable behaviour, but many different types are 
consistent with democratic practice. 
Where preselection processes are deficient, the outcome will be imdemocratic 
regardless of the stmcture in which they are embedded. Graham Richardson, former 
secretary of the NSW Labor party has described his role in sacking left-wing 
delegates from right-wing union delegations. He remarked 'we would try ... to kick 
out the bad guys and have the good guys in ... There's nothing wrong with that; this is 
a hard game!''" Some panels in the Labor party are stmctured to ensure union power. 
To appreciate how the accumulation of power occurs, at least in a formal sense, 
requires knowledge of a fiirther rule: the mle under which the unions affiliate to the 
party. This rule will often allow the leader ofthe union to hand-pick the delegates that 
the affiliation wartants. That the political faction-minder then manages these 
'numbers' is a matter of discovery and insight. The way it occurs, though, is through 
the particular mles that facilitate such behaviour, rules that make for entirely anti-
competitive behaviour. 
The method of voting may be very important in determining the outcome of a 
preselection ballot. It is difficult, however, to argue that one method is democratic 
and another not, only that one may produce a clearer outcome or allow for a share of 
candidates among groups in a party. There is a critical point to be made about the use 
of plurality (winner-take-all), preferential and proportional representation voting 
systems'*^ in parties. The Labor party in all divisions uses proportional representation 
to allow two or three factions to share power. The device does not, however, as some 
observers"' have suggested, produce the factions. In terms ofthe impact ofthe voting 
system, the factions are more likely the product of the method of the affiliation of 
^ Hogg, R. 1989. 'A Report and Assessment of ALP Preselection Systems and Long Term 
Organisational Questions'. Canberra: ALP National Executive Minutes, 22 September. (Mimeo) 5. 
"" Cummmg, 1991. Labor Mates, 247. 
*^ PluraUty, preferential and proportional representative voting systems are discussed ui Taylor, P. and 
R Johnston, 1979. (Jeogrcphy of Elections. London: Croom Helm, at respectively 40, 50 and 53. 
*^ Sartori, 1976. Parties and Party Systems, 98. He argues that a proportional representative system 
aUows a high d^ree of factionaUsm. Formal factions have existed m the Labor party under 'proportional 
representation' and 'winner-take-aU' systems. 
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unions where the union secretary selects union delegates to party forums on a winner-
take-all basis. In the Liberal and National parties, formal factions are less common, as 
is the lack of bloc voting as-of-right. A wiimer-take-all system produces the difficulty 
in the Liberal party whereby, if factionalism does arise, the executive, which 
constitutes a part of the cenfral component of the panels, has, to all intents and 
purposes, a bloc vote. Another version of the winner-take-all syndrome is 
"managerialist". Senator Hon. Ron Boswell has observed of the National party in 
Queensland, '[r|n a preselection, management tend to vote in a bloc'.'''* In the case of 
the National party, neither the stmcture of the panels nor the rules of affiliation, nor 
the voting system appear to be critical. Rather, there is a propensity among members 
of the party to leave certain decisions to more experienced people, which suggests a 
deferential ethos not found in the Labor or Liberal parties. That people vote as a bloc 
is an important sign of the accumulation of power and a possible pointer to anti-
competitive behaviour. Accounting for such behaviour and suggesting remedies is 
another and more difficult matter. 
In a ballot for a single position, the vote may be preferential or exhaustive. In effect, 
both of these methods produce a showdown between the two most popular 
candidates. The preferential method forces the issue at a single ballot. The second 
may take many ballots'*^ before a wirmer is determined. The wiimer in both cases is 
the one who records a majority of the votes cast. TTie potential for anti-democratic 
behaviour will vary with each. A show-and-tell ballot, where ballot papers are shown 
to another voter in order to satisfy those concemed that a 'deal' has been abided by is 
more likely in a single ballot. In a multiple ballot, there is a propensity to use the time 
between ballots to conduct fiirther negotiations, but not necessarily of an anti-
democratic kind. 'At each successive vote in the series of exhaustive ballots that was 
used to eliminate the candidates, I [Neil Brown] had stayed in the ballot by only a 
vote or two, until most ofthe local rivals had killed each other off.'** The variation in 
behaviour, however, is not generated by the voting system so much because the voting 
** Interview, 22 February 1999. 
'*' Andrew Peacock was preselected in 1966 for the seat of Kooyong for the LPA V. He won after five 
baUots. Carey. J. and T. McCrae, 1982. Peacock M.P. Adelaide: Rigby, 56. 
^ Brown, N. 1993. On the Other Hcmd: Sketches and Reflections From Political Life. Canberra: The 
Poplar Press, 26. 
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systems afford different opportunities for different strategies, including foul play. The 
issue does arise in a minor role in the context of the informal mles of play and is 
canvassed in Chapter 7, but it has not been presented as a separate category of 
analysis. 
Fair Processes 
The standard of faimess to be applied to party processes is problematic. If the party 
agrees that they are fair, then, in a sense, they are fair. Nevertheless, if the mles were 
written based on a pre-existing unfairness or uncompetitiveness, they may be unfair. 
Such mles may afford advantage to one group at the expense of another. In these 
circumstances, it is essential to apply a standard with the widest possible application. 
There is a set of standards, written by the parties in govemment, and accepted by the 
public. These are the mles for parliamentary elections. The Commonwealth Electoral 
Act is a legislative guide to fair public electoral procedures. It was devised by the 
major parties, largely on an agreed basis, to provide fafr rules of play in the 
competition for votes between the parties. It may provide a means to measure the 
faimess of the competition for votes within the parties. Whether it should be applied, 
as a matter of policy, is a matter discussed below. For now, the aim is to apply some 
fundamental principles of wide acceptability to the conduct of candidate preselection 
ballots. 
The first operational element is the extent to which any party mles and processes 
goveming preselection are inconsistent with procedural faimess as defmed in the Act. 
Any party that breaches such mles should at least have a convincing reason for why it 
does not adhere to such standards in its intemal operations. The Commonwealth 
Electoral Act 1918 contains provisions for a number of principles that may be 
regarded as fimdamental to a fair electoral system. Six of the most fimdamental have 
been chosen to test the parties and are set out in Table 3.2. below. The Table contains 
the principles to be applied to the parties' mles, and the corresponding provisions in 
the order in which tiiey appear in the Act. 
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The first principle, equal weight of votes or 'one-vote, one-value', applies to elections 
for the House of Representatives. Strict rules against malapportionment ensure that 
the number of electors in each electorate differs from the average by no more than ten 
percent (although the quota between the States can vary more widely). While the mle 
does not apply to the Senate, and is not universally applied throughout all legislative 
chambers in Australia, it is an enduring principle and is unlikely to be legislatively 
overtumed. 
Table 3.2: Six Principles for Fair Elections: the Commonwealth Electoral Act 
Principle j Part or Section ofthe Commonwealth Electoral Act 
'ii 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - ^ - . . . ^ . ^ - ^ ^ - ^ ^ ™ ^ - ™ ^ • - - . . ^ - - . ^ - ^ - - ^ • - ^ - • 
One-Vote, One-Value | 
I S. 5 9 (10) Malapportionment 
I Integrity ofthe Roil 
1 S. 90 Inspection of Rolls 
I S. 91C Provide a Certified List of Voters to Candidates 
1 S. 105 Alteration of RoUs 
I 
IS . 114 Objection to Enrolment 
I S. 326 Bribery 
Equal Application of the | 
Qualification to Vote or Nominate | P. VII Qualifications for Enrolment... 
I S. 99 Claims for Enrolment... 
I S. 163 Qualification for Nomination 
Fair Conduct of Ballot 
i S. 155 Date for Close of RoU 
if 
;i S. 156 Date of Nomination 
I S. 157 Date of Polling 
I S. 219 Participation by Candidate in Conduct of Election 
I S. 263 Scmtiny 
I P. XXI Electoral Offences 
Secret Ballot 
S. 206 Separate Voting Compartments 
S. 207 Secure BaUot Boxes 
S. 233 Vote to be Marked in Private 
Access to Fair Dispute Procedures j 
I P^jQQI Court of Disputed Retums 
Source: Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918. 
The second principle, the integrity of the roll of voters, is fiindamental to a fair 
election. The right to inspect the roll, for copies to be made available to candidates 
and on equal terms, the right to object to the inclusion or exclusion of voters, as well 
as defining responsibility for keeping the roll and ensuring the independence and 
integrity ofthe keeper(s) ofthe roll are components ofthe principle. The absence, or 
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poor specification, of mles in these regards would be fatal to fair play. An additional 
matter is bribing a voter, which is an offence under the Act and may occur at the point 
of voting. This element of the integrity of the rolls, arguably, may also occur at the 
point of paying for another person's membership, and is an issue taken up below in 
the discussion ofthe test of freedom of association. 
The third principle, the ability to define the qualification to vote or stand, is very 
important. The actual qualifications stated in the Act are not the issue; for instance, 
there is no reason why a party should restrict membership to citizens. The interest, 
however, lies in the mles that the parties have designed to allow or disallow members 
to vote or stand, and the misapplication of mles to deny candidates support or deny 
candidates' eligibility to stand. 
The fourth principle, the fair conduct of the ballot, requires that the individual voter 
not be subject to any interference during the conduct of the ballot. Various other 
offences are nominated in the Act such as issuing deceptive publications, falsely 
claiming a vote, defaming a candidate, forging ballot papers and so on. Further, a 
proper scmtiny of the ballot should be ensured, and proper notice should be given for 
all of the important elements of the election such as the time to nominate and to 
conduct the poll. 
The fifth principle is the secret ballot, a widely accepted and fiindamental principle of 
democratic elections.'*^ A ballot should be conducted in private and the prerequisites 
for this are the provision of separate voting compartments and a secure ballot box for 
placing ballot papers. 
The sixth principle, the provision of dispute procedures, is an important element of 
fair elections. The principle is not extended to an independent source of dispute 
resolution, as applies to a general election. The need for an independent tribunal 
would require a sfrong argument against the right of private association. Nevertheless, 
a party should be able to hear and decide matters that concem an alleged breach of 
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party mles in circumstances that allow for a fair hearing. Where mles are breached 
but there is little recourse to a remedy, it could be concluded that the intention to 
conduct preselections fairly is not firm. 
These principles will be used to audit the mles of each of the parties with respect to 
fair process. 
Freedom of Association 
Parties are seen to be legitimate political organisations if they maintain sufficient 
electoral support, although their vitality, based on membership numbers,'** especially 
those involved in the candidate selection process,'*^ plays some part. A party is 
legitimate if a substantial portion of the electorate, for whatever reasons, accepts it. 
Its actions are justified in the act of acceptance. The integrity of a party is a different 
concept. It derives its substance from the requirements of free association— 
requirements such as the creation of acceptable mles for joining and expelling 
members, and virtue in the performance of certain tasks, such as meeting procedures, 
creating policies and keeping records. Most important for the purposes of preselection 
is the creation of a group of voters who undertake the task of preselection in the full 
knowledge of what they do. A party that fails in these tasks lacks organisational 
integrity. A party lacking integrity may not be illegitimate. However, its legitimacy 
may be damaged should a lack of integrity reach significant proportions. 
There are many good reasons why most people will not become involved in a political 
party. Olson's^^ 'paradox of participation', the principle that for most participants the 
rewards do not justify the costs of joining, is a powerftil explanation of why the 
numbers of those joining a political party are small relative to the voting population. 
Others will make the effort to become politically active but participate in other 
forums, such as interest groups.^' Indeed, the motivation of those who join political 
"*' It does have detractors; see Brennan, G. and L. Lomasky, 1993. Democracy and Decision. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 218. 
'*^  Webb, 1995. 'Are British Political Parties ...', 302. 
"" Ware, A. 1992. 'Activist-Leader Relations: "Exchange" Models and Vote-Seeking Behaviour in 
Parties.' British Joumal of Political Science 22: 74. 
'"Olson, 1971. The Logic of Collective Action, 11. 
' ' Richardson, 1995. 'Interest Groups and Representation', 61. 
52 
Measuring Party Democracy 
parties will vary widely.^' For whatever reasons, sufficient people have overcome the 
cost of collective decision-making^ and volunteered to join a political party. 
Obviously, members of parties are different to the rest ofthe electorate by the fact of 
their membership. Taken as a collective, the behaviour of these freely associating 
individuals will determine the integrity ofthe process of preselection. 
A fundamental element of the freedom of association is the distinction between a 
person who votes for the party and a party member. Only the latter, in fact a sub-
category of the latter, has the right to vote in a party ballot. The assumption is that if 
there is no distinction between members and non-members, or if the members have 
been forced to join, or are unaware of the aims and objectives of the association, or 
join unknowingly, then freedom of association is breached. If a distinction is made on 
the groimds of the member having a greater commitment than the voter to the ideals 
or objectives of the party, how then to distinguish between the member who joined 
yesterday and one who joined ten years ago, or one who joined only for the purpose of 
taking part in the ballot? The parties have clear mles to establish the qualification of 
members to vote in a ballot. They also make judgements about the virtues of 
qualifications. These may be entirely practical. For example, restricting the right to 
vote to members of long-standing would dissuade joiners. Nevertheless, giving every 
voter a say, regardless of membership, would desfroy the reason to join. 
Freedom of association and competition may be diminished when too few compete. 
While size is not critical, very small numbers are a concem to parties. Most 
Ausfralian parties allow for the intervention of the party adminisfration in 
circumstances where the number of members involved in a ballot is small. A small 
pool of members may lead to an unsafe choice^ "* of candidate. Party mles also allow 
for the intervention of the party adminisfration in circumstances where too few 
candidates stand. New candidates may be invited to stand and competition is 
" Whiteley, P., P. Seyd, J. Richardson and P. Bissell, 1993. 'Explainmg Party Activism: The Case ofthe 
British Conservative Party.' British Joumal of Political Science 24: 79. 
" Schlozman, K. etai, 1995. 'Participation's Not a Paradox: From a Study of American Activists' 
British Journal of Political Science 25:1. 
^* Just eight local Liberal party delegates in Oxley selected Pauline Hanson. She was disendorsed as an 
unsuitable candidate during the 1996 election, too late to be replaced on the baUot paper. Conversation 
with John Blake, campaign director for EUzabeth Grace MHR, LPA Q, 29 April 1998. 
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enhanced. However, if the numbers are small because a local candidate or their 
accomplice closes the books to new joiners, the result lacks integrity. It brings into 
question the ability of the party to perform the role of conducting preselections. The 
practice of signing up new members en masse (sometimes called 'branch stacking' or 
'exuberant democracy') in time for a preselection has the potential to change the 
character of a party. It is a matter for the parties whether the mles are restrictive and 
are a disincentive, or open and are an incentive, to stack. ^ ^ Either extreme, however, 
may result in an abuse ofthe free association ofthe membership. 
Recmiting, and sometimes the restriction of the membership, may rely on access to 
superior resources, or knowledge. The former Westem Ausfralian Liberal Senator, 
Noel Crichton-Browne estimated that he signed up (but did not pay for) 10,000 
members ofthe Liberal part}' division in Westem Ausfralia in a fifteen-year period.^ ^ 
That amount of effort and the recruits' loyalty gave him immense power in the 
division. The fact that it flowed from an estimated $1-1.5 million of his personal 
finances expended in travel and accommodation during the period did not necessarily 
make it imdemocratic. Others are free to work and expend as they please. Similarly, if 
vote buying is forbidden, the mles of a party may be invoked. Where it is not 
forbidden,^ ^ 'organising' cannot be held to be imdemocratic in the sense of being 
unfair. Neither can it be anti-competitive; in fact, it is exfremely competitive. 
However, these behaviours do raise the issue of the ability of a party to distinguish 
itself from the rest ofthe electorate. It may suggest that there is nothihg to distinguish 
this group of voters from any other. It raises the question, why should this group of 
voters have the right to preselect candidates for public office, and others not be 
allowed to do so? 
The Commonwealth Electoral Act contains a prohibition on bribery of a voter. It 
specifies that, 'A person shall not ask for, receive or obtain, ... any property or benefit 
" Robinson, S. 1996. 'Remarks' In The Paradox of Parties: Australian Political Parties, ed. M. 
Simms. Sydney: AUen and UnvWn, 59. 
^ hiterview, 13 August 1998. 
" There is no mle in South Australia Labor forbidding vote buying, but the allegation that 'membership 
fees for the [2,000] "new members" were paid by about eight to ten persons ... the total of these fees 
was $41,937,' was central to the successfiil 1999 court injunction by Clarke against the party executive. 
Clarke v ALP (2 September 1999), 3. 
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of any kind, ... on an understanding that ... any vote ofthe first-mentioned person ... 
any candidature ofthe first-mentioned person ... will, in any manner, be influenced or 
affected'. It further specifies that, 'A person shall not in order to influence or affect 
... any vote of another person ... any candidature of another person ... give or confer, 
... any property or benefit of any kind to that other person or to a third person'.^^ 
Signing-up a person to become a member of a political party and paying the 
membership fee on their behalf is a matter of some controversy. It may be tantamount 
to an inducement to vote. However, joining and voting are two separate acts, so it 
may not be reasonable to rely on the prohibition on bribing a voter as a principle to 
assess the payment of membership fees by others. In a sense, a vote is always cast in 
expectation of some reward, however remote. On the other hand, a political party, 
which contains a large proportion of people whose membership fees have been paid 
by others, is clearly undermining its own claim to be different to the wider electorate. 
In such circumstances, a party cannot be said to be an association of free individuals. 
Party officials worry that the candidacy of someone selected by a group of people 
who join at the last moment before a ballot lacks integrity. According to former NSW 
Labor party secretary and Senator, Graham Richardson, '[I]n New South Wales, 
where branch votes coimt for everything, the next few years may well see the party 
stalwarts replaced by "stackers" with no party history ... the Labor Party will be the 
ultimate loser'.^^ The practice is, on the surface, certainly competitive. It is fair in the 
sense that it may fall within the mles and be available to all sides. At another level 
though, the lack of experience among members may ensure that the decisions are 
confined to a closed circle of activists, and therefore is anti-competitive. A dramatic 
loss of membership may be just as damaging to a party. In the NSW Liberal party, 
membership dropped from neariy 45,000 in the 1980s to 13,000 in the eariy 1990s 
after 'vicious' faction fighting.^ In these examples, the average experience and 
longevity of the membership has declined in the party with the stacking, and in the 
party with the loss of membership. In some respects, competition may well be 
diminished in both. 
'* Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, Section 326. 
*' Richardson, G. 1994. Whatever It Takes. Sydney: Bantam, 62. 
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Another questionable practice is the recmitment of large numbers of 'ethnic' 
members. In this case, the membership may object but formal mles to exclude 
members because of their ethnicity would be impossible without invoking a wider 
issue of discrimination. Michael Johnson, Liberal party activist in the Federal seat of 
Ryan, has experienced considerable pressure from other members to withdraw his 
nomination, among other reasons, for the disquiet that he has caused by being able to 
recruit over 200 new members to the Liberal party mainly from the Chinese 
commimity.^ ' The concern about ethnic branch stacking has two bases. Ffrst, the 
disquiet at a group winning voting rights, despite the fact that they allegedly have no 
idea of what they are being asked to do. The other, the fact that such numbers are 
confrollable and are therefore a power to be reckoned with. Allegedly, 60 members of 
the Greek community would, without demur, raise their hands at meetings of the 
Victorian Labor Left faction at the request of Theo Theophanous MLC.^ ^ Arguably, 
the practice arises out of a competitive urge, and is not against the mles, but the effect 
may be anti-competitive. 
A deal between factions to join forces in support of certain candidates does not 
necessarily breach the freedom of association. Factions tend to concenfrate power in 
few hands but this may occur by consent and rely on an exchange between leaders 
and members. 'The [Labor NSW] Right... was a feudal system ... You got in a queue 
and you got rewarded... And that's how the kept the political party together'.^^ Then 
again, it may be a gift built on loyalty, deference or ignorance. A high concentration 
of power in few hands suggests anti-competitive practice, which practice seeks to 
make outcomes more predictable. A predictable outcome is prima facie evidence of 
confrol and antipathetic to competition. The ability to negotiate a whole series of 
outcomes at one time or even several years ahead, as occurs in cross-factional deals in 
the Labor party, is a clear indication of oligarchy. The competition between factions 
is intense but for non-faction players is non-existent. 
^ Christopher Puplick. Interview, 8 December 1998. Leser, D. 1994. Bronwyn Bishop: A Woman in 
PursuU of Power. Melboume: Text Publishing, 65, 72. 
'^ Michael Johnson. Interviews, March-April 1999. 
" Senator Bamey Cooney, ALP V. Interviews, 19, 26 November 1997. 
63 Hon Leo McLeay MHR, ALP NSW. In Cumming, 1991. Mates, 242. 
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Democracy does not mean that competition for recmits or, more widely, preselection 
deals are not made or that people are not persuaded or cajoled into making a decision. 
A deal designed to secure a given outcome when based on a competitive panel and 
procedural faimess may be democratic. Practices which call into question the 
distinction between the party member and all other electors raises the question ofthe 
integrity of the freedom of association and indeed the legitimacy of the party to 
perform its role. 
The Methods 
The primary data to be used in the three tests of party democracy—competition, 
faimess and integrity—are the mles of the parties. In the first instance, the mles of 
each party in each division are used to evaluate the competitive characteristics of the 
panels of voters. Second, the mles will be audited to see if they are consistent with the 
six principles derived from the Electoral Act. The audit will provide a firm basis to 
draw conclusions about party behaviour. It will also provide a base for the case 
studies to shed further light on party behaviour. Further, the parties' performance at 
managing their mles will be evaluated. A simple pass or fail on the audit may not 
allow for the fact of good intentions not being fiilfilled. More likely, the performance 
ofthe parties in managing their mles will lend itself to a more informed debate on the 
issue of whether the parties' overall performance is sufficiently weak to wartant 
outside scmtiny. 
In addition to the audit ofthe mles, there is a series of interviews with candidates and 
some administrators, to assess the systems in practice. Additional sources of data 
were the media and biographies of former Members of Parliament. Preselections are 
generally undertaken in private and are not readily accessible by the media, so 
coverage is ertatic. A search of newspaper files for the period January 1996-
December 2000 found reference to a handful of contests.^ Eighteen biographies were 
used as a supplementary source of data. These are listed in Appendix three. 
^'^ Author search of The Adelaide Review, The Age, The Australian, The Australian Financial Review, 
The Courier-MaU and The Sydney Morning Herald. 
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The purposes of the audit of the rules are to search for breaches of the tests, and the 
source of ertors in the system. As well, the audit aims to produce a typology of 
preselections to indicate the conditions under which democratic practices are more or 
less likely to occur. The scope of the study is limited only to those parties who 
successfully stood candidates at the 1996 election. This is to ensure that the mles are 
relevant in the light of the experience of elections. The exception to this is the data 
from numerous biographies of mostiy contemporary preselections where these are 
particulariy insightful. A number of other party activists are referted to in the text. For 
the practical purpose of interviewing candidates, successfiil candidates are mostly 
selected, unsuccessful ones are not necessarily easy to trace. The question is whether 
any bias is introduced by selecting only the wirmers. Would the losers have a different 
story to tell? It is likely that the winner and the loser in the same contest experienced 
different aspects of the same preselection, and that two or more views would be 
valuable. Apart from the instances of cheating (it would hardly make any difference 
whether the cheat was a winner or a loser as neither are likely to confess) the factors 
at play would be the same. The results of the interviews, biographies and newspaper 
reports indicate that examples of cheating are few. The instances of procedures and 
mles that are meant to favour one candidate over another, however, are evident and 
these are as likely to be known by the winner as the loser. The results of the 
interviews have in fact proved this assumption cortect. 
The accuracy of tiie study relies not so much on the verification of events by the 
traditional means of listening to two sides ofthe story, but of ensuring that there are a 
suf!icient number of stories to cover the field of potential faults. As the important 
variables in the study are likely to be, for example, the stmcture of the panels and 
access to legitimate dispute procedures, two views of the experience of one panel or 
dispute would not necessarily expand the picture. Selections were made with the 
primary objective being to develop the picture of the artay of actual and potential 
faults in the systems. So long as the material gathered was valid, that is, first hand and 
with no obvious reason to disbelieve the interviewee, the data were accepted. 
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Table 3.3: Members ofthe Major Parties in the Australian Parliament, 1996 
•arty \ Democrat i Labor \ Liberal C National 
Source: 
Department of Parliamentary Library, 1996-97. Federal Elections 1996, 3, 59. 
Notes: 
The Members of the House of Representative (MHR) are elected one per electorate. The number of 
electorates is in proportion to the number of electors in each State (except Tasmania where there are 
five electorates regardless of population). The Senators (SEN) are elected six per State and two for each 
ofthe two Territories. There were five Independent MP's (three of whom had been elected previously 
on a party ticket and lost endorsement. Each failed at the 1998 election), one Country/Liberal party 
Senator, two Green Senators and one Independent Senator. 
Cooperation from interviewees was excellent. One reason for this may be that the 
researcher was known to many ofthe interviewees. A second may be that a number of 
more experienced members were chosen. These interviewees may have felt less 
consfrained to discuss issues than was the case earlier in their political career. The 
major variables in the determination ofthe mles of preselection were the parties, and 
the panels and the chamber for which candidates were selected. The number of 
candidates selected for each panel is set out in Table 3.1. The numbers of members 
elected for each chamber and party is set out in Table 3.3. These two sets of data 
provided the basic sampling framework for the audit ofthe mles. Clearly, the bulk of 
members are concenfrated in the larger States and the two main parties. Labor and 
Liberal. 
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Table 3.4: Interviews Conducted in Each Type of Voting Panel 
Category 1 Plebiscite of Local Branch Category 2 Vote of Local Party Delegates 
Members 
Baldwin (Sydney) safe Labor 
Hoare (Charlton) safe Labor 
HoUis (Throsby) safe Labor 
Melham (Banks) safe Labor' 
Plibersek (Sydney) safe Labor 
Woodley (Senate Qld.) Democrat 
Hicks (Riverina) marginal National 
Nehl (Cowper) safe National 
Category 3 Local Plebiscite and Central Panel 
Denman (Senate Tas.) Labor 
Griffiths (Maribymong) safe Labor 
Johnson (Ryan) safe Liberal 
KeUy (Dawson) marginal National 
McDougall (GrifBth) marginal Liberal 
O'Connor (Corio) safe Labor 
Sawford (Pt. Adelaide) safe Labor'^  
Scott (Oxley) safe Labor 
Smith (Dickson) marginal Liberal 
Theophanous (CalweU) safe Labor 
Thomson (WiUs) safe Labor 
Category 4 Local Delegates and Central 
Panel 
Abbott (Warringah) safe Liberal 
Andrew (Wakefield) safe Liberal 
CampbeU (Kalgoorlie) safe Ind/Labor 
Hawker (Wannon) safe Literal 
Lieberman (Indi) safe Liberal 
McArthur (Corangamite) safe Liberal 
McGauran (Gippsland) safe National 
Pyne (Sturt) safe Liberal 
Rocher (Curtin) safe Ind/Liberal 
Thomley (Macquarie) marginal Liberal 
Category 5 Central Panel and other Delegates: 
i; Senate 
te \ Boswell (Senate Qld.) National 
I \ BrownhiU (Senate NSW) National 
I Crichton-Browne (Senate WA) Liberal 
I Mason (Senate Qld.) Liberal 
S; McGibbon (Senate Qld.) Liberal 
i PupUck (Senate NSW) Liberal 
; Stone (Senate Vic. and Fairfax) National 
Category 6 Union and other Delegates: 
Senate 
Beahan (Senate WA) Labor 
Cooney (Senate Vic.) Labor 
Crowley (Senate SA) Labor' 
Schacht (Senate SA) Labor' 
Source: 
Author's selection. 
Notes: 
' In addition. National Executive intervention was invoked. 
^ State Executive selection. 
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It is important however, to include the experience in the smaller States and the 
Territories and in the other parties, keeping in mind the comparative scarcity of 
elections and preselections in some States and parties. The sample serves two 
purposes: one is to cover the breadth of the experience of preselections among 
Ausfralia's major parties, and the other to recognise that the bulk ofthe preselection 
experience takes place in the larger States and parties. It is also likely that the 
intensity of the competition may vary depending on the margin of the seat. 
Competition for seats considered safe should be intense because the prize is greater— 
the possibility of a long career and a cabinet post. The prospects for the less safe seats 
are likely to be a short stay in the Parliament. The study of the experience of 
preselection drew on 40 interviews of Members and former Members of Parliament 
Table 3.4) and some party officials, and eighteen biographies. The sample was based 
on the type of panel (Table 3.1) faced by the candidate, and within those categories, 
each party. State, chamber and margin was selected with a view to capturing the 
range of possibilities. 
For example, a category one panel, a direct plebiscite of all members in the district, 
preselected Peter Baldwin. His was a safe House of Representatives seat for Labor, in 
the largest State, NSW. The overwhelming numbers of preselections take place in the 
two largest States, New South Wales and Victoria for the larger of the two major 
parties, Labor and Liberal (93 out of 224). There is no benefit in sampling in 
proportion to these preselections where the same mles and stmctures apply. However, 
any other variables, such as margin of seat or special factors are taken into account. 
Elsewhere, the emphasis is on covering the field of possible mle and panel variations. 
The parties have some national mles, such as appeals to a national executive 
(however constituted), and a number of divisions of different parties in the one State 
may have similar mles arising out of common experiences. 
Some parties have very few preselections. A small party division such as the 
Victorian National party has only 2 seats (3 until recently) and I Senate position and 
some of those seats had been held for many years. With a tendency to leave the 
member alone and mles that favour the member, there is very little endorsement 
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activity or experience. In other parties, in the bigger divisions, and under mles that are 
less dominated by the local member, there is a vast experience of preselections. 
The Questionnaire 
The method of collecting data directly from the sample of candidates was by way of 
stmctured questionnaire. The questionnaire (see Appendix 1) was used as the basis 
for all of the interviews, most of which were taped. When this was not convenient, 
notes were kept. In refrospect, provided the notes were written up immediately 
following the interview, the note method was the cheaper and easier method (see 
Appendix 3). 
The questions were grouped to guide the interviewee to the chronology of events. 
They were designed to map the forces involved in the candidate's path of success, 
including significant influences, sfrategies and stmcture of the process, and any 
disputes in which a candidate was involved. The sfrategy section sought to discover 
the part played by 'significant others' in the candidate's path. This path may have 
been by way of having been recmited to the party, or even firstly into a faction of the 
party. The candidate was asked to assess their confidence at the prospect for success 
as a means of finding out the degree of unpredictability in the outcome. Predictable 
outcomes were assumed an indication, though not proof, of anti-competitive 
outcomes, if not anti-competitive behaviour. The process of the preselection contest 
concenfrated on the degree of competition, including whether any candidates had 
been persuaded to withdraw from the contest. The interviewees were also asked 
whether their result depended on the outcome of other contests, again as an indication 
of methods of confrolling competition. 
The interview data were added to the audit of the mles and the analysis of the panels 
to provide a more complete picture of preselections among successfiil candidates of 
the major parties. The interviews were essential to understand those weaknesses that 
open the parties to a charge of a lack of integrity in their democratic practices. The 
results of the audit of the panels and mles are set out in the following chapter. The 
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discussion of the more informal aspects of the contests, as well an overview of the 
entire analysis ofthe data is set out in Chapter five. 
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The Audit of Party Rules and Selection Panels 
An audit of the mles of the four major parties is designed to judge, in each case, if the 
process of preselection is fair. The measures of faimess are six principles selected from 
the Commonwealth Electoral Act. The mles that govern the preselection processes in 
each party division are set out, often in detail, in the various party constitutions. Each set 
of mles for each party division were read and interpreted as either complying with the 
Act, or failing to comply. Where the mle failed to comply, the way in which it failed is 
presented and discussed. The mles also describe the stmcture ofthe selection panels, the 
combination of party members who have the right to select the candidate. The audit will 
be used to judge if the panels are anti-competitive. A selection panel is anti-competitive 
when any fonnal group in the party has no realistic chance of effecting an outcome 
favoured by them. 
The Selection Panels 
Selection panels comprise party members who are qualified to vote for candidates in a 
preselection. Apart from the merits of the candidates, the ways in which members 
combine, and the interests of the sections of the party they represent, will determine the 
outcome of the contest. The major issue in the constmction of panels is to weigh the 
interests of different parts of the party. In a completely dispersed panel, all members 
would vote for all candidates, in all contests. Each vote would be of equal worth. Such 
dispersal is rare. Often, those members in a disfrict for which a candidate is to be selected 
will have the greatest say. Where local interests (votes) are weighed against the votes of 
party members elsewhere in equal proportion, both sets of opinions have a chance of 
being expressed. The way in which the interests of the rest of the party are counted is 
cmcial. Parties mostiy prefer to use the least costly means of electing candidates—means 
that do not involve all members in all contests. A cenfral panel of voters may be selected 
at a broad forum of the party, for example a party conference, where delegates from all 
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districts vote for a panel to be used for a host of contests. The proportion of the local 
panel votes to cenfral panel votes will determine whether the locals have a realistic say in 
the selection of their candidate. The central panel of voters may also consist of a higher 
level of delegates. These are the part>' executive, senior members ofthe party whose vote 
will be combined with other delegates' votes and the local members. Again, the issue is 
the relative weight of each component. 
Stmcturally, some selection panels may be considered 'beyond the pale'. For example, 
where the balance of votes is weighted so heavily in favour of the central panel, real 
competition between the cenfral panel and the local branches is unlikely. The Westem 
Ausfralian Labor party allows the delegates from the local electorate to comprise only 
12% ofthe total panel (panel 4 in Table 4.1). A local vote split between two or more 
close contestants renders the vote ineffectual in the face of a much greater force in the 
central panel. Further, where the central panel is dominated by a union vote and each 
union votes in a bloc because their delegates are elected outside ofthe Labor party under 
a wiimer-take-all system, the local-to-central stmggle is wholly uncompetitive. In 1991, 
the Labor party failed in its attempt' to reform the union bloc vote, a system that 
underpins the informal process of accumulation of power in the party. 
Don Chipp's description ofthe preselection procedure in the Liberal Party in Victoria in 
the 1960s as 'fair' assumed that only the local preselectors had a legitimate interest in 
the outcome. In 1989, the preselection system was changed in order to weight the views 
ofthe locals against those of a central panel. The rationale was to overcome parochialism 
and Member of Parliament capture and to impose discipline on renegades and non-
performers. 'When I [David Hawker MP] first joined the party a sitting member was 
guaranteed to be unchallenged for 12 years. In 1975 it changed to two terms, next the 
sitting member had to be actively endorsed, ... then we moved to a system where 
nominations are called every time'.' Hawker described the earlier mles in place, which 
protected sitting members from challenge. The apparentiy democratic and competitive 
locally confrolled system described by Chipp was simply a highly confrolled and anti-
' ALP National Executive, 1991. Recommendations and Options ofthe Organisational Review Commitiee, 
referred to the 1991 National Conference, 1, 4, 6. (Mimeo) 
^ Chipp, D. and J. Larkin, 1978. Don Chipp: The Third Man. Melboume: Rigby, 32. 
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competitive system. Under the 1989 changes, the central panel consisted of delegates 
from all federal electorates and balanced the decision-making ofthe locals. 
Categorising panels into democratic (or competitive) and anti-competitive panels is thus 
a subtle exercise. Where the local delegation is substantial (for argument's sake, a 
majority ofthe panel) and where the central component is dispersed, the system is most 
likely to be competitive. Where the local component is a minority and the central panel 
votes in blocs, the effect is probably anti-competitive. The competition within the central 
panel, however, is a further and separate element to consider. In the Labor party, the 
central component is always a majority union vote (not that all union delegates vote as a 
single bloc), and that majority is offset by a local component. The arithmetic proportion 
of a union vote is thus perhaps 50% of 50%, or just 25% ofthe total number of votes in 
the whole panel. A 25% vote provides substantial leverage in the central component. 
Two unions, each with 25% of the total vote, constitute a near majority of the central 
panel and between them are likely to control the outcome of all preselections. In this 
example, there may be competition between the unions but not between the unions and 
the branch members. The dispersed vote of the branches would make their vote 
ineffectual. A cenfral bloc of votes may also leverage local votes. Often candidates will 
pledge their local support in an on-going way to the group from whom they are seeking 
central support. These more subtle manoeuvres will be explored in the following chapter. 
At present, the object is to distinguish the basic divisions and voting strengths of the 
formal constituents of each panel. 
In the Liberal and National parties, the central component of the panel is less clear 
because that part of the panel often comprises delegates from across the State. The 
percentage figure in Table 4.1 only indicates the local vote versus the central panel 
(panels 3 and 4), or central versus local (panel 5) to distinguish panels for Senate 
selection. The cenfral panel itself, however, consists of part executive and part delegates 
from elsewhere. Where the central component consists substantially of an executive 
committee assembled 
^ David Hawker MHR, LPA V. Interview, 26 November 1997. 
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Table 4.1: Competitive and Anti-Competitive Selection Panels 
(Anti-competitive panels indicated by bold text) 
Division 
; 1 ^ 2 
I Plebiscite I Vote of 
j of Local I Local 
t Branch j Party 
I Members | Delegates 
NSW 
^»"-ii»>-™ 
Labor 
HR 
National 
HR 
Victoria 
Queens-
land 
j Westem 
I Australia 
National 
HR 
South 
Australia 
Tasmania 
"ACT"" 
Northem 
Territory 
i Liberal 
i mUSen 
ji Liberal | 
Jj HR+Jen j 
( Labor j 
( HR+Sen 1 
\ CLP Sen I 
3 
Local 
Plebiscite 
and 
Central 
Panel 
Labor 
HR 50% 
Liberal 
HR 66% 
Labor 
HR 50% 
4 
Local 
Delegates 
and 
Central 
Panel 
Liberal' 
HR60-
90% 
Liberal 
HR 60% 
National 
HR >90% 
Labor 
HR 12% 
Liberal 
im>85% 
Liberal 
HR >75% 
Labor 
HR 25% 
\ Central and 
other 
I Delegates: 
I Senate 
s 
i Liberal 
i Sen 35% 
j NAT 
J Sen<25%. 
I Liberal 
I Sen 45% 
I National 
j jenl0%^ 
\ Liberal 
j Sen 33% 
J National 
\ Sen<50% 
j Liberal 
\ Sen <30% 
I Liberal 
1 Sen <25% 
Labor 
HR + Sen 
50% 
Labor 
HR 50% 
CLP^ 
HR 
Union and 
other 
Delegates: 
Senate 
Labor 
Sen 60% 
Labor 
Sen 60% 
Labor 
Sen 60% 
Labor 
Sen 60% 
Labor 
Sen 50% 
Labor 
Sen 50% 
Source: 
Modelled after GaUagher and Marsh, 1988. Candidate Selection, 237. Data fi-om parties (see References). 
Notes: 
Panels deemed anti-competitive are in bold type. 
Percentages refer to the proportion ofthe total vote ofthe first named component ofthe panel. 
'There are three zones—metropoUtan, central and country—^where the local component is respectively 60%, 
80% and 90%. ^ National members can insist on a plebiscite, but otherwise plebiscite and central (60%). ^  
Data on CLP not available. 
on a 'winner-take-all basis','^  and that central component itself is substantial, then the 
same advantage as applies to unions may exist. In the Queensland division ofthe Liberal 
'* Senator David McGibbon, Liberal party Queensland, has described the Queensland Division ofthe Liberal 
party in such terms. Interview, 8 April 1999. 
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party, the central panel makes up only 33% ofthe total vote. The central panel, however, 
consists of 100% State Executive members. Some members of State Executive are 
chosen on a 'multiple-first-past-the-post'^ system, which allows a winner-take-all 
situation. Even so, these delegates do not constitute the whole of the executive. If the 
executive votes as a bloc, it does not arise from a structural feature ofthe system. 
The Victorian Liberal executive makes up less than half of the central panel and the 
central panel is 45%) of the whole for a Senate preselection. In this instance, the 
executive may not exhibit an overwhelming influence. However, a significant bloc of 
State caucus votes is involved in Senate preselection. This issue arose in the 1998 
disendorsement of Senator Karen Synon, and involved an alleged breach of the mles 
when Victorian Premier Kennett handpicked the caucus delegates.^ This example may 
involve a breach ofthe mles rather than a stmctural fault, although it is certainly arguable 
that the stmcture of the panel is anti-competitive. The Westem Australian and South 
Australian Liberal divisions also consist of dispersed central panels, where the executive 
has a minority of the vote. The Tasmania and the ACT Liberal divisions are selected by 
delegates from all electorates and are therefore dispersed. The same applies in the CLP in 
the Northem Territory. The cenfral components of the panels for the National party in 
NSW and Victoria have a modest share of the vote and are therefore unlikely to 
constitute a powerful bloc. For the Senate preselection in the Queensland division, 
however, the cenfral component is near 50% of the total vote. Moreover, a sizeable, 
though minority component of the central panel consists of the State Management 
Committee.^  Senator Boswell claims that the Committee votes as a bloc on preselection 
issues, but this is a matter of ethos rather than stmcture. The combination of the local 
panel with a dispersed cenfral panel is characteristic of the open competition system. 
Table 4.1 indicates that these panels apply to many ofthe Liberal and National party and 
some ofthe Labor party panels for House of Representative elections. 
The typology of panels presented in Table 3.1 has been taken a further step by accounting 
for the concenfration of power in the executive component of each cenfral panel. Taking 
' LPA Q, 1997. State Constitution. Rule 127(d), 32. 
^ The Austi-alian, 6 July 1998. 
^ NPA Q, 1995. Constitution. Rule 99, 18. 
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into account the two-way competition between local and central, and elements within the 
central, the result of the audit of the panels allows a categorisation on the competitive -
anti-competitive axis. On these measures, 13 ofthe 40 panels tend to be anti-competitive 
(they are indicated by bold text). Obviously, the method reveals greater anti-
competitiveness in Labor because of the bloc vote of unions. This is not to suggest that 
there is a lack of competition among unions for power, or that non-union favoured 
candidates cannot succeed, but where they do so, it is against the odds. Power is more 
dispersed in the Coalition parties in a stmctural sense. It can, of course, be cenfralised by 
means of good organising, but that is due to the competitive nature of the event not the 
stmcture of the panel. Nevertheless, where a component of the central panel can be 
assembled on a winner-take-all basis, the influence ofthe centre may be anti-competitive. 
No Coalition party was found to contain anti-competitive stmctures among the selection 
panels. 
The Audit Results 
The audit of each set of mles produced a discrete set of outcomes for each party in each 
division. The results set out in Table 4.2 highlight mles that do not comply with the six 
principles selected from the Commonwealth Electoral Act (these are marked with a 
cross). The cases where the mles comply with the principle are indicated by a tick, and 
are not discussed fiirther. Where the mles do not comply, the fault is set out below and 
discussed. The qualifications of candidates and voters are not amenable to simple 
classification and are not included in the Table but are presented in the order outlined in 
Table 3.1. The section on qualifications compares the different standards applied to party 
membership and candidacy requirements including the power to scmtinise applications 
and to exclude potential and cmrent members. 
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Table 4.2: Results ofthe Audit of Party Rules Using 
the Principles for Fair Elections 
Party and Division 
Democrat 
Labor *NSW 
One-
Vote, 
One-
Value 
r^x 
Integrity 
of 
Roll 
rWt^lIs* r ^ rmj^^Wt V * IVCVA'I/ 
Victoria 
^Queensland 
L 
Westem Australia 
South Australia 
Tasmania 
^ ^ ACT" 
Northem Territory 
Liberal _ NSW 
Victoria 
Queensland 
*SVestem Australia 
X 
''x 
"x 
"x 
x^ 
"x 
~x' 
1x 
'x" 
7 
x" 
X 
'^™jl*'** 
X 
t X 
Fair 
Conduct 
of Ballot 
"7 
"7 
2 
X 
"E 
l< 
"7 
X 
'"x 
Provision 
for Secret 
Ballot 
!rix~' 
Fair Dispute 
Procedures 
'7" 
T 
\ 
^ 
^South Australia | 
^Tasmania | 
^5cii„ 
r]x ..,z][z Eiii., 3x1 
X f 'x 1 "x 
X _ If X 1 x_^_ 
r X f y 
\ Ix.._ |_^  • • ^ - 2 
^ j X L._...^.x ,_ 
7" 
7''' 
21 
Z. 
"x_ 
x" 
x" 
>r 
ix" 
« S | S « K « . ^ X 
"x 
T 
"1 ! 
Source: 
Rules of each party (see References). 
Notes: 
X = unsatisfactory, • / = satisfactory, 
# Overmle clause: the ability for any of the procedures to be overmled by a majority of an executive body. 
The requirement for a substantial majority vote, 60% or more, is considered a sufficient remedy. 
Total: the number of parties that do not satisfy the principle. 
Table 4.2 also indicates the total number of parties that fail, in some respect, each 
principle. All party divisions fail, in some respect, the principle of one-vote one-value. 
Most have weaknesses in the integrity of their voter rolls and in the conduct of the 
ballots. Most have provision for a secret ballot and fair dispute procedures. The Table 
does not provide a report card for each party. It would be misleading to do so because the 
weight of each failure has not been determined. A string of minor infringements may do 
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no great harm to the democratic process within a party, though one major failing almost 
certainly will. For example, even the best set of mles will count for nought if a powerful 
executive can ignore them. The first report ofthe audit, therefore, is to look at mles that 
allow procedures to be overmled. 
The Power to Overrule 
There are circumstances when preselection procedures need to be waived. In selecting a 
candidate for a by-election, there may be insufficient time to fulfil a party's conventional 
mle and hold a plebiscite of the relevant membership. A by-election, however, may 
simply be used as an excuse by an executive to waive the mles in favour of a particular 
candidate. The critical questions are, which body, in which circumstances, is competent 
to decide when time is insufficient to hold a plebiscite? Most of the audited parties have 
three tiers of adminisfration: conference, council and executive. Clearly, a vote of the 
broadest body of the membership, a State convention or conference must be able to 
change the mles. The difficulty with such bodies is that they meet infrequently and are 
expensive to convene. In each case, the party executive is smallest and meets more 
frequently and is thus in a position to decide matters more easily and more quickly than 
the larger bodies. However, where an executive is confrolled by one group in a party with 
the power to overmle procedures for preselection, that group can ensure that its own 
candidates succeed. This is not to say that the executive cannot endorse or disendorse 
candidates as set out in the mles, but where those mles provide a wide discretion to do 
so, they can be abused. The standard way to control such excess is to consfrain the 
executive in its actions by requiring a substantial majority to overmle decisions and 
procedures. Some constitutions are even more conservative and require, even of their 
g 
conference, a two-thirds majority for mle changes. 
In the Victorian Labor party, 'the Administrative Committee may, in circumstances 
where the continued endorsement of a candidate is no longer viable, re-open nominations 
for any seat, provided such resolution is supported by 15% of all the Adminisfrative 
* For example, the ALP T, 1997. Rules, Section 18.2, 22 states '...rule changes may be considered by State 
Conference in odd numbered years only if supported by a motion carried wdth the support of at least two-
thirds ofthe members...' 
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Committee members'.^ The NSW Liberal party 'State Executive may cancel the selection 
if the motion is carried by not less than 60% of the members of State Executive 
present and voting at the meeting' and, in the Tasmanian Liberal party, a cancellation of 
endorsement requires a 75% vote of the executive.'^ In these ways, the politically 
necessary flexibility of response is retained, but the opportunity for abuse is minimised. 
Within the framework of a national constitution, each major party is self-governing in 
each division. However, there is some ability for intervention by the federal executive of 
three of the parties. The parties vary considerably in the extent to which the national 
body of mles has any part to play in the selection of candidates. The Democrats are the 
most centralised in that there is a national set of mles goveming preselection for Federal 
parliament, which overrides the State divisional mles. Furthermore, the National 
Executive has the authority 'to intervene in a Division's preselection process'." 
However, while the National Executive has considered numerous reports on preselections 
and taken action, such as the extension of a deadline for the completion ofthe process, it 
has not intervened to the extent of overtuming or determining a State decision. 
The Labor National Executive has clear powers to hear and decide an appeal 'from any 
person seeking to be a candidate for Federal elections...' and indeed has 'plenary powers 
to deal with and decide any matters which, in the opinion of an absolute majority ... 
19 
affect the welfare of the Labour Movement...' A review of National Executive 
decisions for the years 1983-1995 (a period which coincides with the sample of case 
studies) shows that the plenary powers were used to hear an appeal, conduct a 
preselection or overtum a preselection decision on 25 occasions (see Appendix 2). At the 
1996 Liberal Federal Council, its Federal Executive gained the power to disendorse a 
candidate with a two-thirds majority of Federal Executive and Divisional Presidents.'^ 
No preselection has been overtumed by these means. The National party Federal 
^ ALP V, 1996, Rules, Section 15.14, 24. 
'"Respectively, LPA NSW, 1997. Constitution and Regulations, Section 19.19.2, 57. LPAT, 1996. 
Constitution and General Standing Orders for Meetings, Part XXVII, I. 30. b, 28. 
" AD, \996 National Constitution and Regulations. September, Section 11.2.37. (Mimeo). Senator 
Andrew Bartlett, AD Q. Discussion on National Executive interventions, 19 May 1998. 
'^  ALP, 1994. Platform, Resolutions and Rules, Rules7c viii (c), 7 c ix, and 12 d, 323, 324, 326. 
'^  LPA 1998. Federal Constitution, Section 40. (f) (U) and (g) (ii), 13-14. Correspondence from Brett 
Mason confirming on inquiring with the Federal Secretariat the non-use of these sections, 21 July 1998. 
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Management Committee has power to endorse candidates in States and Tertitories only 
where there is no affiliated party. 
At the State level, there are eight examples of a clear power to overmle at executive (or 
council) with a simple (or absolute) majority, in broadly defined circumstances. That is, 
not simply, for example, to re-open nominations because of resignation of the candidate 
or a proven ertor in the ballot. These are: 
1. Labor NSW: 'In electorates where the local branch ... has not taken the necessary 
steps as laid down by the Rules to select a candidate at least six months before 
Parliament comes to an end ... the Administrative Committee will select a candidate' 
and, 
'The Adminisfrative Committee can ... decide not to hold a selection ballot. It can only 
do this if there is no sitting Labor member. If this happens the candidate will be selected 
by a committee made up of equal numbers from the Adminisfrative Committee and 
where practicable, the local Electorate Council'.'^ 
2. Labor Queensland: 'The Adminisfrative Committee may withdraw the endorsement of 
any candidate on the grounds of unfitaess for the position...' '^  
3. Liberal Westem Australia: 'Upon receipt of the recommendation of the Selection 
17 
Committee the State Council may ... make such other decision as it shall see fit'. 
4. Liberal South Ausfralia: 'Notwithstanding the procedures provided herein for 
preselection and endorsement of candidates State Executive shall be at liberty if special 
1 Q 
circumstances exist to vary such procedures as it deems appropnate'. 
5. Liberal Tasmania: 'If in any special circumstances ... the State Executive considers 
that in the interests of the Organisation an endorsement should be re-opened, the State 
Executive may call for fresh applications'. 
6. Liberal ACT: 'Where in the opinion of the Management Committee the endorsed 
Candidate is no longer a suitable representative of the Division, the Management 
Committee may disendorse that candidate'. 
'^NPA 1988a. Federal Constitution, Rule 23 (c), 9. 
" ALP NSW, 1996-97. Platform and Rules, D.4 (d), 101 and N.40, 117. 
'^  ALP Q, 1997. Rules, Section 25.19, 38. 
'^LPAWA 1997. Constitiition and Rules, Section 128, 58. 
'*LPA SA 1996. Constitution, Section 17.12, 51. 
'^  LPA T, 1996. Constitution, Part XXVH, Rule 29, 28. 
^^  LPA ACT, 1997. Constitution, Section 93, 35. 
73 
The AudU of Party Rules and Selection Panels 
7. National Victoria: 'In the event that State Council deems that urgent and immediate 
action is necessary ... it shall take such action in relation to the election ... as it considers 
to be in the best interests ofthe Party... '^' 
8. National Queensland: '... if Central Council considers at any time that the interests of 
the party will be best served by selection it may resolve by a majority of those present... 
that it will select the candidate'.'^ ^ 
In each case. State division party mles are open to abuse. The NSW Labor Administrative 
Committee has clear powers by simple majority to select the candidate, restricted only by 
the 'trigger' that the local branch has failed to act, which of course it may have done with 
the agreement of that same majority of the Committee. The Adminisfrative Committee 
can also re-weight the selection panel by joining its number to those ofthe local panel in 
cases where there is no sitting member, again to suit the simple majority of the 
administration. The Queensland Labor, South Australia and ACT Liberal parties' 
administrative committees can overtum the decision of a panel on very broad grounds, by 
a simple majority. The mles provide no direction for the selection of a new candidate. In 
the Westem Ausfralian Liberal, NSW and Queensland National parties, the power to 
override the decision of a panel is unfettered. The only redeeming feature is that the 
power rests with the intermediate body, a council. The Tasmanian Liberal State 
Executive has a clear power to override but only to the extent to reopen nominations and 
restart the process, and as noted (note 19), the power to overtum a ballot is fettered. 
These overtule provisions are so powerful, and so unconsfrained, that the audit of the 
mles in these party divisions must take into account the fact that the processes of each 
may be significantly unfair, regardless of their record on each of the six parts of the 
analysis. The cases are marked (#) on Table 4.2. 
'^ NPA V, 1997. Constitution and Rules, Rule 114 (photocopy, no page number). 
" N P A Q , 1995. Constitution, Section 140, 25. 
^^  There is a general proviso that the Administrative Committee 'Cannot make any Rule ineffective' ALP 
NSW, 1996-97. Platform and Rules, Rule D. 1. (b) (i), 101, but this rule can be outmanoeuvred by the 
more specific rules quoted above. 
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One Vote, One Value 
The value of each vote in a preselection ballot is obviously important to the result. The 
immediate issue is whether the mles for assigning value to votes are applied fairly within 
the respective categories ofthe voters. Where a panel of voters has the capacity to co-opt 
extra votes there is a potential for a group with a bare majority to enhance that majority. 
Where some voters obtain more than one vote, or where the weight of a delegate's vote 
bears no relationship to the numbers that the delegate represents, the vote is unequally 
apportioned. Each suggests an inequality of vote that may offend the one-vote one-value 
principle, which appears in the Commonwealth Electoral Act, and is an accepted test of 
faimess. 
Every party that was examined weighted votes unequally in some respect, for either or 
both of the House of Representatives and the Senate preselections. The result for each 
party is recorded only once, so for example, although elections by plebiscite of all the 
members would satisfy the test, a party was marked as having failed the test if their 
Senate panels were unfairly weighted. The inequality arises for six basic reasons: 
1. Delegates are elected at the armual general meeting of a branch. The election of 
delegates to a preselection panel at the annual general meeting of local branches or 
electorate councils is common in the Liberal party. The number of delegates allocated to 
a branch may be in proportion to branch membership but the likelihood is that attendance 
at an AGM will be lower than at a plebiscite specifically held for the election of 
delegates.^ '* This is not a strict example of imbalance, but where an election for 
delegates, an indirect form of vote, is taken at a fomm where other matters are discussed, 
the method becomes even more indirect and may de facto, be subject to great imbalance. 
2. There is no proportionality between the number of delegates and the number who vote 
for them. A common practice in many of the panels where delegates are elected is to 
allocate the same number of delegates per body. For example, the same number of 
delegates from each federal electorate is elected to a conference that will form the basis 
24 Christopher Pyne MHR, LPA SA. Interview, 29 October 1997. 
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of the Senate selection panel. The number of members who elect those delegates will 
vary considerably^^ and constitutes a clear case of malapportionment. In some cases, 
there is a different ratio of delegates to members dependent on the geographic region, for 
example, country and city electorates. 
3. The mles for the election of delegates are unknown. The Labor party affiliates unions 
whose members elect delegates to panels. Unless it is not specified, in all but one case 
'the unions follow their own procedures'^ ^ in the election of delegates. The exception 
requires the method of selection to be according to the registered rules of the union with 
the party to be notified. In no case did the party mles specify the method of election, 
9Q 
although in all but one case the delegate had to be Labor party member. The Democrats 
only consult with local branch members in preselections for House of Representatives in 
areas where their membership is low. 
4. The mles specify a weighted vote for the election of certain delegates. The mle for 
women in the NSW Labor party allows for a 20% weighting until the number of women 
preselected has reached a given quota.'° In no other division of any party is a weighting 
given, although quotas are used extensively (affirmative action is discussed below). 
Union affiliates can vary the weight of vote, for example, for junior members although 
there is no such qualification for casual or part-time members, which arguably gives an 
advantage to those unions whose membership mainly consists of fractional, seasonal or 
'^ The number of delegates to Queensland Labor State CouncU is the same for each federal electorate, 
although the branch members wiU vary between less than 100 to over 400. (Author's information). 
^^  The Liberal NSW system has three zones, metropoUtan, central and country (the formula allows for 
considerable variation in the ratio of members to delegates and central to local delegates, dependent on the 
zone). Labor South AustraUa diflFerentiates the weight between country and city branches (1 city delegate 
per 25-50 members and 1 country delegate per 15-50 members to Convention). 
" ALP NSW, 1996-97. Platform and Rules, Rule B.28, 100. 
*^ ALP Q, 1997. Rules, Rule 4.08 (a), 15. 
^^  'AfBliated organisations may appouit proxy delegates [to Convention or State CouncU], provided such 
proxy delegates are members ofthe organisation they represent...' ALP SA, 1994. Constitution and 
General Rules, Rule 24. (b), 33 and 30. (b), 36. In other words, there is no requirement for such delegates 
to be party members. 
^^  '... in any lower house preselection, primary votes or preferences distributed to women candidates in 
baUots for seats not held by a continuing member or where the continuing member is excluded during the 
course ofthe count wiU be weighted by a factor of 20% (i.e. valued at 1.2)', ALP NSW, 1996-97. Platform 
and Rules, Rule'N. 7, 114. 
'^ 'If a union wishes to affiliate junior members, two junior members represent one equivalent adult member 
for the purpose ofthe calculation of a union's delegation to conference.' ALP V, 1996. Rules, Schedule A 5, 
29. This despite the fact that membership ofthe party is open to anyone 14 years of age. 
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day workers. There is a minor element of weighting in every case where a youth and a 
women's wing of a party exists and young and/or women members have dual 
membership. In every case, these members have an ordinary vote and a vote to elect a 
woman and/or a youth delegate. However, those delegates feed into the wider 
preselection forums in very small numbers. In the Tasmanian Liberal party, restrictions 
are placed on the positions that may be held by an individual with dual membership. 
A stark confrast to this is the NSW Liberal division 'where a person may be a member 
and hold office including as a delegate in ... not more than 1 Ordinary Branch ... and a 
•3-5 
Young Liberal Branch ... and 1 or more Special Branches'. In other words, people 
eligible to be Young Liberals or in a Special Branch ('community of interest', usually of 
the same ethnic background) have two votes in branches and could feed into the system 
in large numbers. This mle was abolished at the August 1998 meeting ofthe NSW State 
Council but applied to the 1998 round of preselections. The ACT Liberals also allow the 
formation of Special Branches. In NSW, a Special Branch is entitled to send two 
delegates to State Council where an Ordinary Branch is entitled to one. 
There are other instances where a member has two votes, for example, where a Member 
of Parliament is, as of right, a delegate to a conference and is also an elected delegate.^'' 
In a mixed panel system for example, there are delegates or executive who cast a vote in 
that capacity and in a direct plebiscite. Husband/wife membership is a form of 
membership exclusive to the National party, so that if one pays a membership, the other 
^^  '... a person may be a member of any two or more of a branch, a Women's group and a Young Liberal 
Movement Branch... 2. No such person shall hold ... office[s] ... or be a delegate of more than one ... 
branch ...'. LPA T, 1996. Constitution, Part XX 1, and 2, 19. 
" LPA NSW, 1997. Comtitiition ofvi Regulations, Rule 10. 2 (1), 35 and Rule 2.3.1, 4. LPA ACT, 1997. 
Constitution, 28 (2), 16. Rule 30 (1), 17. The ACT division Secretary has made assurances that a member is 
entitied to only one vote in a baUot (conversation with John Ryan, July 1998). 
^ '[EJach ofthe members ofthe Parliament entitled to be represented at Conference shall exercise two (2) 
votes provided that the total parhamentary vote shaU at no time exceed 6 per cent ofthe total of exercisable 
votes at any Annual Conference.' ALP NT, 1996. Rules, 3.5 (c), 11. 
'^ This can occur in a very dispersed vote for example where there is a central panel for a whole State and 
the local electorate vote counted together (eg, ALP ACT, 1997. Rules and Regulations, Rule 11. 4 (f), 
140), and so the delegate vote is of Uttle extra weight. This impact can be nullified by specifying that 
delegates for the central component cannot also be branch delegates (eg, LPA V, 1997. Constitution, Rule 
14.13 (b) (i), 44). It can occur entirely within an electorate. Where a delegate to the federal electorate body 
also exercises a local vote in a plebiscite and there is no wider input, the doubling up has a greater impact. 
Where branch delegates and electorate council delegates make up the panel there is a double vote (NPA 
NSW, 1996. Constitution and Rules, Rule 5.1.1, 16, and LPA T, 1996. Constitution, Part XXVO C.8. a), 
25. 
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is, on application, entitied to membership without fee. The NSW National party takes 
this even further by allowing the category of Nominated Member where, for one 
subscription, a company or the like can purchase four memberships.^ ^ The party also 
allows members of metropolitan branches to belong to one other branch, with no 
apparent prohibition on voting in both. 
5. There are special categories of voter given automatic entry to certain ballots. In Senate 
preselections in the Queensland Liberal party, life members and former presidents are 
allowed to vote, and in the Queensland National party life members are able to attach 
themselves to an electorate of their choosing and cast a vote in a plebiscite for the House 
TO 
of Representatives. There are forms of limited or non-voting membership in all parties, 
but as these people choose not to participate in the preselection activities, they are of no 
concem. 
6. Exfra voters are appointed by another body. The South Ausfralian Liberal party State 
Executive can nominate five members to State Council, thus giving the Executive some 
measure of confrol over the more senior body. In the NSW National party, the Cenfral 
Council that preselects Senate candidates has the power to determine its own 
constitution.'^ Further, the Queensland National party has a mle for the co-option of 
members with voting rights.'^' On the positive side, the Victorian and Westem Australian 
*^ 'A company, organisation, firm, partnership, estate, or trust paying at least the standard annual 
membership subscription, and nominating a person to represent it, shall have that subscription accepted and 
that person shall be a Nominated Member. Further nominated members, up to a maximum of four per 
subscription, may be accepted on apphcation if the subscription represents at least the standard annual 
membership subscription for each Nominated Member (NPA NSW, 1996. Constitution and Rules, Rules 
2.5.1 and 2, 9). 
"NPA NSW, 1996. Constitution and Rules, Rule 4.2.3, 13. 
^^  LPA Q, 1997. State Constitution, Rule 137 (1) (c), 38 and NPA Q, 1995. Constitution, Rule 16, 6. 
^^  'The State Council shall comprise: - ... five members of the Division nominated by the State Executive 
and approved by the State Coundl at its Aimual General Meeting.' LPA SA 1996. Constitution, Rule 9.2 
(m), 23. 
^ 'The Central Coundl shall be composed of ... Such delegates as Central Council may determine.' NPA 
NSW, 1996. Constitution and Rules, 7.1.1 (i). 20. 
'" 'It shaU be competent for: State Electorate Coundls; Federal Divisional Councils; Central CouncU; the 
State Management Committee ... to co-opt members ofthe party ... provided that no more than 10% ofthe 
members of any CouncU ... shall be co-opted members and that co-opted members who are not otherwise 
entitled shaU not have any voting right as a member ofthe councU ... which appointed them, but may 
exercise aU rights (including voting rights) appertainmg to any position to which they are appointed in a 
representative capacity.' [Emphasis added] NPA Q, 1995. Constitution, Rule 156, 28. 
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Liberals allow for a random ballot of delegates from a central panel to a selection 
panel 42 
The principle of one-vote, one-value is not adhered to by most of the parties. The 
appearance but not the form of equal weighting seems to be important to the parties at an 
electorate level. Parties prefer the number of delegates from each electorate to be the 
same, regardless ofthe membership. This preference acts as a disincentive to members in 
large branches and electorates and is often a deliberate strategy to encourage membership 
in areas where organisation is weak. The other means of breaching the principle appear 
even less sustainable. 
The Integrity of the Roll 
Fourteen ofthe State parties failed, in some respect, the test ofthe integrity ofthe roll of 
voters. Four issues arise in the consideration ofthe integrity ofthe roll. The first is who 
conttols entry to the party, and whether their decisions are subject to review. The second 
is who should decide the eligibility to vote, and whether their decisions are subject to 
review. The third is whether candidates have equal access to the roll of voters. The fourth 
is whether there are mles that adequately govem proxy voting. 
A preliminary point is whether there are any unfair barriers to entry to the organisation. 
Each party division excludes persons who are members of a proscribed organisation 
including other parties, or who have stood against the party's endorsed candidate. The 
extent of the ban varies but such activity can exclude a person for several years or 
indefinitely. These mles could hardly be described as unfair. Similarly, a joining fee is 
payable in each case, usually variable according to means whether specified by income or 
by pension or employment status. Until June 2000, following the change to the mles of 
the Labor party at its National Conference,'*^ only two cases, the Westem Ausfralian 
Labor and South Ausfralian Liberal parties, had mles forbidding paying for another 
"^LPA V, 1997. Constitiition, Rule 14.13 (c), 45. LPA WA 1997. Constitution and Rules, Rule 18. (f), 85. 
"^  ALP, 2000. Rules. Rule 16 a. (Photocopy) 
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person's membership.'^ A variant is that offers or rewards as inducements to membership 
are forbidden in the Queensland Liberal party. Membership applications en masse are 
forbidden in the NSW and Victorian Labor parties.'^ The mles in all parties are silent on 
the issue of bribing a voting member. 
First, in most cases, a person joins a party either by applying to Head Office or the local 
branch, with the vetting of applications undertaken by a cenfral committee. An appeal 
against a refusal of membership is not always available, whether at local or cenfral level. 
In the Democrats, and every division of the Labor party, there is an appeal to a higher 
body against a branch rejection of an application. The Democrat mle is the most explicit: 
'[pjersons excluded from membership ofthe Party may appeal against such exclusion as 
if they were members'.''^ In the Liberal party, there is a contrast between those State 
divisions that allow no appeal and have no requirement to alert the State director (NSW), 
those that allow no appeal, but must inform the State director of the decision (Victoria, 
Queensland, South Ausfralia), those where there is a refertal to a higher body from a 
branch decision, but no right of appeal per se (Tasmania), and those where there is an 
appeal (ACT and Westem Ausfralia). In Westem Australia, there is not only an appeal to 
State Executive, but if the branch seeks to delay an application beyond a 42-day period 
the application is automatically accepted.'^ The ACT mles forbid a branch to have a mle 
to preclude a member joining the party. The measure is designed to counter one of the 
more basic forms of exclusion.''^ ^ In the National party, the applications are made direct to 
the State Management Committee, and there is no appeal from a rejection. In one case 
'^ ALP WA 1995. Platform, Constitution and Rules, 15.4.1, 49. LPA SA, 1996. Constitution, Rule 5.9.3, 
7. 
^^ 'No member of the party shaU make any material offer or reward to any person as an inducement to any 
person to become a member of the Party without the approval of the State Executive, and no person who 
has accepted such an offer or reward shall be accepted thereby as a member ofthe Party.' LPA Q, 1997. 
State Constitution, Rule 15 B, 10. Another variation is the prohibition on the use of professional consultants 
by a candidate in a preselection contest. LPA V, 1997. Constitution, Rule 21.7 (a), 56. 
"** 'If a branch receives eight or more new apphcations for branch registration at any one meeting ... the 
branch must send the apphcations to the NSW Administrative Committee...' ALP NSW, 1996-1997. Policy 
and Rules, Rule A.20 (a), 93. 'The branch may not recommend acceptance of more than 13 new members at 
a single meeting.' ALP V, 1996. Rules, Rule 5.3.6 (c), 5. 
''^  AD, 1996. National Constitiition, Rule 4.3, 3. 
''* '[If] a Branch ... feUs to deal with the application ... within a period of forty two days ... the apphcation 
wUl... be deemed to have been approved...' LPA WA 1997. Constitution and Rules, Rule 12. e (ui), 10. 
"' LPA ACT, 1997. Constitution, Rule 30 (2), 17. 
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only, the NSW National party is the power to expel a party member in the hands of a 
local branch. ^ ^ 
Second, the questions of who holds the roll, who verifies it, and what appeal rights exist 
where an individual is excluded from the roll need to be considered. In a system where 
the vote is by plebiscite, without the qualification of branch attendance, the list is held 
cenfrally in all cases and there is either a right of appeal to the retuming officer or a 
cenfral committee. In a system with a plebiscite but with a qualification of branch 
attendance (Labor NSW, Tasmania, ACT) the branch record has to be verified, and there 
are mles for the marmer of keeping records. This type of system relies heavily on local 
scmtiny for verification.^' In a system where delegates are elected at an AGM, local 
verification is critical. For example, in the NSW, Westem Ausfralian and South 
Ausfralian Liberal parties, the secretary of a branch has to notify the General Secretary 
not only ofthe details ofthe results ofthe election of delegates, but also the details ofthe 
roll of those who voted. ^ ^ In the Victorian and Tasmanian divisions ofthe Liberal Party, 
and the Victorian division of the National party, only the names of the delegates are 
fumished to the General Secretary. ^ ^ 
The rights of access to membership lists held at a cenfral level vary considerably. The 
most accessible are the Victorian and Tasmanian divisions of the Labor party, which 
allow access to any member (the Tasmanian division of the Labor party has the most 
comprehensive arrangements covering access and privacy).^ '* Some allow access by 
certain persons, such as administrative and credentials committees (Labor NSW), or a 
broader list including chairs of electorate councils (South Ausfralian Liberal). Others 
'" 'A Branch may expel a member ... fi-om the Party for improper conduct. ... The motion for expulsion 
must be carried by two-thirds of those present voting in its favour. Any member ... expeUed may appeal to 
Central CouncU.' NPA NSW, 1996. Constitiition and Rules, Rules 4.2.7, 13. 
'^ For example, the extraordmary detaU in specifying the keeping of the record of branch attendances and 
verifying signatures in the ALP NSW, 1996-97. Platform and Rules, Rule I. 9, 107. 
" LPA NSW, 1997. Constitiition and Regulations, Rule 3.13, 13. LPA WA 1997. Constitution and Rules, 
Rule 36, 21. LPA SA 1996. Constitution, Rule 6.16.3. (b) and (c), 13. There is an mteresting waiver clause 
where State executive may declare the election of delegates vaUd despite breaches ofthe rules. 
^^  LPA V, 1997. Constitiition, Rule 7.2 (2) (b), 24. LPA T, 1996. Constitiition, Part VI 7, 9. NPA V, 1997. 
Constitution and Rules, Rule 120 (a) (u). In the NSW National party there is no provision for makmg the 
names of delegates avaUable to anyone, 'It shall be the responsibUity of the Branch Chairman ... to satisfy 
Electorate CouncUs and Conferences that the Branch delegation is correct.', NPA NSW, 1996. Constitiition 
onrfRules, Rule 3.2.3, 11. The Queensland National party rules are silent on this matter. 
''' ALP T,'l997. Rules. Rule 16, 21. 
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have no mle that allows anyone access to the records, only that records be kept (National 
party in NSW, Queensland and Victoria). 
The verification of union affiliations in divisions of the Labor party is handled at 
adminisfrative committee level but the proof required varies considerably. Only the ACT 
division requires an audit of union members.^ ^ The Westem Ausfralian division requires 
evidence from an industrial regisfrar, whereas NSW, Victoria, Tasmania and the 
Northem Territory require a statement from the union concemed, and an audit only when 
requested (there is no provision for the latter in the Northem Territory). In the case ofthe 
Queensland and South Ausfralian divisions, it is not specified at all.^ ^ In addition, unions 
can choose to under-affiliate in order to allow for conscientious objection by members 
against party affiliation.^ ^ They can also choose to over-affiliate, that is, to buy votes.^ ^ 
Third, the preselection candidates' right of access to the roll of eligible electors is critical 
to the verification of the roll. The systems divide along the lines of plebiscite and 
delegation appointment by branch. Where the plebiscite system is in place, there is 
provision in each instance for candidate scmtiny of the roll and for the roll to be made 
available to all candidates. Where the electoral college consists of delegates appointed by 
branches, there is no provision for lists to be available as the emphasis is on the 
candidates' meeting the delegates at the preselection. The assumption is that the roles 
" 'The membership of an affihated union . . shaU be detennined by the union ... providing to the 
Administrative Committee ... a statement prepared and certified by an independent public auditor ...' ALP 
ACT, 1997. Rules and Regulations, Rule 5.6, 141. 
*^ 'The membership of an affihated union shall be determined by the union providing to the Administrative 
Committee ... a statement of hs financial members. Where requested ... the union shaU provide a statement 
by a public auditor ofthe number of financial members in that union.' Emphasis added. ALP V, 1996, Rules, 
Rule 5.2.5, 4. (The same holds for Labor NSW and Tasmania). The Northem Territory is the same except 
that there is no mention of request for audh. 
'A union wishing to affiUate to the Party must: provide written advice from the relevant Industrial Registry 
ofthe Union's current total financial membership figure.' ALP WA, 1995. Platform, Rule 3.1.3, 3. 
'When a union affihates h shaU pay capitation fees on the membership at the end of the precedmg quarter 
...' ALP Q, 1997. Rules, Rule 13.03, 25. 
'Any disputes regarding a Trade Unions level of affiliation shall be referred to the State Executive ...' ALP 
SA 1994. Constitution, Rule 68. (c), 59. 
" For example, 'Where a union seeks aflfiUation on a number less than that disclosed m the advice [from the 
Industrial Registry]... the Union Secretary must state in the letter of apphcation, the number they wish to 
affUiate on.' ALP WA 1995. Platform, Rule 3.1.4, 3. 
'* PubUc allegations have been made by former MHR Brian Courtice ALP Q, against the Australian 
Worker's Union (Queensland) in relation to his 1998 contest for the position of AWU secretary (various 
interviews various 1997-99). AMWU Secretary Dave Harrison has admitted that he affihates his union to 
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switch from politician seeking votes in the plebiscite to candidate being judged by the 
panel of delegates. In fact, there is probably no reason to make such a distinction and the 
loose mles of access to lists of delegates seem a failure to comply. 
Fourth, the integrity of the roll requires mles that control the use of altemate or proxy 
delegates. Proxy voting does not occur in Ausfralian public elections (except in a minor 
way with the provision of assistance to those not capable of casting a vote) but is not 
uncommon in political parties. The mles in each party division are explicit. They either 
ban proxies, or allow them under stringent conditions, the main one being that the proxy 
delegate (there is no proxy voting for plebiscites) must satisfy the same eligibility criteria 
as the delegate they replaced. For example, the Westem Ausfralian Liberal party specifies 
the circumstances for the election of proxies for all of its constituent bodies. 'All proxies 
for each Constituent Body shall be elected at the armual general meeting of the 
Constituent Body and shall be elected in accordance with the rules of the Constituent 
Body in such numbers and in such numerical order as shall be determined at the annual 
general meeting... '^' The exception is the Westem Ausfralian Labor party, which allows 
delegates to State Conference from 'Non-Metropolitan Councils and Sub-branches [to] 
credential any financial Party member as their proxy'^ 
The integrity of the roll of voters is one of the most important areas of electoral politics. 
The evidence suggests that there are poor procedures in place in a number of party 
divisions, especially where verification takes place locally and not elsewhere. While the 
powerful players are presumed to be in the most cenfral parts of the party organisation, 
some of the greatest breaches of faith with the mles occur at the local level. A concerted 
campaign to sign-up members by buying membei^hip is arguably a blow to the integrity 
ofthe membership and may be at the behest of cenfral figures. That few parties explicitly 
state that the buying of memberships is illegal is a serious concem. Such a void is not 
only an invitation to undermine the integrity of the association but implies that the 
undermining is condoned by the rule-makers. The attempt to establish rules to slow 
the Labor party m numbers that suh the union's purpose, i.e. 'strategicaUy' (The Courier Mail 20 April 
2000). 
' ' LPA WA \991- Constitution and Rules, Rule 137. (b), 60. There is also a ban on anyone casting more 
than one vote, except m the case of a remote constituency, and then under stringent conditions. 
^ ALP WA 1995. Platform, Rule 5.4.5, 13. 
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branch-stacking in tiie Labor party is a reflection of a tmce between warring factions. It 
does nothing to instil a confidence that recmits have joined in good faith and in full 
knowledge of their actions. 
Equal Application ofthe Qualifications to Vote 
The two major concems here are whether branch membership or electorate residence 
dictate eligibility to vote and whether discretion by party officials in the application of a 
system leads to a candidate obtaining an unfair advantage. In the Democrat and Labor 
parties, there is a clear preference for the electorate qualification. In the Liberal party, 
there is a clear preference for defining eligibility based on branch membership. National 
party use varies for each division. 
The mle for public elections is that voters should reside within the boundaries of the 
electorate (except for military personnel and itinerants). Systems which use the electorate 
definition have a standard which is beyond dispute, and the only issues that arise are 
length of residence, and the nature of the proof required, which is usually the name 
appearing on the electoral roll at a given date. This system does not, of course, ensure 
against fraudulent enrolment.^' The revelations of the Shepherdson Inquiry^^ in 
Queensland reveal that the public law has been broken where party members defraud the 
electoral role in order to enrol new branch members. In some regards, the stringent mles 
about electorate qualification forced cheats into defrauding the public law, a far more 
serious matter than breaking party mles. 
Those systems that rely on branch membership and, by extension, branch area 
boundaries, at the very least require a great deal of management. The business of 
'^ For example, the following rule change was made in response to charges of electoral fraud being laid 
against the Labor candidate, and one other in the State seat of Thuringowa, foUowing the preselection for 
that seat in 1998, 'On or unmediately after the 31^ March (the cut-off day) m each year the State Secretary 
shall acquire an electronic roU ... and the place at which each Branch member is enrolled shall be deemed 
their enrohnent address regardless of their alteration of enrolment during the succeeding 12 month period 
...' ALP Q, 1997. Rules, Rule 30.01 (b), 40. 
*^  The Inquiry, established by the Criminal Justice Commission to mvestigate electoral fraud was yet to 
report at the tune ofthe audit. 
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defining branch boundaries becomes contestable. It is obviously acceptable in such a 
system to draw membership with no particular relevance to the electorate. It also 
provides the opportunity to shift: voters from one electorate to another as required, 
although there are mles against people voting twice in a single round of preselections.^^ 
Table 4.3: Qualifications Required to Vote in a Preselection Ballot 
Party and Division 
Democrat 
Labor 
Minimum 
\ Membership in | Meetings 
i Branch I Relevant 
Months to Attend 
Location of 
Membership 
""24 
12 
j 0 I Electorate 
I 3 I Electorate 
i 0 I Electorate 
1.... Electorate 
Westem Australia I 16 
South Australia 16 
1 
iT 
0 
"0" 
Branch 
Branch 
Tasmania 14 Electorate 
Northem Territory | 
16 
1?" 
12 Electorate 
/J^VE^A^^^^tCbM J}vr£JG&^f^^:«^UU^J>Wc^ 
Electorate 
Liberal "NsVf 
Victoria 
16 
17 
6 
0 
Queensland!^ 17 
Westem Australia I 18 
Branch 
Branch 
1? 
r 
J-' 
'*i^««*7n»i^^^vK»K**fl 
q I Branch 
^""^^""^"""f Branch' 
0 I Branch 
Source: 
Rules of each party in the study as referenced. 
Notes: 
' Includes membership qualification. 
^ And 6 months in a branch. 
Must be applying for citizenship, othenvise eligible 
to vote in an Australian Federal election. 
'^  Qualification may be waived. 
^ 50% of branch meetings in the last 12 * 75%> of branch members to Uve m the electorate. 
months. 
' A majority Uvmg or working in the 
electorate. 
^^  'A member who transfers his membership or voting rights from one branch to another shaU be ineUgible to 
vote at the Annual General Meeting of more than one Branch m any one year.' LPA SA 1996 Constitution, 
S5 
The AudU of Party Rules and Selection Panels 
The NSW Liberal division encourages branch members to reside in tiie electorate. Failing 
that, there is a mle to specify that 75% of members should reside in the electorate for the 
purposes of the calculation of delegate numbers.^ The Westem Australian Liberal 
division allows the workplace to count as a residence.^ ^ Such mles allow different classes 
of residential qualification, which at the very least make the task of verifying the roll 
more difficult, and may increase the opportunity to 'import' voters at short notice. There 
is no right or wrong boundary or qualification but a significant management issue does 
arise under the branch membership system, which implies that branch membership has 
little to do with local residence. 
Equal Application of the Qualifications to Nominate 
Table 4.4 shows the qualifications required for a member of a party to become eligible to 
nominate as a candidate for preselection. The first three categories indicate the 
preference among the parties to have candidates with some involvement in the local 
branches, as demonsfrated by their length of membership (in nearly every case this can be 
waived), attendance at branch meetings and local branch support. The policy issues 
arising from this data will be discussed in the next chapter. 
The immediate issue is the natiu-e of the vetting of candidates. In addition to the process 
of satisfying the eligibility requirements (credentialing) before preselection, all of the 
parties' executive committees have the power to refuse to endorse or to disendorse 
candidates. The Democrats, Liberals in all divisions and the NSW National party, 
however, have a system of vetting the candidates before the preselection. The Labor party 
has no formal sifting process, preferring the matter be left to the preselectors. The 
question is whether the vetting committees act in such a way as to take the decision out 
of the hands of the properly constituted panel and deliver it into their own hands. For 
example, some simply make a recommendation to the preselectors; others have the 
power to refiise a candidate the opportunity to stand. 
Rule 5.5. (b), 5. 
^ LPA NSW, 1997. Constitution and Regulations. Rules 2.3.2, 4 and 3.5,1, 11. 
" LPA WA 1997. Constitution and Rules, Rule 117 (d) (iv), 54. 
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The Candidate Assessment Committees for the Democrats are elected directly by the 
membership in each division. They have the responsibility to determine whether each 
candidate is suitable for endorsement for public office. They proceed by interviewing 
each applicant and providing each with a written statement of their performance against 
certain criteria. ^  A candidate who is rejected has a right of appeal. 
Table 4.4: Qualifications Required to Nominate in a Preselection Ballot 
Source: 
Rules of each party (see References). 
Notes: 
* QuaUfications may be waived. 1 Or one year branch and three years union 
membership. 
^ Members of more than 12 month's Exceptions granted, 
duration. 
From within the electorate. The State Executive may declare any person seeking 
preselection to be unsuitable. 
^ 'The criteria for assessmg applications for endorsement shaU include: inter alia, party involvement, 
community mvolvement, public speaking skUls, employment history, suhabUity for ParUamentary work.' AD, 
1996. National Constitiition, Rule 11.2.27, 7. 
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In the NSW Liberal party the Nomination Review Committee, comprising the division 
president, the federal parliamentary leader, the electorate president and the State director 
interviews the candidates and recommends to State executive whether candidates are 'fit 
and proper' to present to a selection committee. There is a right of appeal against a 
decision to reject an application. The Victorian Liberal party has a two-part process. 
The first consists of a Prospective Candidates Committee appointed by the president of 
the division, which carries out a development program for potential candidates. At the 
time of application, the executive of the electoral coimcil investigates the qualifications 
of applicants and reports any findings to the Convention.^ ^ The Queensland Liberal party 
Management Committee appoints a Vetting Committee which investigates applications 
and recommends to State Executive, which having given a candidate an opportunity to be 
heard can deny an applicant proceeding to preselection.^° The Westem Australian Liberal 
party vetting is less interventionist, in as much as the chair of the selection committee 
simply makes a report on the veracity of the credentials and qualifications of the 
applicants, including 'the verification of all references and testimonials'.^' 
There is no provision to stop the application proceeding on grounds other than failure to 
satisfy the credentials test. The South Ausfralian Liberal party Candidate Review 
Committee consists of the division president and State parliamentary leader, the senior 
South Australian federal minister, various members of the executive, the presidents of 
each State Electorate Council within the federal electorate, and the Federal Electorate 
Council president. The committee must be satisfied that candidates are 'fit and proper 
persons'^ ^ for preselection and may recommend to State Executive against a candidate 
presenting to an electoral college. State Executive may refiise a nomination on the advice 
*'LPA NSW, 1997. Constitution and Regulations Rj\e 18.5.3 (a), 49. 
*^ LPA NSW, 1997. Constitution and Regidations, Rule 18.5.5 (c), 49. 
*' LPA V, 1997. Constitution, 'Prospective Candidates' Rule 15.7, 47. 'Investigations of Apphcants' Rule 
21.8,57. 
™ 'The Executive may with a minimum quorum of at least three quarters of its members present and by 
resolution carried by three quarters of those present, having given the candidate an opportunity to be heard, 
resolve that a candidate's nomination not be aUowed to proceed to a plebiscite or other preselection 
councU.' LPA Q, 1997. State Constitution, Rule 141 (5), 40. 
' ' LPA WA 1997. Constitution and Rules, Rules 115-117, 50. 
'^  LPA SA 1996. Constitution, fiinctions ofthe Candidate Review Committee, Rule 11.4.2, 33-34. 
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of the committee. There is no appeal against a refusal. The Tasmanian division 
Candidature Committee consists of the leader of the federal parliamentary party (or 
nominee), the State president and vice-president and two local members elected by the 
local electorate committee, whose job is to scmtinise all applications and report to the 
selection committee. There is no provision for refusing an applicant the opportunity to 
face the preselectors.^ '* The NSW branch of the National party undertakes a vetting 
procedure using the Electorate Council, the same body that preselects a candidate. The 
Council satisfies itself, based on several criteria,^ ^ about the suitability of candidates to 
enter the contest. There is no appeal from a decision to refuse the application.^^ 
Vetting procedures based on 'quality' criteria, and in some instances without appeal, can 
deny a candidate a chance at a ballot. Such a power places a very sfrong tool in the hands 
ofthe vetting committee and may be used to stifle competition. The panel of voters alone 
should decide the suitability of candidates. At the very least, if a party does not tmst its 
own panel, there should at least be an appeal from the decision ofthe vetting committee. 
Fair Conduct of the Ballot 
Each State division of each party has reasonably specific mles about the machinery 
aspects of the conduct of the ballot. Thirteen of the parties, however, failed in one or 
more of three areas of fair conduct. These are the truncation ofthe procedures, provisions 
for retiring members, and ethical behaviour. 
The provision common to all cases is that the executive can call for preselections when it 
chooses, and has the power to truncate the normal procedures when there is insufficient 
time, such as an election called at short notice. Given the flexibility in the electoral laws. 
'^  LPA SA 1996. Constitution, Rule 17.4.6, 44. The rules goveming vetting are m two different parts ofthe 
constitution and could cause confusion as to the proper process. Nevertheless, it is clear that a person can be 
refiised an opportunity to face preselection. 
'^* LPA T, 1996. Constitution, Rule 10. (c), 26. 
' ' 'The meeting shall then satisfy hself, ... that each prospective candidate ... satisfies acceptable standards 
of Character. Sincerity. General quaUfication. AbiUty.' NPA NSW, 1996. Constitution and Rules, Rule 
12.2.5, 29. 
'* 'If a prospective candidate is found to be unsuitable by faUmg to meet an acceptable standard ... the 
Electorate CouncU shall not recommend that person's endorsement [to face preselection] and shall report to 
Central CouncU the reasons for the faUure ofthe person to satisfy the Electorate CouncU.' NPA NSW, 1996. 
Constitution and Rules, Rule 12.2.6, 29. 
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which allow a govemment the power to determine the timing of an election, it would be 
difficult to expect the parties to deny themselves equivalent flexibility. Nevertheless, a 
variation in the timing of preselections and/or the tmncation of procedures can be a 
weapon in intemal battles. The key element is whether there are mles that govem the 
nature of the tmncation. For example, the NSW Labor party Adminisfrative Committee 
can call and close nominations for preselections 'in the way decided by the Rules'.^^ The 
circumstances that allow for variations are set out and include by-elections, when the call 
for nominations has failed, and when the candidates are not approved. In these cases, the 
Adminisfrative Committee can select the candidate if there is no time to hold a ballot.^ ^ 
The Victorian, Queensland and ACT Labor parties specify that if there is insufficient 
time to hold a ballot locally, the cenfral panel of delegates conducts the ballot.'^ Such an 
arrangement is somewhat easier to organise under a delegate system than it is in the case 
of a plebiscite. 
The Westem Ausfralian, Tasmanian and Northem Territory Labor parties' mles are silent 
on the issue of truncated processes, which leaves the matter in the hands of the 
adminisfrative committee. The South Australian Labor party relies on the State Council 
or, failing that, the State Executive to select a candidate where time does not allow the 
fiill preselection.^^ 
The NSW Liberal party can modify the procedures in very specific circumstances and, in 
the exfreme, dispense with them while at the same time consulting with the local panel. 
There are no mles covering truncated processes in the Victorian Liberal party, so the 
decision would fall to the adminisfrative committee. The Queensland Liberal party 
provides an altemative set of procedures for a tmncated preselection that involves the 
local members.^ "^  The Westem Ausfralian Liberal party has no truncated procedures other 
than to have State Council take over the running of the preselection. The South 
'^  ALP NSW, 1996-97. Platform and Rules, Rules D.4 (a), 101. 
'^  ALP NSW, 1996-97. Platform and Rules, Rule N.4, 114. 
'^  ALP V, 1996. Rules, Rule 15.8, 23. The Victorian rule has the additional opportunity for local 
preselection voters 'present at the scheduled tune' to participate. ALP Q, 1997. Rules, Rule 27.05, 39. ALP 
ACT, 1997. Rules and Regulations, Rule 11.5 a), 141. 
*" ALP SA 1994. Constitution, Rule 58.8, 56. 
*' LPA NSW, 1997. Constitution and Regulations, Rule 18.20, 57-58. 
^^  LPA Q, 1997. State Constitution, Rule 140, 39. 
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Ausfralian Liberal party has no truncated procedures; in 'special circumstances' the 
matter falls to State Executive to decide. The Tasmanian Liberal party has no tmncated 
procedure other than to leave the matter to the State Executive. ^ ^ The ACT Liberal party 
allows the Management Committee to endorse the candidate in certain circumstances.^ 
The CLP has a form of tmncated procedure, which allows some branch input into a 
decision of Central Council. The NSW National party essentially places the matter of 
expedited procedures in the hands of Central Council, although it is not clear that 
Council makes the choice, which is certainly the case in the Victorian and Queensland 
branches. 
One cause of a truncation of the normal preselection process is a Member of Parliament 
giving no notice of resignation. For instance, in the Victorian, Queensland and South 
Australian Labor parties the sitting member must give notice of their intention not to 
on 
nominate, otherwise nominations shall be re-opened. No other parties have rules for this 
event. The late notice of the intention to retire has been used from time to time to ensure 
a limited field of competitors. 
The major concem with the ability of a senior body, such as the adminisfrative 
committee, to tmncate the normal process of preselection is that emergency procedures 
may be too readily relied upon to ensure that a favoured candidate wins. The need for 
flexibility of response to the electoral timetable is a reasonable excuse; it should not be 
used as a weapon in the battle for preselection. The combination of the overmle power 
and the specific ability to adjust the timetable of a ballot or to truncate the procedures are 
^^  'If the President's Standing Committee consider a situation of emergency exists, it may, ... recommend 
such rules as are deemed necessary for the endorsement of candidates. Such action will be required to be 
ratified and endorsed by State Executive, which may be called to meet on one day's notice. LPA T, 1996. 
Constitution, Part XXVH, Rule Ale), 24. 
'^ Where 'writs have been issued for the conduct of an election at a time when the preselection process has 
not been completed ...' LPA ACT, 1997. Constitution, Rule 92(l)(h), 35. 
'^ 'The first opportunity to move the motion giving effect to any ... altemative procedures will rest with the 
Branch responsible...' CLP NT, 1997. Constitutional Requirements cmd Central CouncU Guidelines for 
Preselection q/" Candidates, Rule 98(i), 6. 
^ 'Where a parhamentary election is imminent and an Electorate CouncU has yet to be constituted. Central 
CouncU may caU for nominations in that electorate and set a timetable for pre-selection of a candidate.' NPA 
NSW, 1996. Constitution and Rules, Rule 12.1.1, 28. 
^' One month's notice. ALP V, 1996, Rules, Rule 15.13 a), 24. Fourteen day's notice prior to close of 
nominations. ALP Q, 1997. Rules Rule 25.05, 37. All sitting members must mdicate within fourteen days of 
receipt of letter from State Executive. 
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perhaps the most serious abuses available to the intermediate adminisfrative body in each 
party division. 
The parties' attempts to specify mles for ethical behaviour have been sparse. The 
Democrats National Executive attempted to write a code of conduct, but failed to agree 
on it. The NSW Labor party forbids the candidates to employ agents to campaign on their 
behalf, or to make personal comments about other candidates. The Queensland Labor 
party forbids the circulation of defamatory material and requires material to be 
authorised.^ ^ The Victorian Liberal party forbids a candidate retaining any professional 
consultant and from circularising any material 'intended to promote his or her 
candidacy'. The Westem Ausfralian Liberal party forbids members from making public 
statements about party matters. Should defamator>' statements be made, the individual is 
to be held personally liable.^' The Tasmanian Liberal party has a unique mle to allow the 
selection committee to meet and interview the applicants, retire for up to fourteen days to 
consider the matter, and then reconvene for endorsement. 
The sparsity of mles to ensure ethical behaviour seems to reflect the fact that specific 
incidents that have caused strife have been addressed by specific mles. As the 
Democrats' experience shows, a more general set of mles that may act as a guide to 
behaviour is too difficult to secure agreement. A more important ability is the response to 
specific events. 
The Secret Ballot 
There are three elements to ensure secrecy of the ballot in other than a postal ballot: 
separate voting compartments, a secure ballot box and privacy. Nine parties failed to 
specify one or more of these criteria. The Queensland Labor party mles provide that 
'suitable receptacles' be provided for use as ballot boxes and that these be secured. There 
** ALP NSW, 1996-97. Platform arui Rules, Rule N. 16 (c), 114. 
*^  ALP Q, 1997. Rules, Rule 30.07, 41. 
°^ LPA V, 1997. Constitution, Rules 21.7, 56 and 21.12, 57. 
'^ LPA WA 1997. Constitution and Rides, Rules 7 and 8, 73. 
^ LPA T, 1996. Constitiition, Part XXVH Rule C 11, 26. 
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is, however, no provision for voting compartments or privacy.^ ^ The Westem Australian 
Labor party mles state that 'a member entitled to vote may exercise their right to vote in 
secret'.^ '* There is, however, no provision whatsoever to ensure such secrecy. The South 
Australian Labor party has extensive mles to ensure a secret ballot, including the 
requirement that 'the Retuming Officer shall follow the same procedures as apply ... in 
ballots conducted by the Australian Electoral Commission'.^^ Although the NSW Liberal 
party allows for a secret ballot,^ ^ there are no mles to ensure this occurs. 
The Victorian Liberal party specifies a secret ballot for all manner of positions, from 
branch meetings, policy assembly delegates and Convention votes. On the selection of 
candidates it is more specific, requiring a secret ballot and that '[vjotes shall be cast by 
delegates in accordance with their individual judgement free of any direction, restriction 
or undertaking'.^^ The Westem Ausfralian Liberal party requires a secret ballot for 
preselection and a number of other party positions, but does not specify how this is to 
be ensured. The South Ausfralian Liberal party also requires a secret ballot for 
preselection but fails to specify how this is to be ensured, except to specify that 
'[sjcmtineers shall not during the course of the balloting in any way approach or 
communicate with other members of the College'.^^ The Tasmanian and ACT Liberal 
parties specify the ballot be secret but make no provision.'°° There is no mention of 
secret ballot in the CLP mles. 
The NSW National party specifies that a secret ballot be used and sets out in some detail 
how this is to be ensured. For example, '[tjhe voter must strictly adhere to the Retuming 
^^  ALP Q, 1997. Rules, Rule 30.18, 41. 
^^  ALP WA 1997. Constitution and Rules, Rule 14.1.9, 43. 
^^  ALP SA 1994. Constitution, Rule 58.2 (i), 52. 
'^ AUows for secret baUot for election of candidates by the Selection Committee 'in the manner determined 
by State CouncU from time to time.' LPA NSW, 1997. Constitution cmd Regulations, Rule 18.17 (g) (u), 
56. 
" For the House of Representatives, LPA V, 1997. Constitution, Rules 24.5 and 24.6, 64. For the Senate 
Rules 26.11 and 26.12, 67. The rale for the Representatives, however, leaves out mention of secret ballot in 
both the mle and the sub-heading. Presumably, given the number of times the specification is made 
throughout the rules, this is an oversight. 
^^  LPA WA 1997. Constitution and Rules, Rule 6, 70. 
^ LPA SA 1996. Constitiition, Rule 17.7.7 (b), 47. 
"^ LPA T, 1996. Constitution, Part XXIV, Rule 1. b), 22. LPA ACT, 1997. Constitution, Appendk One, 
Rule 6, 28. 
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Officer's directions ... to maintain the secrecy ... of the ballot'."°' The Victorian 
National party does not specify a secret ballot for preselection, but requires that 
'delegates must vote in person and the vote must be exercised free from any interference 
or obligation'.'^^ It does specify the use of a secret ballot however in a vote to disendorse 
a candidate.'^ ^ In the Queensland National party there is no mention of a secret ballot 
except, as a general provision of standing orders, when a dispute arises about a chair's 
mling. In such circumstances, members may request that a secret ballot be taken. "^ '' 
The secret ballot is one of the most sfraightforward and accepted procedures against 
fraud in a ballot. The fact that many party divisions fail to provide mles for a secret ballot 
is of great concem. A retuming officer, for example, may fail to apply rules in a ballot 
properly, but if a mle exists, at least a dissatisfied candidate has grounds to appeal a 
decision. The lack of mles raises a very sfrong suspicion that ballots are indeed no more 
than confirmation of a deal. The 'show-and-tell' ballots in the Labor party are a clear 
breach ofthe secret ballot. This occurs when members are paired to observe each other's 
ballot paper, to ensure that a deal is carried out. For example, in a ballot for several 
Senate preselections, two or three factions may agree beforehand that their candidates 
will each receive a position and the show-and-tell ballot ensures that the votes deliver the 
'right' result. Ballots as confirmation of a deal are not an inessential part of politics. 
However, the tmst that goes with allowing those who are presumed to agree with the 
deal, to do so, is essential. The essence of democracy, the dispersal of power, needs to be 
secured through the secret ballot. The desire to centralise power in a party and to 
maintain integrity often takes place at this simple point in an election, the ballot. 
Access to Fair Dispute Procedures 
For practical purposes, tribunals of the type found in political parties can rarely exhibit 
the standards of impartiality expected of a court. 'Domestic tribunals are often 
constituted of persons who may, or even must, have taken some part in the matters 
'°' NPA NSW, 1996. Constitution and Rules, Rules 5. b) (v), 36. 
'°^ NPA V, 1997. Constitution and Rules, Rule 120 (e). 
'°^NPA V, 1997. Constitution and Rules, Rule 129. 
""* NPA Q 1995. Constitution, The Schedule 21, 32. 
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conceming which they are called upon to exercise their quasi-judicial function'.^ "^ ^ It is of 
course common that members of a disputes tribunal will be chosen for their political 
allegiance, apart from any other attributes that may be useful to the task. The provision 
by the parties for the semi-judicial functions that members must perform from time to 
time varies considerably. A sophisticated disputes procedure may not guarantee faimess 
in the settlement of disputes, and a simple procedure may indicate nothing more than the 
absence of conflict or a conservative or obedient party constituency, or indeed an 
autocratic leadership. Further, a sophisticated disputes procedure almost inevitably 
involves a quasi-judicial method and may reflect the degree to which the party has been 
affected by the general move towards the judicialisation of politics observed in Australia 
and elsewhere. '^ ^ 
Nevertheless, the variation in the procedures for dispute settlement within the parties 
may provide some clues as to the seriousness with which parties take their role of 
securing the rights of members, as opposed to keeping the peace. A party with no formal 
procedures, or with procedures that lack even the mdiments of natural justice, would fail 
the test. On this basis, six State party divisions did so fail. An example of poor procedure 
is where the only opportunity to put a case occurs in a forum such as a State conference, 
where a proper hearing would be most difficult to accommodate and therefore unlikely. 
The appeals systems at the federal level follow closely the powers of the national body. 
Neither the National party Federal Management Committee nor Federal Council have 
provision for an appeals body. The Liberal party Federal Executive is able to delegate its 
powers to a sub-committee or establish a Review Committee. The Democrats have a 
National Appeals Committee, and the Labor party uses the National Executive. On a 
question of expulsion, however, the Labor party establishes an Appeal Committee for 
which there are procedural guidelines. 
'°^ Quoted in, Forbes, J.KS. 1996. 'Judicial Review of Political Parties' Research Paper 21 Departmert of 
ParUamentary Library, Commonwealth of Austraha, 8. Bowen v Australian Workers' Union (no. 2) (1948) 
77 CLR 630. 
'"* Johns, G 1997. 'The Arrogance ofthe Unelected'. Proceedings of the Australasian Political Studies 
Association Conference. Adelaide. 391-408. ValUnder, T. 1994. 'The Judicialization of Politics: A World-
Wide Phenomenon.' Intemational Political Science Review 15 (2): 91-9. 
'"' For example, part 7.'All parties to an appeal are entitled to be represented at the hearing by some other 
person of thdr choice. Any such representative, whether legally qualified or not, must be a member ofthe 
party.' ALP National Executive, 1987. Procedural Guidelines For Appeals Committee, Minutes, 12 
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The sophistication of the appeals systems in each division varies between the 
extraordinary, such as the NSW and ACT branches of the Labor party, and the ordinary, 
such as the NSW and Victorian National parties' State Coimcils, which are pooriy 
specified as appeal bodies. Appeals can be heard on all maimer of issues such as 
credentials, discipline, expulsion and ballots. Only the right to be heard on a disputed 
preselection ballot is essential to the consideration of fair preselections. The less 
sophisticated systems lack the mdiments of a fair appeal process and, in some cases, no 
right of appeal on the question of a disputed preselection ballot. 
The Democrats, every division of the Labor party, the Westem and South Australian 
branches of the Liberal party, the CLP and the Queensland Nationals have a disputes 
tribunal, which is a separate body from the executive. Each hears appeals on contested 
ballots and allows an appeal to State conference from a decision of the tribunal. The 
Victorian Liberal party has no tribunal but has a detailed complaints procedure for 
preselections, which involves the State director and the adminisfrative committee. The 
procedure includes the right to be heard, and a final vote by the administrative committee 
by a two-thirds majority.'°^ The remainder have less than satisfactory processes. 
The NSW Liberal party has no tribunal and allows an appeal to State executive on a 
rejection of nomination. On the ballot itself there are the regulations to guide the conduct 
ofthe ballot and the decision ofthe retuming officer is final.'^^ The Queensland Liberal 
party has no tribunal and no process for handling disputes set out in the mles. Further, if a 
candidate does not object to the composition of the plebiscite, 'that candidate shall be 
deemed to have waived any right they might otherwise have ...'"*^ There are no 
provisions in the mles ofthe Tasmanian and ACT Liberal branches for the resolution of a 
dispute arising from a ballot. 
November. Canberra: National Secretariat. (Mimeo) The guidelines were drawn up in response to the 
expulsion m 1986 of left-winger Bill Hartley, who was advised by Alec Shand QC. 
'°* LPA V, 1997. Constitution, Rule 27.6, 68. 
'°^ LPA NSW, 1997. Constitution and Regulations, Regulations C. 15.2, 24. 
"" LPA Q, 1997. State Constitution, Rule 135 (g), 36. 
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The NSW branch of the National party has no dispute mechanism, and like the 
Queensland Liberal party has a waiver mechanism, which forestalls any appeal."' The 
Victorian National party holds that, in the event of a dispute, the retuming officer's 
decision shall be final 'subject only to State Coimcil determining otherwise'.'''^ There is 
no indication as to how the matter is to be raised at State Council and whether an 
individual has the right of appeal. 
The access to fair disputes procedures is one of the most intimate of areas for the display 
of power in a political party. It is rarely open to outside scmtiny or comment. There are, 
however, a number of intemal party disputes that have, very recently, come before the 
courts. Once in the courts, judges may insist on a standard of dispute settlement that the 
court thinks appropriate. The parties may be forced to change their mles in response to 
this outside influence. A more sophisticated requirement of a disputes tribunal would be 
to free it from the control of the party entirely. This policy has huge implications for the 
freedom of association ofthe parties, and may be an example of two great principles, free 
association and democracy coming into conflict. These matters are explored more fiilly 
in Chapter six. 
Affirmative Action 
For the reasons outlined earlier, affirmative action is not regarded as a basic principle of 
fair democratic processes. Nevertheless, there is considerable debate about the 'politics 
of presence',"^ where the characteristics of candidates count as much as the ideas they 
represent. In this regard, it is worthwhile reporting the response by the parties to the 
perceived need to have a greater female representation in Parliament. Clearly, the 
response depends on the acceptance by the parties of the values implicit in the policy; 
even then, the means of implementation has varied considerably. 
' " 'The Returmng Officer shall request the meeting chairman to call for and put to the meeting a motion that 
at this stage the conduct ofthe baUot is correct. If the motion is not resolved in the affirmative then the 
baUot shall be declared nuU and void, the matters disputing the correctness ofthe baUot shall be resolved by 
the meeting and the whole of this procedure shaU begin again ...' NPA NSW, 1996. Constitution and Rules, 
Appendix C 5. f), 36. 
"^ NPA V, 1997. Constitution and Rules, Rule 120 (h). 
"^ PhUUps, A. 1995. The Politics of Presence. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
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The Democrats have no mles or procedures that could be described as affirmative action 
for women, including a women's section ofthe party. They nevertheless have the highest 
proportion of female representatives of any party. Most ofthe parties have some mles in 
place whether for candidate selection or other positions in the party (not counting a 
women's section which is common to all). The remainder have no mles and very low 
levels of female representation. 
The Labor party response has been guided by the national mles on affirmative action, 
agreed upon in 1994.'^ '' The mle requires that a minimum quota of 35% of all party, 
union delegation, and public office preselected positions be allocated to women by 2001. 
The NSW Labor party has the only example of a weighted ballot, where a female 
candidate's votes are weighted by a factor of 20% (see note 30). Kelly Hoare is the first 
woman to succeed because of this mle. She defeated a male preselection candidate for 
the seat of Charlton in 1995, by just 1.2 votes out of 135. Without the 20% weighting she 
would not have succeeded. The seat is safe for Labor and she is now the Member for 
Charlton."^ In addition, NSW Labor has a quota for other positions m the party as 
prescribed by the national mles. The Victorian Labor party has a target of 35% of 
females to be preselected in witmable seats, as does every other branch; the only 
variation is the date of fulfilment ofthe target, which was 1994 for Victoria and 2002 for 
the ACT branch. The Tasmanian branch has set a 40% target to be achieved in any party 
election."^ 
The Liberal party has no quotas for the election of women to public office in any 
division, and considerable variation in the imposition of quotas for party positions across 
State divisions. The NSW Liberal party imposes quotas on some positions, the election of 
office bearers to Federal Electorate Conferences, the election of office bearers to State 
Council and the Convention Committee of State Convention.''^ The use of quotas in the 
Victorian Liberal party is comprehensive. There is a designated position on the executive 
of branches and (as far as possible) branch committees, a 50% quota is imposed on 
'"• ALP 1994. Platform, 325. 
" ' Kelly Hoare. Interview, 29 October 1997. 
"^ 'In any election involving two or more positions, at least 40% of those elected shaU be women 
ALP T, 1997. Rules, Rule 12.4, 16. 
"^ LPA NSW, 1997. Constitiition and Regulations, Rules 5.3.1 (c), 26, 10.4, 35, 14.2.1, 43, 
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delegations to Federal Electorate Councils, State Council and State Convention, as well 
as for the office bearers of these bodies."^ The South Ausfralian Liberal party has a quota 
artangement where branch delegates to Electorate Committees, Regional Conventions 
and State Council shall 'where possible at least one shall be a man and one shall be a 
woman'."^ This provision does not apply to the selection of delegates for Electoral 
Colleges. The Queensland National party provides for a woman delegate in branch 
delegations (consisting of 5) to State Electorate Councils, Federal Divisional Councils 
and State Electoral Council delegations to State Conference.'^° These provisions do not 
apply to the selection of delegates to Central Council, which is the electoral college for 
Senate candidates, and in lieu of a local plebiscite can be the electoral college for House 
of Representatives preselections. 
The remainder, those that have no mles for affirmative action, are the Liberal party in 
Queensland, Westem Australia, Tasmania and the ACT, the CLP and the National party 
in NSW and Victoria. The response to the policy of affirmative action makes a clear 
divide between progressive (accepting) and conservative (not accepting) parties. The 
results indicate clearly why the policy cannot be accepted as a universal principle of 
faimess. 
Conclusion 
Using a measure of anti-competitiveness, the audit of party mles reveals some serious 
deficiencies in the stmcture ofthe selection panels in many divisions ofthe Labor party. 
The anti-competitive nature of the Labor panels arises from the weight of the vote given 
to frade imions, and more important, the ability to use votes in a bloc, as of right. The 
panels for the Coalition parties are far more dispersed. The opportunities to aggregate 
power are not based on the stmcture of panels. As the Democrats operate on a plebiscite 
basis and almost exclusively across the entire division, the issue of mixing the various 
component parts of a party does not arise. 
"* For example, office bearers for State CouncU must be 50%© women, which include Vice-Presidents, 
Adnunistrative Committee, State Council Agenda Committee, and Pohcy Assembly (members of which form 
one part ofthe preselection conventions). LPA V, 1997. Constitution, Rule 11.2, 35. 
' " LPA SA 1996. Constitiition, Rules 6.7.2, 11 and 7.5.3 (b), 17. 
'^ ^ NPA Q, 1995. Constitution, Rules 41. (a), 9, 51. (b), 11, 79. (b), 15. 
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Using six principles derived from the Commonwealth Electoral Act, the audit indicates a 
general failure to allow an equal weight to be accorded each vote in a preselection ballot. 
The unequal weight of votes may be relatively mild in its impact, as with extra votes for 
female and youth wings of all the parties, but sometimes through the formation of special 
branches, membership categories, and special voting rights the impact may be 
substantial. There are elements of weakness in each system to maintain the integrity of 
the roll. The propensity, indeed the temptation, to use the mles or indeed to ignore the 
mles in order to affect voter eligibility is a serious area for improvement for almost all of 
the parties. In some instances, too much power is left in the hands of local officials, 
without supervision. In others, too much power rests in the hands of central 
adminisfrators who use their discretion to affect eligibility. The conduct of the ballot is 
clearly professional and highly scmtinised in some parties, for example, the NSW, 
Victorian and Queensland Labor parties and in the NSW and Queensland divisions ofthe 
Liberal party, but elsewhere they are unsatisfactory. Provision for the secret ballot is 
more complete in the Coalition parties and much less so in the Labor party where the 
ethos of using 'super\ised voting' in the ballots to confirtn deals is entrenched. Disputes 
procedures are mdimentary in some of the divisions of the Liberal and National parties, 
and generally highly sophisticated in the Labor party divisions. 
If the democratic process is conceived of as links in a chain, then there are significant 
weaknesses in the links of nearly every party audited. The results indicate that these 
significant weaknesses can lead to a breakdown in democratic practice and that that 
breakdown is not confined to the local members, local branches or the executives of the 
parties. All or any of these have the opportunity to behaviour poorly. The break in the 
links in the democratic process is not solely confined to the mles, nor is their remedy. 
The behaviour of various actors within the parties and the ways in which they organise 
also exert a powerfiil influence. 
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The Integrity of Association in Political Parties 
The competition for the party label takes many forms and is handled by the parties 
and the candidates in different ways, some of which stretch the limits of the integrity 
of association. Each competitor may seek to control the factors that will determine the 
outcome of a preselection. The party officers are charged with the responsibility to 
maintain the integrity ofthe organisation as a whole. Many ofthe strategies which the 
candidates use to improve their chance of success, or which the powerbrokers use to 
manage the process of preselection, while highly consfrained by the mles, are not 
determined by them. These sfrategies affect the competitiveness and the faimess of 
the preselections and the freedom of association of the members. Overall, they have 
an impact on the integrity ofthe parties. 
The competition for endorsement takes place within an environment where some 
factors are extemal to the party and beyond the control of the competitors, and 
sometimes beyond the confrol of the parties. Other factors are intemal to the party 
and in the hands ofthe candidates, such as the resources and skills that they can apply 
in order to gain the requisite number of votes. These requirements will depend, to 
some extent, on the source of votes and the type of panel to be faced. Still other 
factors are intemal to the party, but mostly beyond the reach of candidates. They are 
the province of 'head office', cenfral panels and factions. 
Taking into account these various sources of influence on the competition for 
endorsement, three different types of ways of managing competition are assessed for 
their impact on the integrity ofthe parties. 
The Integrity of Association in PolUical Parties 
Factors External to the Party 
A smorgasbord of extemal events may conspire to change the competitive 
circumstances of a preselection. The agent may be the Church. The Anglican 
Archbishop openly supported the candidacy of the first Aboriginal member of the 
Commonwealth Parliament, Neville Bonner, who was endorsed in 1971 for the 
Queensland Liberal Party Senate ticket.' It may be the police: 'the pLabor] party had 
preselected a young person [for Corio] ... the cops caught him pissing in 
Woolworths' car park. He was pulled out, persuaded not to stand ... four weeks 
before the [1983] election'.^ On the other hand, it may be God. In 1980, the probable 
winner ofthe preselection for the Nationals in Riverina died just three weeks before 
the preselection. This reduced the field of candidates from three to two.^  Largely, 
though, the major factors extemal to the parties are redistribution, an eariy election, 
the unexpected retirement of an incumbent and the history of previous preselections 
in the seat. 
A redistribution of electoral boundaries is relatively common in the Federal arena, 
especially in States where the population growth has been above or below the national 
average. This may cause significant disruption to the prospects of candidates through 
a change of boundaries and its impact on the margin required to win or retain a seat. 
Altematively, and just as important, a redistribution can affect the base of party 
members remaining in a district. These events may enhance prospects'* for those who 
may not otherwise have had an opportunity to stand. They may bring pressure on a 
member who was previously unchallenged at preselection. The seat of Throsby was 
won by Colin Hollis for Labor as a marginal seat and became safer with subsequent 
redistributions. As the threat from the Liberal party declined, that from the Labor 
party increased: 'the safer the seat the more marginal the member. The last tv/o 
preselections have been very torrid'.^ 
' Burger, A 1979. Neville Bonner: A Biography. Melboume: MacmUlan, 76 
^ Gavin O'Connor MHR, ALP V. Interview, 26 November 1997. 
3 Noel Hicks MHR, NPA NSW. Interview, 23 October 1997. 
•* NeU O'Keefe MHR, ALP V, relied on a major redistribution, which caused a chain of events and led to 
his successful bid m Bourke. See Hon Andrew Theophanous, ALP V. Interview, (undated) latel997. 
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A redistribution may cause tiie party to close down the competition to the advantage 
of one candidate, and leave another to sink. Former Prime Minister Paul Keating's 
attempt to win the 1969 preselection in Banks was thwarted by redistribution. With 
the help of the adminisfration, the entire membership of one of his branches was 
transferted to Blaxland 'exactly one year and one day before the preselection ballot,'^ 
thus ensuring his victory. Hon Leo McLeay MHR commented on the propriety ofthe 
timing ofthe preselection, saying 'it wasn't crookery, it was being able to have an 
input into the determining ofthe date'. A left faction candidate for the Labor seat of 
Griffiths withdrew from the race when the 1994 redistribution took her numbers out 
ofthe seat, thus handing Griffiths to a right faction opponent. 
An early election may also upset candidates' plans and deliver the power to determine 
the preselection into the hands of others. On a number of occasions the Labor party 
National Executive has used the pretext of an early election to confirm existing 
members and avoid a preselection stmggle. In 1983 and 1987, all Labor Senate tickets 
were confirmed, and in 1992 all ministers in the Keating Govemment, and the 
Speaker, were endorsed in this way.^  The NSW Liberal executive also used this 
excuse to by-pass the normal endorsement procedures. Jeanette Thomley, the Liberal 
candidate for Macquarie was disendorsed in 1995 and challenged the 'urgent 
endorsement procedures' ofthe party because the executive's excuse of an imminent 
election was patently false. "^  
An unexpected early retirement, or the suggestion of one, by an incumbent can affect 
the outcome, or even determine the nature of the competition. The Liberal Member 
for Wakefield, Geoffrey Giles, let it be known in 1982 that he was thinking of 
standing down, and then changed his mind. The announcement let loose the 
competition from those who had been prepared to wait." The same occmred with Ian 
^ Colm HoUis MHR, ALP NSW. Interview, 23 October 1997. 
^ Cummmg \99\. Labor Mates, 74. 
' Cumming 1991. Labor Mates, 79. 
* Norma Jones, former organiser ALP Q and would-be candidate. Conversation March 1998. 
^ See Appendbc 2. 
'" Jeanette Thomley, candidate LPA NSW. Various conversations late 1998-early 1999. Also see 
Thomley v HeflFeman CLS 1995 NSWC EQ 206. 
" Neil Andrew MHR, LPA SA. hiterview, 22 September 1997. 
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Wilson, Liberal Member for Sturt, who allegedly reneged in 1991 on a commifrnent 
to retire, too late to stave off a successful challenge.'^ The unexpected announcement 
ofthe eariy retirement of Hon. Peter Baldwin Member for Sydney in 1998 left the 
competition for preselection 'wide open'. Baldwin commented, 'this is a real local 
plebiscite because ofthe unanticipated nature of it'.'^ 
The history of the competition in a particular seat may determine the nature of 
subsequent preselections. In Sydney, the great battle by the left faction to wrest 
confrol ofthe Labor party branches from the right faction in Baldwin's preselection of 
1982 was so successful that the recent preselection was between members of the 
Labor left. The wiimer ofthe 1997 local plebiscite, Tanya Plibersek MHR, described 
the preselectors of Sydney as 'very sophisticated, quite different from the factional 
assigned "sign-ups" of some elections'.''' Seats may remain a battleground for 
factions over many years with competing groups within a party agreeing not to give 
way. The safe Liberal seat of Curtin'^ has remained a factional battleground in 
Westem Australia for some twenty years, with the incumbent Alan Rocher MHR 
facing no fewer than six preselections between 1981 and 1996. 
Largely, extemal events open competition by presenting an opportunity that may not 
otherwise have arisen for candidates. They can also upset the best-laid plans of those 
in a favoured or dominant position. They make outcomes less predictable by 
offsetting the control that candidates and others seek to impose on the process. Then 
again, they may work to close competition by excluding a candidate or presenting an 
opportunity to a powerful body in a party to assert authority by changing the process 
through the mles. Mostly, extemal events present the occasional opportunity or the 
occasional crisis, but they are not a significant factor in shaping the behaviour of the 
'^  Christopher Pyne. Interview, 29 October 1997. 
'^  Hon Peter Baldwin, ALP NSW. Interview, 19 November 1997. 
''' Tanya Plibersek, candidate ALP NSW and staff member of Senator George CampbeU, ALP NSW. 
Conversation 27 October 1997. 
' ' The Sir Charles Court, LPA WA and Noel Crichton-Browne's faction, agamst the Fred Chaney 
faction, mitially backed Rocher. Rocher was then abandoned by them, to be supported by the Prune 
Minister against Crichton-Browne's new candidate, Julie Bishop. Alan Rocher MHR, LPA WA. 
Interview, 23 September 1997. Senator Noel Crichton-Browne, LPA WA. Interview, 13 August 1998, 
and Noel Crichton-Browne's notes on the Bishop preselection (mimeo) Appendix 3, 
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parties in managing preselections. They provide only a fleeting insight into the 
integrity ofthe process. 
Candidate Skills and Local Panels 
The way in which candidates seek to win preselection, the nature of the contest and 
the panel they face offer significant insights to the integrity of the process. On being 
accused of recmiting new members in time for a preselection, a candidate recently 
pleaded in his defence, 'preselection for candidates should be based on merit'.'^ To 
which the reply is, what is the measure of merit in a preselection? Is it the best 
recmiter, the best speaker, the most loyal member? Clearly, there are skills that a 
candidate needs to win a preselection. These skills are quite different for different 
parties, for different electorates within the same party, and even the same party and 
same electorate at different times. 
Candidates working alone may be able to convince a local selection panel for support, 
but often they rely on others to do so. Hon. Jim McLelland's view of his own 
preselection, 'to a large extent I had to win the preselection myself,' was preceded by 
the admission that he 'had contributed many delegates to Ducker's [senior union 
official and NSW president] support by the factional victories in which I had been 
involved ... I was able to remind Ducker of this ...''^ The Senate preselection 
depended heavily on union delegates and McLelland was a barrister who had 
appeared in the industrial court for many unions. On the other hand. Senator Peter 
Walsh's view was '1 never had to scrounge for preselection votes or do deals'.'^ But 
Senator Walsh also admits that he relied on others, in particular [activists and future 
Federal Ministers] John Dawkins and Bob McMullan, to lobby on his behalf for his 
position on the Westem Ausfralian Labor Senate ticket. 
The skills required of a candidate will vary with the requirements and nature of the 
local panel. Sir Billy Snedden, a former leader ofthe Opposition, described his 1955 
'^  Mr Ciobbo, mooted candidate for the Liberal party for the seat of MoncrieflF, The Courier-MaU, 31 
May 2000. 
" McLeUand, J. 1988. Stirring the Possum: A Political Autobiography. Melboume: Pengum, 123. 
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preselection for the seat of Bmce, which occurred before a panel where the 
candidates were largely unknown, as 'naive' and a 'beauty contest'. '^  Where contact 
with the panel is restricted to literature sent out by the candidates, as was the case 
with John Hewson's 1986 preselection for Wentworth, the panel may be flooded by 
material. 'Not waiting for the preselectors to find out about him for themselves, 
Hewson delivered by courier to each of them a weighty document containing 
testimonies from 95 personal referees'.^^ In addition to the material in circulation, the 
beauty contests characteristic of the Liberal and National parties rely heavily on the 
performance on the day. According to Tony Abbott MP, his 1994 Warringah 
preselection was largely won because of his public profile. He distributed a lO-minute 
video of his media performances, and an 'excellent' list of referees and 'made a 
"7 1 
corker of a speech' to secure his nomination. 
A panel of new recmits signed-up to vote for their sponsor may undertake no 
evaluation of the candidates at the ballot. The emphasis may be wholly intemally 
focussed with scant regard for the electoral prospects of the party. This scenario is 
likely in a safe seat but may occur in a marginal seat if the conditions are right. In this 
type of contest, a candidate's skills lie in recmitment and possibly an ability to trade 
allegiance for further numbers. In the preselection for Banks, Daryl Melham out-
stacked the sitting member. 'There was a massive stacking operation [between 1984-
1986]. The branch membership went from 850 to 1,500. The tmth is 440 of them 
were Mountford's [MHR] and we basically responded'."^^ Sometimes the skill 
required is to climb aboard the most promising vehicle, whether this is a faction or a 
leader or head office. Kelvin Thomson MHR tended to the Left of the Labor party 
ideologically but joined Labor Unity (the Right faction in Victoria) when he saw it 
was better organised and could help his career. A panel of members, deferential to 
the requirements and views of the senior managers '^' of the party, play only a 
legitimising role. They will, essentially, give authority to the choice ofthe managers. 
'^  Walsh, P. 1995. Confessions of a Failed Firumce Minister. Sydney: Random House, 13. 
'^  Snedden, B. and M. Schedvin, 1990. Billy Snedden: An Unlikely Liberal Melboume: MacmiUan. 
^^  Abjorensen, N. 1993. John Hewson: A Biography. Melboume: Lothian Books, 101 and 99. 
'^ Tony Abbott MHR, LPA NSW. Interview, 12 November 1997. 
" DarreU Melham MHR, LPA NSW. Interview, 18 December 1997. 
23 Kelvin Thomson MHR, ALP V. Interview, 25 November 1997. 
'^' Ron BosweU. Interview, 22 February 1999. 
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A wise candidate will concentrate on the senior managers for their support. The 
likelihood of power being delivered upward in this manner tends to increase with the 
opacity of the process. Having people who understand little of the process may 
increase opacity. This is more likely with new recmits and with ballots among 
delegates most removed from the knowledge ofthe candidates. 
In a marginal seat, the choice of candidate may have a real bearing on the election. 
That being so, the focus ofthe preselection may be predominantly on the candidate's 
ability to win the seat. A sfrategic decision by a panel is evident in the three-comered 
contests where the National, Liberal and Labor votes are significant. The National 
Party seat of Gippsland is vulnerable to challenge from the Liberal Party. In the 
opinion ofthe wiimer ofthe 1983 preselection for Gippsland, Hon. Peter McGauran 
MHR, the panel chose him because he was a 'solicitor with the same farming 
credentials' as his opponent and therefore more likely to appeal to Liberal voters.^ ^ 
The National party seat of Riverina, on the other hand, is vulnerable to challenge 
from Labor, so in the 1980 preselection the panel chose a former Mayor of Broken 
Hill, Noel Hicks, to appeal to Labor voters. 'If you want to win this seat you have to 
get some votes from Broken Hill ... I've been the mayor' was his successfiil pitch. 
Where the choice of candidate may have little bearing on the election, most likely in a 
safe seat, the focus may be almost exclusively on the candidate's ability to represent 
the party or a section of it. 
As a general proposition, and judging from those party divisions which have a vetting 
process (see Table 4.4), it is clear that the Labor party contests (and the National party 
Queensland and Victoria) do not require candidates to perform in public, at least not 
at the local panel level. There is no emphasis on the local candidate to convince the 
local panel of their merit to be the party's candidate. The sole emphasis is on 
gathering support for a ballot. These skills are altogether different to the performance 
skills required of those systems that vet the candidate and require formal speeches 
and questions. These are very common in the Democrats, the Liberal party and in the 
25 Peter McGauran. Interview, 19 November 1997. 
^^  Noel Hicks. Interview, 23 October 1997. 
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National party in NSW. The ethos of, indeed the meaning of, selecting on 'merit' is 
entirely different in the two systems. 
Candidates and Preferred Sources of Votes 
Where preselection candidates have to exercise the skills of recmitment, then 
logically, they will recmit where there is the best retum for effort. The calculus ofthe 
candidates, particularly when applied to recmiting, will be determined by the 
incentives and rewards attaching to recmiting certain types of voter. Some incentives 
and disincentives are provided in the party mles. Until very recently, the double 
voting rights of Young Liberals in the Westem Ausfralian and NSW divisions made 
them an obvious target. In the NSW National party, 'a company, organisation, firm, 
partnership, estate, or tmst [may have] a Nominated Member [as well as] fiirther 
nominated members, up to a maximum of four...'^^ Such an incentive to recmit 
among the farming and business community would be difficult to resist! The ban on 
family members and staff voting in a number of Liberal divisions is an obvious 
disincentive to recruit. With the NSW National party, the ban extends to employees. 
'A person who is or was within the period of six months prior to the date on which 
applications for endorsement were first called an employee of a business controlled 
by an applicant... shall not be eligible to be a delegate'. None of these bans exist in 
the Labor party, where one Federal Member is alleged to have 25 members of his 
family enrolled to vote in his branches.^ ^ 
Rules can lower or raise the incentive or the cost of recruitment through the length of 
membership or attendance required to be eligible to vote. Table 5.1 sets out the period 
for which members have to join and the number of branch meetings they must attend 
before being eligible to vote. There is a considerable variation between the parties 
and divisions. The importance of the vote of local delegates or voters, over which a 
candidate may have some sway, also varies considerably. Taking the House of 
Representative panels only (the Senate panels are highly cenfralised and not as 
" NPA NSW, 1996. Constitution and Rules. Rules 2.5.1-2, 9. 
^^  LPA V, 1997. Constitution. Rule 23.13, 62. 
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susceptible to a local recmiting strategy), the incentive to recmit in the NSW Labor 
party is high because the panel consists 100% of local voters. The barrier to 
successfiil recmiting, however, is high, inasmuch as an eligible voter must be a 
member for 2 years and attend 3 branch meetings in the year before the ballot. The 
Baldwin preselection showed the difficulty of a candidate maintaining numbers, 
where only 700 were eligible out of 2,000 branch members (Table 5.2). 
The cost of recruiting in the Westem Australian Labor party is low. The requirement 
is just one month's membership with no requirement to attend meetings to be eligible 
to vote. The incentive, however, is also low—the branch vote accounts for just 12% 
of the total panel. In the Westem Ausfralian Liberal party, the cost of recmiting is 
low—one month to be eligible and no branch meetings. Moreover, the incentive to 
recruit is high as the branch vote accounts for 85% ofthe total panel. The incentive to 
recmit is also high in the South Ausfralian Liberal party, and a member seeking to 
stave off attack would be best served by local recmiting. Christopher Pyne MHR 
lifted his branch membership from 780 to 1200 between 1992 and 1995 after 
defeating a sitting member at the 1991 preselection 'because I knew they would 
challenge me the next time'.^° 
On occasion, the integrity of voter rolls is questionable. For example, some parties do 
not keep branch records, and 'paper branches' may be established in order to gamer 
delegates. In a system that allocates the same number of delegates to branches, 
irtespective of branch size, there is an incentive to establish, or campaign among, 
small branches. Senator Bronwyn Bishop reportedly used this technique, 'The West of 
Sydney was full of pocket branches ... and each of them sent... one delegate to state 
council. In terms of putting one's time to best use these ... were undoubtedly the 
branches to target'.^^ 
^^  Hon Laurie Brereton MHR, ALP NSW. As reported in 1997 to the author, by Hon. 'Johnno' Johnson 
MLC, ALP NSW. 
°^ Christopher Pyne. Interview, 29 October 1997. 
'^ Christopher Puphck. Interview, 8 December 1998. 
32 Leser, D. 1994. Bronwyn Bishop: A Woman in PursuU of Power. Melboume: Text Publishing, 72. 
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Table 5.1: Incentive to Recruit Voters for HoR Preselections for Each Party 
Party and Division Minimum ;i Number of Branch li Local Branch 
Membership to i! Meetings Attended |i Voters 
L 
Qualify to Vote ; to Qualify to Vote 
(months) 
Democrat 
Labor 
L.^ 
NSW+ACT 
k.=...==:...=.==;^  Victoria 
1 
24 
12 
wil^lUwH'^l'Alabirt'ild 
\ %Total Vote of 
! Preselection Panel 
fvvtr**ffj^rvy»/ 
100%' 
100% 
50% 
Queensland 50% 
Westem Australia + 
Northem Territory 
South Australia | 
Tasmania I 
13 
6 
'L 
0 
12% + 100% 
25% 
50% 
Liberal 
NSW 
Victoria + Queensland | 
Western Australia j 
I 
South Australia i 
12 
1 
_ F J _ 
60-90% 
60% + 66% 
85% 
75% 
Tasmania I 24 100% 
National 
^ ACT^ 
NSW 
_ Victoria 
3 
i 
6 
0 
0 
100% 
100% 
90% 
Queensland 100%' 
Source: 
Rules ofthe parties m the study as referenced. 
Notes: 
' The Democrats allow for a local plebiscite for House of Representatives, however their membership is 
often so low in a particular seat, that the State executive selects with local advice. 
^ A rule not always uivoked, often 60% local with 40% central panel. 
The formal requirements of a candidate for membership of a party are largely very 
few (see Table 4.4), and present no great impediments to competition. The Democrats 
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and the Liberal party generally require a candidate to be a member for less than three 
months, and often only one month, with no requirement to have attended branch 
meetings. The Labor party generally requires membership of 12 months (as do the 
Victorian Liberals) and the Queensland division 3 years but with a proviso to relax 
this requirement for exceptional candidates. This proviso was used for Cheryl Kemot 
MHR, former Leader ofthe Ausfralian Democrats, who defected to the Labor party in 
1998 and successfully sought a Queensland seat. The NSW and ACT Labor parties 
have the most arduous requirement of 2 years' membership and attendance at 3 
branch meetings, and no proviso to overmle. 
Although the residence mles of the party divisions (see Table 4.3) reveal two very 
different systems, electorate and branch qualification for voting, the impact on the 
incentive to recmit is unclear. The qualification to vote in the Labor party (except 
Westem Ausfralia and South Australia) and the National party divisions of NSW and 
Victoria is based on the electorate residence of the member. In the Liberal party 
(except in the ACT) and the in the National Party Queensland division, the 
qualification is based on the branch membership. The member can live anywhere but 
must join a branch inside the electorate. The rationale for the former is clear— t^he 
local party activists are best placed to know their electorate. The explanation for the 
latter is that the system encourages members who live in safe seats to join and work 
in marginal areas. 'You can live anywhere you like. We [in the Liberal party] would 
prefer to encourage members in places like Bragg [South Australia State electorate] 
where we have a 32% margin to join in marginal Liberal seats and be active there'. 
The reality, however, is sometimes quite the opposite, fri order to win preselection in 
the safe seats, candidates recmit branch members from anywhere and everywhere.^ '* 
The degree of control a candidate may exercise over branch voters is a major source 
of power. To sign up or assist people who subsequently cannot be relied upon may be 
handing numbers to an opponent. 'On the ground in Geelong, my [Gavin O'Connor 
MHR] opponents who had cars running people up to the preselection had people in 
" Christopher Pyne. Interview, 8 December 1998. 
^^ Michael Johnson. Intaviews, March-April 1999. 
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those cars who voted for me'.^ ^ The now commonplace sources of malleable numbers 
at the local level are young and ethnic voters. University students have long been a 
source of activists in political parties, and in some instances, their enthusiasm and 
naivety may make them particularly loyal troops for a candidate seeking party 
endorsement. This was certainly the view of Noel Crichton-Browne who recmited 
heavily among students, both because of the mles favouring their vote and because of 
their response to his 'pastoral' interest in and concem for their studies. 'What 
disappointed me was the very modest number of kids that went from the Young 
Liberals to the senior party'.'^ 
The alleged control that some candidates have over members of ethnic communities 
is a source of malleable votes. The establishment of branches exclusive to one ethnic 
group has become common in the Labor party^' and the Liberal party^^ in Victoria 
and NSW. The malleability of these voters is arguable. On the issue of 'ethnic branch 
stacking', Zappala records, 'the people I [party activist] sign on in this way are not 
stupid, they know what they are doing ... many ethnic constituents are familiar with 
this kind of politics from their home countries'.^^ The nature of the relationship 
between patron and client is not of concem. What is of concem is the degree of 
confrol that may be exercised by a candidate and the incentive this provides to recmit 
certain people. 
Some 'ethnic' candidates are falsely accused of ethnic branch-stacking. In his first 
preselection, Andrew Theophanous MHR relied on numbers of an existing panel of 
middle-class Anglo-Celtic voters. 'The bulk ofthe population ... were these country 
areas right up to Mt Macedon. Of the panel of 35, the majority were not from 
Broadmeadows but from the country. In that sense they were middle class people, not 
ethnic people'.'*° Nevertheless, there is clear evidence of a propensity for some groups 
to vote en masse without any knowledge ofthe issues before them, which makes them 
*^ Gavin O'Connor. Interview, 26 November 1997. 
*^ Noel Crichton-Brovme. Interview, 13 August 1998. 
" Healy, E. 1993. 'Ethnic ALP Branches: The Balkanisation of Labor.' People and Place 1(40): 39. 
*^ Howson, P. 1984. The Howson Diaries: The Life Of Politics, ed. D. Aitkm. Melboume: The VUdng 
Press, 472 
^^  Zappala, G. 1997. Four Weddings, a Funeral..., 166. 
"" Andrew Theophanous. Interview, (undated) late 1997. 
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an obvious choice to recmit. 'Ethnic groups are used by key leaders and kept in the 
dark ... there is a wall between these people and others. There is little access ... not 
able to speak to these people. The head honcho tells them what to do or how to vote 
... 200 people vote as one says'. '*' 
Branch-stacking refers not only to recmitment but also to recmitment of a malleable 
or confrolled group of voters. In that sense, stacking is competitive but damaging to 
the integrity ofthe process of candidate selection. Similarly, closing off books to new 
enfrants is anti-competitive and certainly prejudicial to the integrity ofthe notion of a 
party as a free association of individuals. Closing the books is a not an uncommon 
device. It was used in the Peter Baldwin Labor preselection for Sydney and remarked 
on by Christopher Puplick as a device used in the Liberal party.'*'^  The re-awakening 
of dormant branch members is a fiirther recmiting device. It is a legitimate source of 
votes and has the advantage of not alerting an opponent. Tom Uren used this tactic to 
great advantage in his preselection contest for Reid in 1956, 'The Grouper element in 
the branches was speechless. They couldn't believe the result, as there had been no 
stacking of branches and the overwhelming majority of voters had been in the party 
c •> 43 
for years . 
The consequences for the integrity of a political party where ethnic stacking activity 
is rife may be that the party can no longer make a judgement at all about a candidate 
on grounds other than ethnic background. Whether the blind loyalty of an ethnic 
group is any different to the blind loyalty of any other group is a matter of conjecture. 
The major criticism of 'identity' politics is that it tends to be one-dimensional. The 
contribution of political parties in a basically dual party system is their ability to 
aggregate the wishes of a substantial part ofthe electorate, including across a range of 
issues most of which do not divide on ethnic lines. Parties that become beholden to 
groups with nartow interests may find that they cannot any longer perform their 
broader role in the electorate and begin to operate as a lobby rather than a party. 
'" Senator Barney Cooney and staff member. Interviews, 19, 26 November 1997. 
''^  Peter Baldwin. Interview, 19 November 1997. Christopher PupUck. Interview, 8 December 1998. 
*'^ Uren, T. 1994. Tom Uren: Sti-aight Left. Sydney: Random House, 97. 
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The effort and resources expended by a candidate are a measurement of competition. 
They need to be interpreted with considerable caution, however, especially if a 
candidate has made a number of attempts at preselection. For example. Liberal 
Senator Alan Missen's 'successfiil 1973 bid for Senate preselection was his seventh 
attempt at preselection for a parliamentary seat'.'*'* There is no suggestion of a parallel 
between effort and success. 
Table 5.2: Elements ofthe Magnitude ofthe Task of Preselection (HoR) 
Source: Interviews and biographies. See Appendix 3. 
Notes:' The total number of members in the electorate. 
N/A Figures not avaUable. 
44 Hermann, A. 1993. AlanMissen: Liberal Pilgrim. Canberra: The Poplar Press, 83. 
14 
The Integrity of Association in PolUical Parties 
Moreover, large in situ panels require only lobbying, and such a campaign may be of 
short duration. A campaign to recmit members ofthe panel may take years. Hon. Paul 
Keating MHR explained, 'by the time I was 21 I was flat out, flat out on my 
preselection every night ofthe week, every night'.'*^ 
Further, while challengers will want to open the competition, incumbents or factional 
inheritors will want to close it down, so numbers may not be a sign of competition. 
Nevertheless, the magnitude of the task is an important element of both competition 
and the integrity of the association, and some indications have been set out in Table 
5.2. The Melham preselection for Banks is illusfrative. 'So 580 [preselectors] was big, 
but what happened was we had a 'credential' [the checking for eligibility to vote] that 
started at 10 o'clock Saturday moming and went till five to one on Sunday'.'*^ By 
contrast, the 1983 McGauran preselection for Gippsland was before [an imrecalled 
number] of delegates, who represented some 2,500 branch members. McGauran, 
however, had only joined the National party the day before!'*^ 
Taking into account the discussion of candidate requirements and recmitment costs 
and incentives as they affect local panels it is possible to distinguish three basic types 
of local panel: 
Type I: Big field of candidates—large and stable numbers of preselectors, open to 
relative newcomer candidates, extemal but non-electorate focus. 
Type 2: Small field of candidates—large and unstable number of preselectors, closed 
to newcomer candidates, intemal focus. 
Type 3: Small field of candidates—large and stable numbers of preselectors, open to 
absolute newcomers, extemal electorate focus. 
In the competition for preselection, different local panels have a priori different 
sfrengths. Few panels will contain an exclusive type of competition, but tendencies 
are discemible. A panel of recruits is the result of a test of sfrength; its focus is 
intemal and best suited to a safe seat. A panel of peers is a priori a judge of skills and 
*' Cummmg, 1991. Labor Mates, 59. 
'*^ DarreU MeUiam. Interview, 18 December 1997. 
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may be suited to both an intemal and extemal focus. A panel of deferential members 
is a priori not a judge of skills or of electoral prospects and therefore not suited to 
either focus, except in so far as it hands the decision to others. A panel that consists of 
peers, that is, a panel of party members with some experience and which is probably 
stable in numbers, is probably the archetypal device for the free expression and 
judgement of the members. Where competition is sufficient and influence is 
satisfactorily dispersed, a panel of peers may judge a colleague or a new comer to be 
worthy to represent the party, based on whatever characteristics it desires. A panel 
based purely on recmiting is more subject to anti-competitive behaviour, although it 
is at the same time a highly competitive activity. Whether the 'harder' school of mass 
recmitment and factional territory wars is a better training ground for parliamentary 
politics is a different matter entirely. 
Each type of panel represents a different ethos of candidate selection. The panel of 
peers seeks a candidate to carry the party baimer. The focus is to select a member of 
parliament in the image ofthe party, one who will perform the duties of a member of 
parliament. It is of a job interview type and is more likely in the Liberal party. The 
second type is not a selection contest at all but a contest to recmit, often in the name 
of a faction rather than a party. Here, the primary allegiance is to the faction, from 
whence resources will come to assist the candidate and to which, in turn, the 
candidate may contribute future numbers and support. The second type is most typical 
in the Labor party in safe seats, and in the Liberal party in safe seats. The third type is 
an electoral judgement by party members intent on winning the seat for the party. 
Typically, this occurs in a seat that is marginal, either to the Coalition partner or to 
the Labor party. Competition, or the lack of it, may occur in many guises, so will poor 
processes, as will activities that damage the free association of members. Practices 
and an ethos intent on making the contest one that is based on recmitment appears the 
most likely to produce such damage. 
•'^  Peter McGauran. Interview, 19 November 1997. 
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Head Office Decisions 
Those responsible for managing the party should want to ensure the selection of the 
'best' candidate in an efficient, orderly and legal manner. To achieve the party's 
objectives there will be in each party an accepted way in which competition is 
managed. Where the preselection is in the hands of local politicians, the party can 
confrol the process, but has little confrol over the outcome. The development of 
cenfral panels, and of powerfiil groups within the party such as factions or an 
executive intent on controlling the local outcome, requires a second tier of analysis. 
Cenfral panels allow for a party-wide view, but they may also create the opportunity 
for frading votes between electorates. Where delegates to the cenfral panel are highly 
loyal or tightly confrolled, certain areas may be declared contestable, others not. 
Central confrol and executive involvement in that confrol may also condone the 
unacceptable practices that occur at a local level and for which the executive has 
responsibility. Senator Beahan brought allegations of serious vote-rigging against 
certain officials and senior members of the Westem Ausfralian Labor party in his 
1994 preselection for the Senate ticket. Ballot papers were allegedly taken from the 
voting room and filled out by persons other than the registered voters, and some ballot 
papers were amended to change the preference of the voter. The Labor party National 
Executive heard the matter but no action was taken.'*^ 
Senator Noel Crichton-Brovme was expelled from the Westem Australian division of 
the Liberal party in 1995 for bringing the party into disrepute. The groimds of appeal 
against his expulsion were largely on the basis that the material used to accuse him 
about his personal domestic behaviour was obtained illegally. The allegations levelled 
against the Senator were sufficient to have him expelled from the party which, just 
months before, had elected him to head their Senate ticket. The Westem Ausfralian 
division is an incorporated association, but the standard of hearing afforded Senator 
'** Senator Hon Michael Beahan, ALP WA Interview, 19 November 1997 and correspondence 
(undated) and Beahan, M. 1994. The WA Branch Senate Preselection. 
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Crichton-BrowTie was not of a standard expected of such an association. The matter 
would be arguable in a court but the former Senator chose not to pursue the matter. ^ ^ 
The power to manage a party's affairs are used in many circumstances, sometimes to 
overcome a situation where raising a candidate is difficult. Gilbert Duthie became the 
Labor party candidate for Wilmot and consequently the member for 30 years based on 
his writing to the State secretary and asking, '[ I ]wouldn't mind having a shot at it'!^^ 
Altematively, managerial power may be needed where a recalcitrant member, or a 
failing candidate, has to be disendorsed. There was considerable involvement by the 
State secretary and the President of the Queensland Liberal party in the defeat at the 
1998 preselection of Tony Smith MHR for Dickson,^' and the NSW Liberal executive 
undertook a performance audit of candidates in 1995 and found, among others, 
Jeanette Thomley (Macquarie) wanting and consequently dismissed her.^ ^ 
At times, a star recmit is fast-tracked. The seat of Dickson was found for Cheryl 
Kemot in 1998, a seat in which she faced nominal resistance at preselection.^' Only 
one other candidate stood and he was not a local. Such a move does not always work 
or meet with approval. Colin Hollis MHR alleges that Senator John Faulkner before 
this was touting 'an outstanding candidate' for Throsby. 'We now know that it was 
Cheryl Kemot'. The suggestion was met with stiff local branch resistance.^ '* Bob 
Hogg, former National and Victorian Labor party secretary, remarked of [Prime 
Minister] Bob Hawke's 1980 preselection, 'Once Hawke had decided to nominate, 
the matter was decided. The party could not afford to defeat him'. This did not stop a 
very hard fought stmggle against the left faction candidate Gerry Hand.^ ^ 
^^ Noel Crichton-Browne. Interview, 13 August 1998 and Crichton-Browne, N. (undated). Appeal 
Against the Expulsion from the Liberal Party of WA Division (Inc). Submission to the Liberal Party 
WA State Executive. (Mimeo) 
^^  Duthie, G. 1984. / Had 50,000 Bosses: Memoirs of a Labor Backbencher 1946-1975. Melboume: 
Angus and Robertson, 17. 
" Tony Smith MHR, LPA Q. Imerview, 17 July 1998. 
" Jeanette Thomley. Various conversations, late 1998-early 1999. 
^^  O'Reilly, D. 1998. Cheryl Kemot: The Woman Most Likely. Sydney: Random House, xxi. 
" Colin HoUis MHR ALP NSW. Interview, 23 October 1997. 
'^ D'Alpuget, B. 1984. Robert J. Hawke. Melboume: Pengum Books, 390. Hand was later endorsed for 
the seat of Melboume and became a member of Hawke's cabinet. 
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At other times, stars will have to be saved because of their position in the 
govemment. Senators Crowley and Schacht represented the same faction ofthe South 
Ausfralian Labor party. The 1994 preselection used proportional representation, 
which would have ensured the demise of one. Schacht was elected under the old list 
system of voting where the dominant faction could elect all candidates. The National 
Executive intervened on the basis that they were Ministers and needed to be saved.^ ^ 
Some interventions are extraordinarily prejudicial and public. Labor's National 
Secretary Gary Gray intervened publicly in the 1998 preselection for Oxley, 
condemning the candidacy of Anne Scott, wife of former Member Les Scott.^ ^ Other 
interventions are more subtle and indirect. Prime Minister John Howard was alleged 
to have 'recmited' senior Liberals in Western Australia to the cause of Alan Rocher 
MHR for readmission to the Liberal party and endorsement for Curtin. Howard also 
made public his support for Alan Rocher.^ ^ Still others were less specifically directed 
at a candidate. South Ausfralian Liberal Senator Nick Minchin attended the 1998 
preselection of Queensland Senator Brett Mason. 'We had a Federal Convention and 
Minchin was hanging around the halls the day ofthe preselections'. 'They [Federal 
Executive] didn't want, to quote Senator Nick Minchin, a "shit fight" in Queensland. 
They wanted it quiet'.^^ On rare occasions, members of a govemment will use a 
preselection to attempt to bring down a competitor. Hon Peter Howson MHR was 
encouraging the Higgins electorate branches to force Prime Minister John Gorton to a 
preselection convention as a way of getting him to resign as Prime Minister.^ 
The confrol exercised by the consensus of the executive of a party is vastly different 
to that exercised by the weight of factional numbers within the party. How such 
consensus arises is of interest inasmuch as it may be engineered or simply taken for 
granted. For example, the Victorian Liberal party Policy Assembly, which has a large 
influence over preselection, is seen as 'a group of senior people'^' who make 
^ Senator Hon Chris Schacht, ALP SA Interview, 18 November 1997. 
^^  Anne Scott, candidate ALP Q. Discussions, March-August 1998 and various correspondence (see 
Appendix 3). 
'^ Notes (undated) by Noel Crichton-Brovme on the 1996 preselection of JuUe Bishop MP (numeo) (see 
Appendix 3). 
'^  Brett Mason. Interview, 13 July 1998. 
*° Howson, P. 1984. The Howson Diaries, 715. 
*' Michael Kroger, former President LPA V. Interview, 9 February 1998. 
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judgements about the suitability of applicants. The ability of the party's senior 
managers to have any influence over new entrants relies on the rules that place some 
power over preselections in the hands of the Assembly. Prior to that system being 
implemented, power rested decisively with the local member of parliament, or when a 
new candidate was to be chosen, the collective of politicians. In the 1966 Andrew 
Peacock preselection, the comment was made, 'in the final days the lobbying by both 
State and federal ministers was intense'.^ "^ The Liberal party in Victoria was very 
much a politicians' party prior to the mle changes in the late 1980s. There is also a 
sifting process that allows this senior group to exercise a veto over unacceptable 
candidates. The device of the panel and the scmtiny has been designed to remove 
power from the hands of incumbents, and operates with a great deal of tmst in an 
ethos of managing the party to get the best result. The concept is somewhat fragile, 
however, and the consensus required for such an instmment appeared to break down 
over the dispute between the Kermett and the Kroger factions to control the 
Assembly. The consensus tool, if indeed it ever operated as such, has thus now 
reverted to a forum of intemal contest. 
The National party appears to have achieved a consensus based on membership 
deference to the leaders, that is, an acceptance ofthe leadership ofthe party 'knowing 
best'. The archetypal party manager. Sir Robert Sparkes, President ofthe Queensland 
National party, preferted a selection committee process to a plebiscite. In some 
circumstances, the committee is unavoidable, for example, when the National party 
wanted to expand into Brisbane in the 1980s but had no urban membership.^ '* 
However, an attitude that may have developed for particular circumstances can persist 
long after its original rationale has passed. Former Federal Treasury Secretary John 
Stone was recruited by Sir Robert Sparkes in 1989 to devise a tax policy for the 'Joh 
for PM' campaign and at the completion of the task was offered a Senate post in 
Queensland, despite his not being a party member and living in Victoria! Stone 
describes the preselection this way: 'on the day of the preselection I felt that I was 
^^  Carey and McCrae, 1982. Peacock MP, 56. 
^^  Marinac, A 1995. 'The Secret Paddock of Australian PoUtics: Preselection Procedures in the 
National Party in Queensland and Victoria.' Honours Thesis, Monash University. Interview, Sir Robert 
Sparkes, 65. 
'^' Marinac, A 1995. 'The Secret Paddock. Interview, Michael Evans, 64. 
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kept more or less in hiding, and was only brought out when the nominees spoke'.^^ 
This attitude of management-knows-best is prevalent, 'management are actively 
looking for people. In a preselection, management tend to vote in a bloc. They will 
come up with a person who can win it. They are better informed than the locals'.^^ 
The same may be said, however, of local members who made a practical choice in the 
Noel Hicks preselection. Perhaps a different ethos exists in the National party, 'the 
National party has always been a close family type party, close knit, political ambition 
does not come in like the Labor and Liberal parties. The National party more [want] 
someone to do a job for their constituency'.^^ 
Consensus decisions do occur in other types of management. The Labor party 
parliamentary leadership, and executive 'management' clearly wanted Cheryl Kemot 
to stand for Labor as someone who could help them win not just a seat, but 
govemment. The degree of consensus in preselections, however, is rare in the Labor 
or the Liberal parties, where either an open contest exists between candidates at large 
or a closed one is conducted along factional lines. Consensus was ignored when 
factional interests were threatened, as was the case when the affirmative action mle 
was overlooked in a deal for the Senate position in Tasmania. 'If affirmative action 
had been used, the Left would have put a woman up to get further up the ticket, which 
/TO 
would have knocked me [Denman] out altogether'. 
Central Panels and Factions 
The simple architecture of a preselection panel cannot convey the entire picture ofthe 
cenfre of power. In the Victorian Liberal party, the late-1980s change in the 
architecture of the panels was accompanied by a change in the culture of the party. 
The ritual speech was abandoned. The party decided that a once-only stand-up speech 
by the candidates to the panel of selectors was not the basis forjudging someone for a 
possible life-long career. The new culture is 'performance-driven' and the tests are 
more formal and lengthy, more akin to a job interview. Whether the new mles and 
*^ Former Senator John Stone, NPA Q. Interview, 18 Febmary 1999. 
^ Ron Boswell. Interview, 22 February 1999. 
*^  Senator David BrovmhUl, NPA NSW. Interview, 26 November 1997. 
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culture work in practice is another matter. The rule changes may in fact have set off 
another dynamic. Michael Kroger^ ^ talks of 'a judgement made by an unofficial 
collective of senior people'. Moreover, the 'dispersed' group of senior people begins 
to think as one and 'a lot of potential candidates go to the Policy Assembly [cenfral 
panel] just to get known'. Because the group is elected at State Council it is possible 
to talk of a 'Head Office camp' and 'candidate'.^^ The fransition in the Victorian 
Liberal party, from a dispersed and open competition, to a centrally managed one 
reflects a change of culture. It reflects a party that has moved from one that was 
controlled by local members of parliament to one where cenfral 'bureaucrats' share 
control with the politicians. The model of open competition, referted to earlier by Sir 
Billy Snedden and Don Chipp, is mythical. Local control is often confused with open 
democracy. In fact, local confrol is often confrol exercised locally in an entirely anti-
competitive manner. The key to power sharing between local and central players rests 
in the impact it has on competition between the two. Neither should prevail. 
The ability to 'deliver the numbers', to hold people together in order to make certain 
an outcome, is at the heart of winning a cenfral panel preselection. In the Labor party, 
the basis for authority is sfraightforward, it is a product of what Olson calls 'a captive 
membership of a group organised for other purposes'.^' Union members are organised 
for employment relations' purposes and affiliated unions deliver their numbers to the 
party. Furthermore, their delegations often vote as a bloc in order to maximise the 
unions' power. They are able to do so because the union leader or party faction leader 
has control over the selection of the delegates. The situation is not nearly so clear in 
the Liberal and National parties. The Liberal party has developed factions, or at least 
a 'machine' that can deliver votes either through the exfraordinary commitment of 
resources by individuals, or by the exfraordinary bitterness and endurance of personal 
divisions between individuals—neither of which are rare commodities in politics. 
Senator Noel Crichton-Browne wielded enormous influence in the Westem 
Australian Liberal party for two decades. His opponents attribute this influence to 
*^ Senator Kay Denman, ALP T. Interview, 18 November 1997. 
^^  Michael Kroger. Interview, 9 February 1998. 
™ Stuart McArthur MHR and former president LPA V. Interview, 21 October 1997. 
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assiduously 'working the numbers'. He did so by signing new members to mainly 
small mral branches, the extensive use of proxy voting 'collected' by his people, 
recmiting among Young Liberals who had special voting rights, the formation of 
dummy branches, the use of 'flying squads' which enabled people to vote at more 
than one branch annual general meeting, and the closing of books to exclude new 
applicants. Crichton-Browne indeed worked the numbers assiduously and responded 
to each criticism. 'If I could go out and sign up thirty members, which I did every 
Sunday ... why would I want to write a cheque out from my own pocket? I'd say to 
my mates, if you're going to sign the application form I want your money'. As for the 
use of proxies, the response was, 'I'm the guy that signed them up. I started the 
branch. I was at the inaugural meeting ... they voted for me'. '^ He established 'every 
single branch north ofthe 26* parallel' and spent $1-1.5 million of his own money in 
'a membership drive', mainly on expenses for accommodation and travel over the 
period. His claim is that none was spent on paying member's dues.''* 
In the NSW Liberal division, the shift from the era of 'party barons', the founders of 
the Menzies era, to 'party factions' (or tendencies) occmred in the early 1970s with 
the rise of middle-class activists. 'Their [the party barons] first defeat was when the 
Young Liberals jumped up and in 1973 by one vote got Phillip Ruddock over Nick 
Shehadie and that was the first time the "laying on of hands" didn't work. It was 
essentially from that time that we got factionalisation ofthe Liberal Party in NSW'.'^ 
The change overtumed the headhunting era where senior party officials chose and 
sponsored candidates. The reason for the creation and endurance of factions is not 
obvious stmcturally, but the passions of the activists served to keep the contest 
divided into essentially two camps. 'There was practically no preselection, executive 
or coimcil meeting where the exchanges between supporters of Bishop and those of 
the Group [Puplick] were not barbed or bellicose'.''^ Factional politics has extended to 
^'Olson, M. 1971. The Logic of Collective Action, 133. 
^^  Former MHR John Hyde, LPA WA. Interview, 2 October 1997. Mr AUstair Tomlinson, quoted in 
Senator Noel Crichton-Browne, Appeal Against Expulsion, (mimeo) 102. Hon. Fred Chaney, quoted in 
Appeal Against Expulsion, (mimeo) 112. 
' ' The issue of multiple proxies voting arose foUowing changes to the Division constitution in 1987, not 
m his time as President. Crichton-Browne, (undated) Appeal Against Expulsion, (mimeo) 116. 
'"^  Crichton-Browne. Interview, 13 August 1998. 
' ' Christopher PupUck. Interview, 8 December 1998. 
*^ Leser, D. 1994. Bronwyn Bishop, 65. 
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the Queensland division of the Liberal Party'' although almost exclusively at the 
central panel level. Nevertheless, the alliances do mn sufficiently deep to operate at 
the local level with some Federal Electorate delegations tied to a faction. 'To what 
extent do chairs of [Federal Electorate Councils] bring ten votes? It depends on the 
chairman, how well organised they are, it varies from FEC to FEC ... We were 
organised, but the converse was also, where the chair was supportive of me but lazy, a 
shambles'.'^ Only occasionally is there the full-blown illusfration of dealing between 
seats. 'Our [1993] preselections were on the same day [Moreton and Griffith], caused 
a lot of damage, he was responsible for the branch stacking ... what happened to me 
was 1 got caught up in it [the two electorates shared panels through a zonal 
artangement], that bloc vote of his to knock off Margaret [another candidate], but 
knocked me off.'^ 
The deal making in the Labor party is far more certain. It reaches across an entire 
division. 'It was during a period [late I980s-late 1990s] of factional negotiations over 
anything and everything in Victoria when every seat and every position possible was 
allocated to one faction or another'. Moreover, due to the existence of national 
factions*' and the sfrength of national mles,*^ it also extends to national deals. The 
candidate will inevitably seek to represent the party, but in seeking to do so may in 
fact be a representative of some section of the party. The candidate may undertake 
this voluntarily or be a 'captive', that is, forced to comply with the wishes of one 
group in order to survive a preselection challenge. The need for certainty in deal-
making is paramount in the circumstances where groups wish to divide positions 
among themselves in proportion to their numbers. The sfrategy relies on the good 
judgement and commimication between the dealmakers and the complete ignorance 
of the voter. With reference to a factional deal over his preselection. Senator Beahan 
remarked, 'Those people [voters] would not have knowTi on the night what was 
'^ Senator David McGibbon, LPA Q. Interview, sometime ui March 1999. 
'* Brett Mason. Interview, 13 July 1998. A much more haphazard arrangement than would occur at a 
NSW, Victorian or Queensland Labor party local plebiscite. 
''^ Former MHR Graham McDougaU, LPA Q. Interview, 2 December 1998. 
*" Kelvin Thomson MHR, ALP V. Interview, 25 November 1997. 
*' Lloyd, C. and W. Swan. 1987. 'National Factions and the ALP', 100. 
*^  Richardson, G. 1994. Whatever It Takes, 193 
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happening'.*^ The methods of closing down competition are the 'show-and-tell' 
ballot, or the supervised ballot. The former involves the system of pain'ng members as 
they vote to ensure that they vote according to the agreed ticket.** The latter involves 
the collection of ballot papers, by a faction representative, from faction members. It is 
most commonly used for union delegates, who are mostly appointed by their union 
secretary for their loyalty, and most likely to comply with the faction's wishes. 
A supervised ballot allegedly brought down Senator Beahan. A preselection under 
proportional representation allows several groups in a party to have their candidate 
succeed in a ballot. The 'left' candidate was to head the ticket, the 'centre' was to be 
next, and the 'right' to be in the third and probably unwinnable position. The sfrategy 
ofthe 'centre' and 'right' was essentially to compete for votes from the 'left', once it 
had secured its own quota. 'The left worked very hard at unstitching those people we 
had pulled across. They did it by using the ploy that their quota was under threat and 
did this quite effectively'. A further example was the Graeme Campbell 
preselection: 'as it tumed out they [faction leaders] did not collect the votes and I won 
[the 1979 preselection ballot] by one vote'. In 1995 the story was different, 'votes 
were gathered up again and supervised. Not taking any chances this time. Big unions 
made sure their tickets held'.^ 
The same fine-tuning of the numbers occurs under various voting systems. For 
example, in an exhaustive ballot for a single position under conditions of tme secret 
ballot some skilled operators claim*' to know the numbers so accurately that they can 
direct their 'people' to give preferences to one candidate and knock another out ofthe 
running, so as to advantage their candidate. Andrew Theophanous MHR described the 
disasfrous result for his opponent in his first preselection with the unpredictability of 
an exhaustive ballot. 'But what happened between the first and the second ballot was 
that a number of people panicked when they saw that I was the front-runner. They 
thought that it would be easier to defeat me, if they switched some votes from 
^^  Michael Beahan. Interview, 19 November 1997. 
^ Author observation of Federal Labor caucus votes. 
'^ Michael Beahan. Interview, 19 November 1997. 
^ Graeme CampbeU MHR, ALP WA. Interview, 21 October 1997. 
" Christopher PupUck. Interview, 8 December 1998. 
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Mackenzie to Johnston. So in the second ballot Mackenzie came third and he dropped 
out. That was a huge mistake because all the people with the Mackenzie votes split 
and I actually received the majority ofthe Mackenzie vote'.** 
The few hands in which power rests is a concem in some parties. The South 
Ausfralian Labor party, which has just 25% ofthe total vote in a preselection assigned 
to the branch members, has been described by Rod Sawford MHR, a beneficiary of 
the system, as a 'joke'. 'Effectively only two people have the power and that's Pat 
Conlan who works for [Senator Hon. Nick] Bolkus and Pat Fartell who works for the 
shoppies [Shop Distributive and Allied Employees' Union]. They are the two that mn 
that liaison group. As the shoppies are the major union of the right and have a lot of 
delegates and also employ a lot of young apparatchiks that's basically how the power 
QQ 
has resulted there'. The power to determine preselections is nartowly based even 
within the unions. The degree of control exercised in the factional negotiations is 
quite exfraordinary, dividing up the 'spoils' between the factions across the complete 
field of fradeable items, including a wide range of conditions for support, 'there was a 
deal done with the left to employ on my staff one ofthe Metalworkers [union official] 
who wanted to run in the next State election'. 
That is not to say that contests do not proceed, 'there were contests despite 
agreements'^' or that 'upsets' do not occur. 'Neil [O'Keefe's preselection] was 
interesting, the local panel, something went wrong, so Neil was chosen by the cenfral 
panel without any [faction] support'. The explanation of what went wrong with the 
local panel is provided by Andrew Theophanous. 'Landeryou had been given the 
opportunity to go for the seat of Bourke ... but he refused to go for it. It's in this 
context that Neil O'Keefe came out of nowhere'.^^ The extent of confrol over the 
outcome of a large number of preselections may be great, but it is rarely absolute. 
There are also considerations given to electoral prospects wider than the faction as 
Andrew Theophanous. Interview, undated, late 1997. 
*' Rod Sawford. Interview, 23 September 1997. 
'° Kay Denman. Interview, 18 November 1997. 
'^ Bamey Cooney on the mabUity to have aU contests predetermined. Interviews, 19, 26 November 
1997. 
^ Bamey Cooney on preselection for Bourke. Interviews, 19, 26 November 1997. 
^ Andrew Theophanous. Interview, undated late 1997. 
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part of the negotiations. 'I was approached to run because "they" [the factional 
leadership] identified a need for a rep[resentative] on the north-west coast [of 
Tasmania] where I lived; they wanted a woman'.^ '* 
Factions are not all top-down, especially in a system where the local vote is 
substantial, 50% or more. A candidate may have substantial local support and force 
the factional favourite out ofthe race by agreeing to assign and deliver that support to 
the faction. Alan Griffiths was able to recmit in Maribymong and place himself in a 
strong position to make an offer to the Labor Unity faction of the Victorian Labor 
party by pledging support and local numbers to other forums in the party. The faction 
accepted the deal and asked their preferted candidate to stand aside.^ ^ A degree of 
mutuality is involved in such a situation. The factions supporting the agreed candidate 
at central preselection deliver a deal. This ensures an overwhelming vote and is 
almost impossible to overcome, no matter what the sfrength of the local candidate. 
'Labor Uruty had and continues to have a majority in Wills ... it was allocated so 
members ofthe left were obliged to vote at the cenfral panel level for whoever Labor 
Unity chose'.^^ 
Deciding the factional candidate and how the choice relates to the local vote is a less 
clear-cut affair than the formal ballot for preselection. A seat allocated to a faction 
means that a small number of faction members meet to decide who should run. An 
intemal faction ballot of the Labor party Left in NSW was held for the seat of 
Throsby to decide the candidate, in fact as a means of removing the Left's incumbent. 
'They [George Campbell, Secretary ofthe AMWU] thought their candidate was going 
to get up. I [Colin Hollis] got 74 votes, my nearest rival got 50-something, tiieir 
favoured candidate got 11'. Through cross-factional agreement and using the power 
of the central panel, the organised minority can impose its will on the unorganised 
majority. There were 500 branch members in Wills but only 25-30 members of the 
leading faction.^ * In some cases, two candidates from the same faction will run to test 
^^ Kay Denman. Interview, 18 November 1997. 
^' Former MHR Hon Alan GriflSths, ALP V. Various conversations late 1998-eariy 1999. 
^ Kelvm Thomson. Interview, 25 November 1997. 
^^  Colm HoUis. Interview, 23 October 1997. 
^^  Kelvm Thomson. Interview, 25 November 1997. 
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their support among tiie branch members. The risk in them doing so is that other 
factions in the seat will have an influence on the faction's candidate. 
The faction mles may mirtor the party mles in a formal and public way, but in fact 
hand the decision to the most powerfiil. 'The Victorian Labor Unity mles have been 
more or less [the same as for the party], depending on the political muscle and 
whoever has the political muscle will adjust the mles in whatever way to give them 
the results that they want'. ^^  The problem of 'stacking' applies to factions as to the 
party as a whole. For example, if a faction hands a substantial say to its local 
representatives, it may provide an incentive to stack the faction. 'In Wills although we 
are the sfrongest group we'd have only 25-30 paid up [Labor Unity] members. So if 
you are saying they are getting 50%) ofthe preselection say, you might not get a result 
that is reflective ofthe real levels of support within the party locally. And it would be 
an incitement to faction-stacking'.'^ Evidence of faction-stacking in the Left in 
Victoria is provided by Senator Bamey Cooney: a 'faction will recmit an ethnic 
leader for the faction, the frade-off is that you get in but you have to keep delivering 
the numbers—at a meeting one night [ofthe Socialist Left] 60 [new] people tumed up 
tovote'.'«' 
The difficulty with such staunchly contested ballots among such intimates is the 
breakdown of faction loyalty and discipline and thus the inability to have small, 
organised numbers hold sway over larger numbers. Sometimes a group will choose an 
outsider as a 'circuit-breaker' in order to preserve peace in the faction. 'Bmce 
Hartnett and Bill Hartley were evenly divided over months. Even though I [Bamey 
Cooney] was not a member of the group I was acceptable to the group as a circuit 
breaker. Everybody could say there is this outsider. Had to have an outsider to keep 
the whole thing together so no-one in the group won'. 
A rather exfraordinary attempt to bar the concept of factional endorsement is set out 
in the mles ofthe Queensland Labor party, 'A candidate who has been knowingly and 
^ Kelvin Thomson. Interview, 25 November 1997. 
"* Kelvm Thomson. Interview, 25 November 1997. 
101 Bamey Cooney. Interviews, 19, 26 November 1997. 
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willingly selected or endorsed by any Party unit or affiliated unit, or any section of an 
affiliated union for the purpose of furthering that candidature in any selection shall 
not be endorsed'.'^^ When this mle was tested before a disputes tribunal in 1998 and 
the evidence of factional endorsement by the Ausfralian Workers' Union of a 
candidate for Oxley was clear [according to Anne Scott a defeated candidate], the 
tribunal found 'that a faction is not a party unit or affiliated union for the purposes of 
[the mle]'.'°'* 
The reach of factions is finite and often does not have influence where the party 
organisers or captive numbers are not available. The influence of factions is not so 
apparent in regional areas, for example, Newcastle and Geelong.'°^ Factions with a 
stmctural base, such as affiliated frade unions, are able to lever considerable support 
through a monopoly of delegate loyalty. On this resource base is built a machine that 
enables the organised minority to control the unorganised majority. Where the 
resource base is less formal it may rely on the extraordinary accumulation of numbers 
through personal loyalty, and in that sense contains an element of the third form of 
managed competition. 
Conclusion 
The three tests ofthe democratic integrity of party preselections presented in Diagram 
3.1 were couched in terms of the environment within which the contests were 
conducted. The audit of the rules and the selection panels indicated some anti-
competitive stmctures and some poor processes. Three styles of local competition 
identified in the discussion of the behaviour of the candidates, extended those results 
by identifying the ethos of each panel and the likely implications of each for the 
integrity ofthe process. 
102 Barney Cooney. Interviews, 19, 26 November 1997. 
'°^ ALP Q, 1997. Rules. Rule 25.25, 38. 
'"'' Anne Scott, correspondence with Labor party Disputes Tribunal, 3 August 1998. 
'"' Gavin O'Connor. Interview, 26 November 1997. KeUy Hoare candidate, ALP NSW. Irterview, 29 
October 1997. 
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It may be that the three styles represent three phases in intemal party politics, from 
local competition confrolled by politicians, to a shared cenfral arrangement, to a 
cenfralised system. These phases were closely related to the management of the 
parties, with an earlier naive stage, a deferential or managerial consensus stage, to a 
factional frade stage. The Labor party has long been in the factional style. The Liberal 
party exhibits elements from naive to managed to factional, and the National party is 
predominantly managed. The three parties are not exclusively of any one style but the 
tendencies are evident. 
Factors that were external to the party were often powerful in providing a stimulus to 
competition. However, the desire to compete sometimes resulted in a loss of integrity 
ofthe party in one of three ways: A breach ofthe free association ofthe membership 
of the party through such practices as branch-stacking. A diminution of competition 
by misuse of the mles to favour one candidate. Or cross-factional agreements to 
exclude a wider body of voters. Factions did not necessarily breach the freedom of 
association per se, although sometimes their means of delivering on deals and their 
source of power did. 
These observations and measurement of the performance of the major Ausfralian 
parties suggest that they do not perform the task of managing preselections in a 
sufficiently democratic way. The ways and means by which they fail are by no means 
uniform and for some the record is far worse than others. This is not to argue that they 
do not intend to manage the processes to be more democratic. Competition for power 
within political parties, as we have seen, can be intense. However, if the parties fail to 
fiilfil their obligations to deliver intemal democracy, it is clear that some extemal 
body will undertake that scmtiny. 
The remaining tasks are to explore the issues ofthe scmtiny ofthe parties and to draw 
some policy conclusions. The first task is to study the parties' record of management 
on preselection issues. The second is to review the amount of extemal scmtiny that 
exists at present and the likelihood of extemal scmtiny in the future. The third is to 
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draw the policy conclusions from the research, including the issue of whether the 
parties should be regulated. 
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Internal Scrutiny: Managing Preselections 
Australia's major parties regard themselves as democratic organisations. They profess to 
be mn by their members, each of whom has a reasonable chance to influence the 
decisions of the party, particularly with regard to the selection of candidates. In many 
respects, however, they fail the tests of democratic practice applied to the selection of 
candidates. The stmcture of some of their panels is anti-competitive, some of their 
procedures are tainted and, in many different ways, they fail some tests of a free 
association of individuals. Are these failings a consequence of a lack of intent or a 
deliberate exercise in the accumulation of power? One means of answering this question, 
indeed one way of gaining access to reliable data, is to see how and why the parties 
change, and sometimes fail to change, the mles that govem preselection. Despite 
Ratmey's view that 'all conflict over party reform is, at bottom, conflict over who should 
be running the parties',' it is possible to distinguish the stmggle for power from the 
establishment of rules that allow competition for power. 
The Struggle for the Rules 
It is possible to sort mle changes into three broad, if sometimes overlapping categories: 
those concemed with the integrity of the process of preselection, those concemed with 
the quality of the outcome, and those concemed with the management and maintenance 
of power. A survey was undertaken in 1998 of major changes or proposed major changes 
to party mles, to assess the intentions of the parties. The survey of mle changes covered 
those that were either recommended by way of a report to the party, or debate at the 
respective party conferences. The information was gathered after telephone interviews 
with the national and each divisional secretary (or their nominee) of the four major 
parties. The question put to the official was, 'what is the most recent report or major 
change of mles, conceming preselection?' In some cases, the parties supplied documents; 
' Ranney, 1975. Curing the Mischiefs of Faction, 144. 
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in others, these were obtained from other sources. As a further aid to interpretation, 
interviews were held with various political activists who had been associated with mle 
changes. Twenty-two reports (identified by the name ofthe principal author where there 
was such a person) and debates were studied. These are set out in Table 6.1 for the four 
major parties. The reports and debates are discussed for each party, with any federal 
reports discussed first, followed by each State. 
Table 6.1: Recent Major Rule Changes and Reports on Candidate Selection 
Divjsion 
Federal 
Democrat 
[^ "Code'o'F" 
I Conduct 
! (97) 
Labor 
Conference (91) 
I Liberal 
\ Goldsworthy (93) 
National 
Federal Manag. 
Committee (96) 
NSW 
j Victoria 
j Queensland 
I Western Australia 
i South Australia 
..L... 
if 
it 
Coulter (95) |! 
Liverpool (89) 
Conference (92) 
Drey&s(98) 
Conference (96) 
Conference (94) 
Osbome (93) 
Conference (97) 
I Kroger (89) 
I Convention (93) 
r^ciou^lig™ 
1 Clarence, 
I Tamworth 
f Murray (95) 
T.'Z"cribb|89)i'''' 
I No Member ^ 
IM -
Tasmania 
Northern 
Territory 
" T 
Intervention (92) 
Conference (93^ ) 
• Simplification (91) 
i Minchin (94} J No Member^ 
; Conference (97) \ No organisation 
\ None I ^ o organisation 
Source: 
Telephone interviews with State or national secretary (or their nominee) of parties, August-September 1997. 
Notes: 
' The mles are national, and only one example of State-based behaviour causing a change to the national 
mles was reported. 
^ The study has been restricted to States where parties hold seats in Federal Parliament. 
^ There was no response from the Country Liberal Party. 
(Kroger) represents the principal author ofthe report or mle changes. 
(91) Indicates the year ofthe report or conference when the mles were considered. 
Democrats Party Management 
The Democrats National Executive has the authority to intervene in a division's 
preselection process but to the extent of overtuming or determining a preselection, has 
not done so. The Democrats reported only one contemplated recent major change to their 
national preselection mles. Following some 'robust' lobbying in the ballot for the Senate 
vacancy, which occurred with the retirement of the former leader Senator Coulter and 
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which resulted in the endorsement of Natasha Stott-Despojta, a draft Code of Conduct for 
lobbying was established. After consideration, however, the National Executive decided 
that it was not possible to 'legislate for morality' and the Code was abandoned.^ As the 
audit ofthe mles and panels has shown, the Democrats appear to have few problems with 
their democratic credentials. The tiny membership and consequent recourse to postal 
ballots on a division-wide basis do not leave a great deal to organise at the party level. 
Presumably, most ofthe realpolitik occurs in the Senate caucus. 
Labor Party Management 
The Labor party National Executive has clear powers to decide on preselections and has 
done so on many occasions. Their most extraordinary recent changes started with a 1989 
preselection dispute in the NSW State seat of Liverpool. The dispute resulted in three 
extensive reports on most aspects of preselection, and for the first time a partial set of 
national mles was accepted at the 1991 National Conference. The Liverpool contest 
caused such a leveX of dispute in the NSW division that two affiliated unions appealed to 
the National Executive against the conduct of the ballot. The Executive responded by 
establishing an arbitration panel to intervene.' The panel determined that the ballot was 
invalid, and conducted a fresh ballot. The key reason cited for the panel's action were the 
mles relating to the eligibility to vote. 'The curtent mles in NSW appear to be based on 
the belief that voters have to prove their eligibility, rather than that there should be a 
presumption of eligibility' and, '[t]hat to endeavour to hold a plebiscite would continue 
the misconception that "rank and file" ballots exist in NSW. In fact, the only ones who 
vote are those who succeed in filing past the myriad of mles and precedents in existence 
without failing the 37 conditions. To get a vote is as much by chance as it is knowledge 
or skill or party loyalty. There is no rank and file ballot in NSW. Those left standing 
vote'."* 
The then Labor party National Secretary, Bob Hogg, used the opportunity of the 
Liverpool intervention to review the mles and preselection systems in the Labor party at 
^ Andrew Bartlett. Interview 19 May 1998 and correspondence. 
^ ALP National Executive Arbitration Panel, 1988. Interim Report, Mmutes, 9 December. Canberra: 
National Secretariat. 
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large. 'We need to examine the long term adequacy ofthe basic operations ofthe Party, 
its membership base and its relationship to the preselection systems nationally'.^ This 
report stimulated the establishment in 1990 ofthe Organisational Review Committee. In 
completing the review of the NSW preselection rules, it also examined the broader 
organisational problems facing the party. The Committee recommended to the 1991 
National Conference a number of changes cmcial to fiiture preselections. Among these 
were: 
1. 'The process of joining the Party shall be simplified and all unnecessary 
impediments to that process shall be removed from State branch mles. [Adopted] 
2. In all States full membership rights shall begin to accme once the member has 
attended their first branch meeting and those rights shall accumulate, to the 
maximum, following twelve months consecutive membership. These rights 
include: being eligible for preselection.... [Adopted] 
3. In all states, the State Conference shall comprise 50 percent union representatives 
and 50 percent constituency Party representatives. [Rejected] 
4. In all States the State Conference shall comprise not less than 50% nor more than 
60% union representatives and not less than 40% nor more than 50% constituency 
party representatives. [Adopted] 
5. When electing delegates to the ALP conferences the union should infroduce a 
system of proportional representation or some other system which ensures a cross 
representative view is reflected in the conference delegation. [Rejected] 
6. The affiliated union delegation to Conferences... should comprise only members 
of the union whose basic employment derives from the awards covered by the 
respective union. [Rejected] 
7. The only residential boundaries that can affect [voting for a candidate] are those 
devised by the Federal, State or municipal electoral commissions. [Adopted] 
8. The collegiate system be the method by which preselections normally occur, the 
cenfral component comprising either the State Conference or a unit elected by 
State Conference together with all the votes cast within the respective electorate 
'' ALP National Executive Arbitration Panel, 1988. Interim Report, 5-6. 
^ Hogg, R 1989. 'A Report and Assessment', 2. 
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for individual candidates on a weighted basis of 50 percent central, 50 percent 
local'. [Rejected]. ^ 
The matters at the heart ofthe Liverpool preselection (items I, 2 and 7), essentially the 
qualification of members to vote in a plebiscite, were taken up by the National 
Conference. These were not issues, however, with which other State divisions needed to 
comply. Largely they already had these mles in place. On the balance of union-to-branch 
power (items 3 and 4) the less radical option was adopted. The unions held on to a 
majority of power. The attempt to make the unions more intemally representative and 
less subject to abuse by outsiders (5 and 6) failed. These were the two most important 
attempts at reform. In the first, the election of union delegates to party fomms would 
have been by proportional representation rather than the union secretary dictating the 
political hue of the entire delegation. In the second, the object was to restrict the unions 
delegations to those who worked in industries covered by unions. This was a clear 
attempt to stop the practice of union leaders filling their delegations will factional 'hired 
hands' who, in many instances, had no connection with the union or its workforce. The 
attempt to convert all preselection systems to a collegiate system, with a balance of local 
and central components, encountered resistance both from those who preferred the local 
plebiscite system, and those who preferred a larger cenfral component. In terms of the 
elements of integrity, quality and power these changes enhanced the integrity of the 
process to the extent of making it easier for members to vote, but only in so much as the 
power of unions was not disturbed. 
At the 1994 National Conference, the party finned its commitment to affirmative action 
for women parliamentary candidates. In doing so, it moved beyond the 1981 Conference 
decision for a program and opted for a quota for public office positions to be filled by 
women. 'Preselections for public office positions at state and federal level shall 
incorporate affirmative action. The intention of this is to produce an outcome where 35 
per cent of public office positions held by Labor or a majority of seats needed to form 
govemment, whichever is the greater, will be filled by women and not less than 35 per 
cent will be filled by men by the year 2002. The National Executive shall have the 
ALP National Executive, 1991. Recommendations and Options, 1, 4, 6. 
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responsibility and the power to determine the outcome in any public office preselection 
progressively between now and the year 2002 in order to ensure that this mle is complied 
with'.^ 
As discussed in Chapter 3, affirmative action is to be assessed in terms of a party's 
acceptance of the policy of demographic representation, not as a core element of 
democratic practice. Nevertheless, the affirmative action mle has been used to advantage 
one group or another as and when it suits the needs of the competitors. The final 
recommendation contains the seeds of the further cenfralisation of power in the Labor 
party. The National Executive shall determine preselections where the affirmative action 
goal is not met. Presumably, further goals could be set in which the Executive also 
becomes the final arbiter. The 2000 preselection of Jeimie George, former President of 
the Ausfralian Council of Trade Unions and member of the left faction in NSW, is a 
prime illusfration of the power of the dominant factional alliance in the Labor party 
apparently fulfilling the affirmative action goal as a mask to a broader agenda. The 
agenda was to avoid three rank-and-file preselections in NSW where two of the right 
Q 
faction's sitting members were under threat. 
The Liverpool imbroglio produced not only the national mle changes cited above, but 
also a fiill-blown intemal party debate on the panel system. The number of conditions to 
be an eligible voter was reduced to 26 from the 37 mentioned above, but there was no 
change in the total local plebiscite stand-up vote system,^  the only one (except the 
Queensland National party where it is an option in a House of Representatives 
preselection) outside the Territories. The major arguments are worth recounting. They 
also provide some insight into the evolution of the system in NSW. The system became 
established in the 1930s and involved not only Labor League (branch) members but also 
members of affiliated frade unions who lived within the electorates concemed (a system 
which not only survived in some State branches, for example Queensland, well into the 
1970s, but was subject to enormous abuse). 
' ALP, 1994. Platform, 325. 
* Mark Latham MHR in Werriwa and Julia Irwin MHR in Fowler wiU be spared the possibUity of defeat in 
preselection. The price of their saving is to 'spare' Jennie George fi-om a preselection she would most likely 
have won m Throsby, vacated by the 'left's' CoUn HoUis MHR. The Weekend Austialian, 24-25 June 2000. 
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The local plebiscite system suffers from its own instances of abuse. For example, a 
member needs to attend three branch meetings to become eligible to vote. The proof of 
attendance is contained in branch attendance books, which are in the hands of local 
branch officials. Unfortunately, from time to time such officials have falsified records. 
An infamous case was the 1980 preselection for Sydney, when the records were stolen on 
the eve ofthe ballot.'° Attempts to overcome abuses with the rewriting of rules have their 
own shortcomings. 'The plethora of anti-abuse criteria in the mles minimise the number 
of persons eligible to vote. This often unfairly disadvantages otherwise longstanding and 
committed ALP members. Consequently, the small number of people eligible to 
participate in preselections (which has been as low as 30 or 40 people on some 
occasions) may not adequately reflect the local Labor constituency, let alone the Labor 
constituency at large... The gradual accumulation of safeguard mles to prevent abuses of 
the system has led to disenfranchisement of members who by any reasonable criteria, 
should otherwise be eligible'." The complex mles for eligibility had at the same time 
increased the potential for damaging the integrity of the party electoral roll at the local 
level, and for the intervention by the Administrative Committee on behalf of favoured 
candidates. 
In Victoria, the 1994 and 1996 Conferences amended the membership mles in an attempt 
to stem the tide of branch-stacking that had engulfed the party, especially after its loss of 
State govemment in 1992. The new mles specify the number of members who may 
apply at any one time, and when and how this shall occur at a local branch meeting. 'The 
branch may not recommend the acceptance of more than 13 new members at a single 
meeting... All new membership applications from branch meetings which exceed these 
numbers are to be lodged with the State Secretary...' This mle enhanced the 1994 mle 
quoted in the 1996 Rules, 'Where seven or more new members are expected at a branch 
meeting, Branch Executives must provide seven days' notice to the State Secretary, who 
will send a nominee ofthe Membership Committee to the Branch meeting. ... A branch 
^ ALP NSW, 1996-1997. Policy and Rules, Rule N. 17 (a)-(g), 115. 
'" Peter Baldwin. Interview, 19 November 1997. 
' ' ALP NSW, 1992. NSW Preselections: A Time for Reform? Organisational Options Paper No. 1, 4, 
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may only recommend approval of membership applications or receive transfers from 
Central Branch during the first two hours after the commencement time for the monthly 
1 '\ 
meeting scheduled'. 
The new mles do not appear to have been all that effective—as the practice of stacking 
branches continued unabated in the lead-up to the 1998 round of preselections.''* A report 
by Dreyfus'^  recommended that the 'branch adopt the principle that the membership fees 
of every member be paid by that member' to counter the practice of purchasing 
memberships. To wrest the appeals processes from the hands of the factions it also 
recommended the 'election of a single member Disputes Tribunal ... to be elected by a 
75% majority ofthe delegates to State Conference'. The mles ofthe Victorian Labor 
party were infroduced as an attempt to change a culture that threatened to desfroy the 
integrity of the party. There is precious little differentiation between members and non-
members when people, recmited at short notice (and often paid for by the operatives of 
the major factions) determine preselections. As Federal Member Martin Ferguson 
reported to his branch members: '[djealing with this issue is exfremely important for two 
reasons: it goes to the integrity and legitimacy of the Labor Party, and it helps confront 
poor community perceptions of the ALP and the political process'.'^ Changing the 
culture of the Victorian division will ultimately rely on goodwill, but the demonsfration 
of the goodwill will be accepting mles of the type recommended by Dreyfus. The 
recommendations do not appear to have fared well, 'it seems implementation of Dreyfus 
17 
is not a high priority'. 
In Queensland the most recent issue of significance was the abolition ofthe '60% Rule' 
whereby a sitting member who attained 60% or more ofthe local vote, was not obliged to 
face the other half of the preselection panel made up of cenfral delegates. The mle was 
initiated in 1986 and was the subject of National Executive scmtiny in 1987, but was not 
'^  John Lenders, State Secretary ALP V, reported in the party organ. The Labor Star, 4 June 1994, that 
membership had grown m the period 1992-1994 fi-om 8,000 to 16,000 members, and that 4,000 ofthe new 
members were 'stackees'. 
'^  ALP V, 1996. Rules, 5, 17-18. 
^* AUegations made on the Channel 9 Sunday program, 3 May 1998. 
'^  Dreyfus, 1998. Panel of Review, 2 and 4. 
'* Ferguson, M. 2000. Federal Member's Report, Batman Report (13) 1, October. (Muneo) 
'^  ALP Members for Democratic Change, 2000. Democracy: The Newsletter of ALP Members for 
Democratic Change. June 2 (2), 4. (Mimeo) 
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abolished until 1994. The mle favoured a sitting member, inasmuch as a competitor had 
to have a strong majority to succeed. In practice, however, the abolition ofthe mle meant 
that all preselections were held under the mixed panel system, which brought a number 
of non-aligned members before the factionally controlled central panel. 
In a separate matter, the conviction of the endorsed candidate for the Queensland State 
seat of Thuringowa in 1998 for electoral fraud at the 1996 round of preselections led to 
the following mle change at the 1997 Conference. 'On or immediately after the 3V^ 
March (the cut-off day) in each year the State Secretary shall require an elecfronic roll for 
the entire State from the Commonwealth or State Electoral Commissions and the place at 
which each branch member is enrolled shall be deemed their enrolment address 
regardless of their alteration of enrolment during the succeeding twelve month period and 
until the next cut-off day'.'* The practice of late changes to enrolment and even the 
'warehousing' of members outside the electorate and a late switch to bring them inside in 
time for a preselection had become a tool abused in some quarters. The mle was devised 
following a most publicly damaging case, which lead to the trial and imprisonment of 
Karen Ehrman of Townsville who was convicted for falsifying electoral enrolments. 
Ehrman enrolled Townsville residents at false addresses without their knowledge 
between 1993 and 1996 in a bid to win [Labor] preselection.'^ The mle will not have any 
direct impact on the falsification of enrolment, for which there are clear public laws, but 
it is an example of where a party has to be seen to be able to control its own 
misdemeanours. 
In the Westem Australia Labor party, the 1994 Constitution and Rules Conference made 
a minor increase in the number of local delegates (from 25 to 30) who, combined with 
the State Executive (218), formed the preselection panel. This change was made in the 
face ofthe defeated Rules Committee recommendation, that 'State Executive will have 
responsibility for selecting the Party's candidates for: ... The House of Representatives 
where the local party membership in that division is less than 600'. There are about 
four Federal divisions in Westem Australia with 600 or more Labor branch members, so 
'^  ALP Q 1997. Rules, Rule 30.01 (b), 40. 
19 The Courier-Mail, 23rd June 2000. 
"^ ALP WA 1994. Constitution, 82. (Mimeo). 
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this recommendation amounted to a virtual abolition of local delegate representation in 
other areas (or acted as an incentive to lift the membership). As in the South Australian 
division, the imbalance in the union vote is gross in Westem Ausfralia, and falls well 
outside the guidelines recommended by the National Conference. This situation is a stark 
example of the National Executive having the power to intervene but being unwilling to 
do so. Clearly, power wins over proper rules, mles that the party itself defined as proper. 
In South Australia the defeat ofthe Bannon govemment in 1993 as well as the debate 
surtounding national mle changes led to the establishment ofthe 1993 Committee of 
Review, chaired by former Federal Attomey-General Michael Duffy. The report 
recommended major mle changes as follows: 
1. 'That a 50/50 preselection system be implemented. This shall be comprised as 
follows: 50% branch members voting in two groups, a local plebiscite of 25% and 
the remaining 25% being those branch members who comprise the sub-branch 
component at Convention. The remaining 50% is to be comprised ofthe affiliated 
unions. 
2. That Convention be changed from 60/40 to 50/50. 
3. That the National Executive appoint a person to chair a Dispute Tribunal. 
4. That all impediments to secret ballots be removed. 
5. That the right to vote in a plebiscite will be conditional on members being 
*) 1 
financial for a full 13 months prior to a preselection'. 
The preselection panel was changed to the 50/25/25 system as recommended, the basis of 
the Convention was changed as recommended, and a disputes tribunal was established, as 
were provisions to enhance the secret ballot by the 1994 Convention. The secret ballot 
provisions were further enhanced by the 1996 Convention. At the 1995 Convention, two 
new membership mles specified that voting rights could only apply to those who lived 
within the electoral boundaries. The old mles allowed for non-residents in branches 
within a district to vote."^ "^  The South Ausfralian matters were clearly concemed with the 
'^ ALP SA 1993. Committee of Review Report, 3-5. (Mimeo). 
^^  ALP SA 1994. Constitution and Rules, Rule 58.3 (a), 53. Rule 23 (a) 32. Rule 52, 45. Rule 58.3 (d), 54. 
ALP SA 1996. Rule Amendments, State Convention, especiaUy mles 55 (p) and (q), 6-7. ALP SA 1995. 
Rule Changes, State Convention, Rules 5 I (ii) and (Ui), 1. 
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integrity of the process as well as the distribution of power, including the change to the 
panel. The panel had given virtually no role to the local branches in preselection with the 
gross imbalance of votes accorded the unions. Even so, the local members still comprise 
just 25% ofthe preselection panel. 
In March 1992 the Labor party National Executive appointed Assistant National 
Secretary Ian Henderson as administrator to the Tasmanian party following the demotion 
of Senator Michael Tate from the number one position on the ticket. Henderson reported 
to the 1993 State Conference, and Conference accepted three major changes to the mles 
goveming preselection. 
First, 'There shall be two components of the preselection process: ... The local 
component shall comprise all eligible members of the Party normally resident in the 
relevant electorate; The central component shall comprise the full membership of State 
Conference; The ... votes cast by the local component and the ... votes cast by the 
cenfral component shall be combined equally...'. Second, 'there shall be a Disputes 
Committee, which shall, subject to the powers of National Conference, National 
Executive, State Conference and the Administrative Committee, mediate, conciliate, 
arbitrate, or otherwise hear, determine or recommend all matters in dispute within the 
Party'. Third, 'the total number of union delegates and membership delegates shall vary 
from year to year, ... Where the Union membership to Branch membership ratio is less 
than 27 to I then the total union delegates equals 100 (50:50): Where the Union 
membership to Branch membership ratio is greater than 27 to 1, but less than 32 to I then 
the total union delegates equals 110 and the total membership delegates equals 90 
(55:45): Where the Union membership to Branch membership is greater than 32 to 1 then 
the total union delegates equals 120 and the total membership delegates equals 80 
(60:40)'.^^ 
These changes weakened the union control of the party, although imder the mles 
goveming the make-up of State Conference it is possible for the unions to take up to 60% 
ofthe delegates if all eligible unions are affiliated to the party. The Rules Committee was 
^^  ALP T, 1997. Rules, 15, 18, 30. 
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a standing committee that met regularly to suggest changes to the mles and act as an 
interpreter of them. Those powers now rest with the Administrative Committee, and the 
Disputes Tribunal only meets as and when required. These changes are a significant 
advance in good practice, first to balance the significant elements ofthe party, union and 
branch members, and to separate mle-making from disputes hearing. 
In June 1993 a Special Conference ofthe ACT Labor party was ordered by the National 
Executive to resubmit an earlier change from a rank-and-file preselection system to a 
central panel/local plebiscite combination, with equal weighting to each component. The 
National Executive also ordered an inquiry by Hon Peter Staples MHR into the ACT 
party following the 1995 by-election for the seat of Canberta and much criticism ofthe 
candidate. He successfiilly recommended a change to the 1995 ACT Conference that the 
composition should change from 60% union delegates/40% local delegates to 50/50 at 
the following Conference.^ '* 
Liberal Party Management 
The Liberal party Federal Council has, since 1994, a much circumscribed power to 
disendorse a candidate. No preselection has been overtumed because of Federal 
Executive action. Federal party president Goldsworthy reported to the Federal Council of 
the Liberal party in 1993 on the question of candidate selection. His report carried the 
same message as that of a predecessor, John Valder, whose 1983 report favoured 
plebiscites for the selection of candidates. Goldsworthy recommended that all branch 
members be eligible to vote in preselections and that the National Executive have the 
power to overturn preselections.^^ Only modest moves have been made to these ends, and 
little uniformity is imposed by national mles. As Valder argued in a 1994 speech, 
reflecting on the poor electoral performance of the federal Liberal party in the period 
1983-1994, 'how do we motivate people to join the party? One way must be to give 
people a greater say in preselections... the most important role for party members must 
be in the preselection of candidates for Parliament'. 
'^* ALP National Executive Minutes, 26 November 1993. (Mimeo) 
^^  The Bulletin, 22 June 1993. 
*^ Address by John Valder, The Valder Report and Plebiscites, undated, 2. (Mimeo) 
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The NSW Liberal party established a committee to report into the nature of preselection 
panels. The report on the panels recommended against a rank and file system, which 
had the support of the Valder and Goldsworthy reports. The debate was concemed with 
the representativeness ofthe panel, with a strong pitch by the adminisfration against local 
control. The then-State Director remarked, 'Branch members... simply don't reflect the 
community out there. Someone said that you either had to be lonely, desperate or 
ambitious to join the local branch of a political party. What happens is that you end up 
with candidates who mirtor the aspirations of the people they mix with, not the 
community'.^* There were no changes to the composition ofthe panels at the 1994 or 
1997 Conferences. There were, however, significant changes in the conduct of 
preselections, including a new procedure for the review of nominations, changes to 
selection committee mles and changes to urgent endorsement procedures: 
1. 'Review of Nominations: A nomination review committee shall be formed 
comprising: inter alia,... the Federal Parliamentary Leader; ... the state director. 
Each nomination review committee... shall... interview and otherwise examine... 
candidates and satisfy itself that those candidates are fit and proper persons... 
2. Selection Committee Rules and Procedures: The quorum for a Selection 
Committee shall be 75% of those constitutionally entitled to attend and vote; 
3. Urgent endorsement Procedures: Where there is less than 7 days ofthe creation of 
the vacancy [in parliamentary office for the House of Representatives]... State 
Executive may modify procedures for selection of candidates or dispense 
altogether with those procedures and endorse a member... provided that before 
exercising this power it must consult and, as far as practicable seek agreement 
with, the Committee ofthe Relevant Conference'.^^ 
Clearly, the issue of the quality of candidates is canvassed in the mle changes in the first 
item with the Federal Parliamentary Leader and the State Director having a formal say 
over the suitability ofthe candidates, and in second item, to guard against an unsuitable 
endorsement due to a low tumout of the panel. The third item reconfirms the powers of 
^' Report ofthe Michael Osbome committee, Sydney Moming Herald, 31 July 1993, 7. 
*^ Statement by Barry O'Farrell, Sydney Moming Herald, 9 June 1994. 
^'LPA NSW, 1997. Constitution and Regulations, 48-9, 56-8. 
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the State Executive to intervene and alter proceedings, but it is limited to certain 
circumstances and in certain ways, without destroying certain rights. Clearly, the power 
of the existing hierarchy wins in these changes. The NSW division did not move to a 
local plebiscite or even mixed plebiscite-cenfral panel system and yet it devised a system 
of centrally vetting candidates, which appeared to be the great concem ofthe leadership, 
had they moved to a plebiscite system. 
The Victorian Liberal party underwent major changes in the composition of its panel, in 
1989, under the presidency of Michael Kroger, who was quoted at the time as saying, 
'Successfiil parties need sfrong party officials and they need some party officials that 
have some power'. The new Convention or panel consisted of a mix of local branch and 
cenfral Policy Assembly delegates in a ratio of 60/40. This move was later argued to be 
not a cenfralising of power but 'dispersal'^' away from the sitting Member of Parliament 
who could confrol a panel consisting solely of local delegates. It continued a long trend 
away from the power and protection of the incumbent, away from a politicians' to a 
membership party. Locally confrolled preselections with poor scmtiny can lead to very 
poor practices of the management of the rolls, and can undermine entirely an otherwise 
'stmcturally' democratic poll such as a plebiscite of local members. The new Victorian 
system sought a new balance between the local members and members from other areas. 
The key is whether the central panel is itself dispersed or subject to confrol by very few, a 
matter canvassed earlier in Chapter 4. 
The Queensland Liberal party made a major change to the preselection panel for MHRs 
and Senators at its 1993 Convention. The 1990 mles" specified that 'State Executive 
shall determine the composition of Selection Councils in Federal ...Elections'. Members 
of State Executive constituted no more than one third ofthe Selection Council (including 
a Senate Selection Council) and the remainder of the delegates were made up either of 
branch delegates from the electorate, in addition to delegates from within the Zone which 
contained the electorate, in a ratio of two to one in favour of electorate delegates, or by a 
plebiscite of members in a particular zone or electorate. The Senate Selection Council 
^^  The Bulletin, 2 May 1989, 134. 
'^ Michael Kroger. Interview, 9 Febmary 1998. 
32 David Hawker. Interview, 26 November 1997. 
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comprised members ofthe State Executive with an equal number of delegates from each 
zone 'provided that wherever practicable the delegates shall be all from different 
Branches and the maximum possible number of branches be represented'. '^* 
These mles allowed an extraordinary amount of control and manipulation from the State 
Executive, which could change the panel to suit its own needs. In 1992 the State 
Executive appointed a Constitution Review Committee to make recommendations for 
change on these and other matters. The Committee recommended that 'the ordinary 
method for the preselection of candidates be changed from Preselection Councils 
comprising delegates elected by local Branches, to plebiscites, in which all rank and file 
members ofthe Party... participate'. The recommendation for the Senate was that State 
Convention constitutes the plebiscite. The State Executive recommended against the 
adoption of a plebiscite system, opting for an expanded franchise by lifting the ratio of 
delegates to one in five members from one in ten. The Management Committee opposed 
the plebiscite 'on the basis of cost, the capacity for branch stacking, the incentive that a 
plebiscite provides for Members of Parliament to keep branch numbers low in their 
electorates and the adminisfrative burdens that a plebiscite... would impose'.^^ This 
debate is reminiscent of the NSW division: cautious in the tmst that the party officers 
place in the branch members and the manipulation of numbers that local confrol can 
allow. 
The 1993 Convention did not follow the recommendations of the Management 
Committee, instead opting for change, though with some compromise on the Senate 
selection. The plebiscite (with a stand-up vote following addresses by candidates) 
consists of all members of branches, and State Executive (no more than one third). The 
compromise appeared to be on the new Senate panel, which comprises delegates from 
the Federal Electorate Councils. The peculiarity in the system is the adherence to branch 
boundaries for the residential qualification, as opposed to the electorate boimdary." This 
is precisely the problem that caused enormous harm in the NSW Labor party. 
" LPA Q 1990. State Constitution, Rule 137, 28. 
'" LPA Q, 1990. State Constitution, Rule 138, 29. 
" LPA Q, 1993a. Proposed Constitution Changes, 20-21. (Mimeo) 
^^  LPA Q, 1993b. Proposed Constitutional Changes: Explanatory Memorandum, section 15. 
" L P A Q, 1996. State Constitution, Rule 136 (a), 46. 
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In the Westem Ausfralian Liberal party the considerable unrest caused by the defeat of 
two incumbents (Rocher and Filing) in the 1995 round of preselections led to the 
establishment of a review committee chaired by prominent local businessman, Harold 
Clough. The Special Conference was called amid conflict between those forces 
supposedly aligned to Senator Noel Crichton-Browne and the reformists, such as Clough 
and John Hyde, with a view to break the confrol of the 'NC-B' forces. The tool for 
breaking such control was the plebiscite. Clough insisted on a local plebiscite for 
preselection and a change to the double vote awarded to members of the Young Liberal 
Movement. Both of these recommendations were defeated at the 1997 Special 
Conference.^ * Other less adventurous measures were infroduced, such as the power of 
State Council to call for a plebiscite (although this power has not been exercised to 
date),^ ^ the random selection of delegates, and increased branch representation. The tool 
that the anti-NCB forces wanted, a plebiscite of local members to select candidates, was 
dismissed by Noel Crichton-Browoie. His view was that he would have the numbers 
under any system!'*^  New mles do not necessarily guarantee change, ff the same group 
remains in power after a system that conforms to the principles of competitiveness, fair 
process and associational integrity, then the outcome is the result of a fair contest. There 
may be many good reasons why one side usually wins. 
The South Australian Liberal party debated the issue of the reintroduction of plebiscites 
(abolished in favour of branch delegates in the 1973) at the 1994 State Council. The 
major advocate for the change was Senator Nick Minchin, who outlined his arguments in 
a paper delivered to the Conference.'*' The plebiscite system was one in which all branch 
members would vote and form the entire panel, not just part, as for example in the 
Queensland division. Minchin argued that the plebiscite would give power to the 
membership and act as a drawcard for new members. He noted that the party (Ausfralia 
wide) had lost 'about two-thirds of its members over the last 20 years'."*^ He defended the 
accusation that plebiscites were open to branch 'stacking'. 'At the moment delegates to 
*^ John Hyde. Interview, 2 November 1997. 
^' John Hyde. Interview, 2 November 1997. 
'"^Noel Crichton-Browne. Interview, 13 August 1998. 
'*' Minchin, Senator Nick. 1994. Plebiscites: Questions and Answers, paper prepared for the South 
AustraUan Liberal party State Council, 12-13 August. 
147 
Internal Scrutiny: Managing Preselections 
electoral colleges, and the members who elect them, need only have been members for 
one month prior to the branch AGM at which they are elected. Delegates need only to 
have been members for 3 months before the close of nominations for preselection. Thus 
the current system is wide open to stacking and manipulation'.'*^ That system remains in 
place. Clearly much of the debate concemed the integrity of the system even though the 
proponents of each system (the status quo or plebiscite) no doubt argued the case that 
suited their side. The debate was underscored by distmst over the motives behind each 
proposition. More important, it revealed the acute discomfort within the party, as in other 
parties, at the loss of members. The real quandary is about who is to be tmsted with the 
future ofthe party. 
An important change took place in the Tasmanian Liberal party in the ability ofthe State 
Executive to grant endorsement. This signalled a significant shift in power away from the 
local Selection Committee. 'State Executive may at its discretion refer the selection back 
to the selection Committee for reconsideration' and, 'if in any special circumstances the 
State Council, or the State Executive considers that in the interests ofthe Organisation an 
endorsement should be re-opened, the State Executive may call for fresh applications'. 
These powers are nowhere near as sfrong as the discretion given to 'head office' in other 
examples but do allow the decision without referral to the locals.'*'* This tendency, noted 
in many divisions, is undertaken in the name of ensuring the best quality candidates and 
overcoming parochialism. The question is whether they move beyond anti-parochialism 
to cenfral control. 
National Party Management 
The National party Federal Management Committee only has power to endorse 
candidates in States and Territories where there is no affiliated party. Affiliated parties 
exist in NSW, Queensland, Victoria, and South and Westem Ausfralia (both of which are 
incorporated bodies). The 1988 Committee of Review into the Future Direction ofthe 
National Party of Australia recommended, among other things, 'that the matter of 
''^ Minchin, \994. Plebiscites, 1. 
'^^ Minchin, 1994. Plebiscites, 8. 
'^LPAT, 1996. Constitution, 28. 
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selection of candidates for Federal elections is one for the State Parties'. '*^  The absolute 
control by the State parties of their own affairs has not changed, and reinforces the 
federal, as opposed to national, nature ofthe party. 
The New South Wales National party's Constitution and Rules, 1996'*^  have not been 
revised for ten years, and despite the mention of two State seats lost in circumstances 
where the candidate was thought to be a factor, no mle changes were proposed. In 
Victoria, the Mmray dispute caused wide-ranging mle changes, some clearly influenced 
by the experience of the loss of the seat. For example, a complication of the appeal 
process in the disputed ballot was that the two contestants sat on the management 
committee that heard the appeal! A new mle was passed in 1997, 'At any meeting 
of.. the Management Committee... that involves or pertains to a pre-selection, any person 
who is a nominee for pre-selection...shall not be present at such meeting whilst issues 
relating to such pre-selection... are being considered... ''*^  
The mles are subject to annual review, but in the opinion of Malcolm Feam, State 
Director of the National Party (Victoria), the party is an 'ulfra conservative' 
organisation, and reluctant to change the mles. He cited the example of the option of a 
plebiscite system that was put to the 1997 Conference but was rejected. The loss of the 
seat of Murray in a three-comered contest was, however, a sufficient shock to stimulate 
changes. The basic allegation was one of 'insider frading', that is, that one candidate had 
the list of delegates before the other and therefore had a head start. Legal advice was that 
the courts were unlikely to hear the matter, although the fact that an individual could 
suffer a considerable loss of fiiture eamings was canvassed. The party used the advice to 
dissuade the contestants from taking the matter to court. 
In Queensland, the only change of significance reported was the option of a local 
plebiscite for the preselection of House of Representative candidates. The change was 
*^ NPA 1988(b). The Future: A Report by the Committee of Review into the Future Direction ofthe 
National Party of Austialia, Canberra; Federal CouncU, 78. 
^ NPA NSW, 1996. Constitution and Rules. Party Secretary Paul Davey and former State President 
Senator David Brownhill (interview 26 November 1987) mentioned the two State election losses m Clarence 
and Tamworth and the discussion about mle changes, and the fact that nevertheless none eventuated. 
"'' NPA V, 1997. Constitiition and Rules, Rule 120 (k). 
'** Malcolm Feam. Interview, 30 April 1998. 
149 
Intemal Scrutiny: Managing Preselections 
recommended by Margaret Cribb, the University of Queensland academic commissioned 
by the party to produce a report on its 1989 State election loss. The mles state that: 
'The candidate shall be selected at a plebiscite of members ofthe Party being a member 
of a Branch operating in the Federal Division ...provided that if Cenfral Council 
considers at any time that the interests ofthe Party will be best served by selection it may 
resolve by a majority of those present: that it will select the candidate; or that it will 
depute the selection to a Selection Committee. If Central Council decides to depute the 
selection to a Selection Committee, the Selection Committee shall consist of members of 
the State Management Committee and members ofthe... Federal Divisional Council... 
provided that... the number of members ofthe Federal Divisional Council... are in the 
majortty . 
One possible reason for the lack of mle changes as a means of managing the National 
party is the fact that the National party holds mainly safe seats. As a result, in addition to 
the innate conservatism of the party members, and the deferential system apparent in the 
comments of officials,^ ° the experience of preselection is infrequent in many areas. The 
lack of activity results in fewer instances of mle change as a response to problems that 
arise. 
Conclusion 
The key debate at the Federal or national level has been concemed principally with the 
management of power (power to overtum preselections) and the quality of the outcome 
(nature ofthe panel), and less to do with the integrity ofthe process (appeals, definitions 
of membership). The party with the greatest experience at handling preselections at the 
national level, the Labor party, has started to use those powers, not simply to resolve 
disputes that may threaten the performance of a division, but to act as a court of appeal 
on the integrity of the process itself The 2000 Jennie George preselection for Throsby 
reinforces a view that, whatever happens on the ground, the executive may intervene to 
enforce its view and the local view is less relevant. If the local outcome does not suit the 
National Executive, it seems increasingly likely to intervene. The number of 
49 Ken Crooke, State Du-ector NPA Q. Telephone conversation undated. NPA Q, 1995. Constitution, 25. 
150 
Internal Scrutiny: Managing Preselections 
interventions is small, but the demonsfration value is immense. The demonstration value 
is three-sided. It may reinforce the idea that a greater force will intervene for a fair 
outcome, or it may reinforce the idea that a greater force will intervene to keep the peace, 
regardless of the faimess. Then again, it may reinforce the dominant national power 
within the National Executive to the detriment of the autonomy of State divisions and 
local branches. 
There is no necessary advantage in having the right to appeal to a higher body. There is 
the possibility that, as a raft of cases comes before a body that acts in an 'appeal' 
capacity, that body may indeed begin to be more carefiil at ensuring integrity in its own 
processes and those that it seeks to judge. It may be a handy tool to enforce uniformity or 
to solve disputes, it may in fact be used as just another forum in which to play out 
intemal stmggles or to centralise power. The 'nationalisation'^' of the mles is much 
favoured by the national press, which uses terms like 'professional' to describe the Labor 
party's National Executive's ability to intervene. In fact, what the term really means is 
that the national parliamentary leadership has a greater input. The Parliamentary 
leadership have four votes on the Executive, and the inference that the press makes is 
that the party is a nuisance to be dealt with, not an expression of the will of the 
membership of a free association. 
The considerable time and energy which the Labor and Liberal parties, in particular, 
spend on the mles goveming preselection indicate that, while much of the effort is over 
the confrol of the organisation, it is possible to recognise that members have certain 
rights to vote and that certain imbalances in the weight of votes are unacceptable. The 
parties have managed their affairs for a very long time, clearly not so cmdely as to have 
caused a mass exodus. Nevertheless, in all four parties there is a paucity of members and 
a real concem at the quality of the membership. People recmited at short notice, 
sometimes without their knowledge, and sometimes without paying their own dues, are 
fatal to one concept of political parties—that they represent activists. The Labor party 
National Secretary wrote recently of branch-stacking, that it is 'an activity that erodes the 
'° Ron BosweU. Interview, 22 Febmary 1999. 
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strong fradition of intemal democracy of the ALP and damages our image as a party that 
it is fit to govem the nation'.^^ 
The parties manage their affairs with very little extemal scrutiny and under a minimum 
of regulation or electoral constraint. If they are not the associations that they claim to be, 
democratic and representing a large part of the electorate, the pariiamentary system may 
be left with a very nartow base of activists from which to select members of pariiament. 
The nartow base arises because of the barriers to entry erected as a result of historical 
political labels and because of sophisticated campaign procedures that may be operated 
by a small number of professional activists. Are other, comparable democracies as 
comfortable as Ausfralia with their circumstances? 
As Lloyd observes the Labor party National Conference and Executive are not purely national identities. 
Lloyd, C. 2000. 'A Quest For National Rules.' In The Machine: Labor Confronts the Future, eds. J. 
Warhurst and A. Parkin. Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 69. 
^^  ALP Members For Democratic Change, 2000. Democracy, June 2 (2), 1. 
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External Scrutiny: Statutory and Judicial 
An important consideration in studying the intemal practice of the parties is whether the 
parties are private or pubhc entities, and in what respects they are so. A wholly private 
association in a competitive party system may avoid, entirely, any obhgation to allow 
extemal scmtiny or extemal mle-setting. A party system that consists of public parties, or 
where there are doubts about tlie competition between the parties, is likely to come under 
extemal scmtiny. Moreover, the context in which parties are established and the history 
of their evolution will have an important impact on whetiier they are regarded with 
suspicion or with rehef, whether they are a welcome or an unwelcome part of the pohtical 
constitution, and therefore more or less likely to be left to their own devices. 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the way in which some other nations freat their 
parties and the extent to which they are subject to extemal scmtiny. The situation in 
Ausfraha, in the hght of the recent changes in the status of the Ausfralian parties, is that 
they may well come under extemal scmtiny for the first time in their long history. The 
major Ausfralian parties, despite considerable efforts to manage their preselections in a 
democratic way, have not been entirely successfiil at doing so. Moreover, the fact that 
they receive the support of the state and that the legal system has begun to impose its 
standards on the parties, may mean that the traditional relationship between the 
Ausfrahan state and the major Austrahan parties has changed. The changes appear 
gradual. The parties devised favourable electoral rules, and then more directiy in their 
interest, devised electoral funding. The electoral fimding was devised at a time when their 
need for members was reduced and, with the change in the technology of campaigning, 
their need for fimds was increased. Further, the expectations of members of private 
organisations in general, and in some instances pohtical parties, was that they should be 
freated fairly. This mix of new and old factors combine to cast new hght on the fiiture of 
the parties. They present new challenges to the autonomy of their intemal operations. 
External Scrutiny: Statutory arid Judicial 
Reguladon of Parties Internationally 
In Chapter two, a number of assumptions were made, about the status of pohtical parties. 
Among other things, a party is said to be a private association if it is closed to the external 
scrtitiny of its intemal operations. Altematively, a party is in some respects pubhc if the 
membership has rights to an extemal review of a dispute. The dichotomy between private 
and public parties may be understood across a number of other dimensions. The more 
highly extemally regulated a party, the less autonomous and therefore the more pubhc it 
is. Six democracies are listed in Table 7.1, deliberately chosen for their famiharity and 
confrasting rules. 
Germany was chosen, for example, because its parties are known to be heavily regulated, 
both in terms of the pubhc dimensions of its funding, as well as in terms of its intemal or 
private operations. Britain was chosen because it was known to be hghtly regulated and 
so on. The countries have been rated according to six criteria. The criteria are aU 
incorporated in German law. These include the fimding of parties, the disclosure of 
donations, the stamtory control of the appointment of party officials, the process of 
selection of candidates for public office, the extent of members' rights and access to 
judicial review. Table 7.1 distinguishes external regulation ofthe pubhc and private side 
ofthe parties' operations. The elements ofthe parties' operations that are regulated by the 
state are marked with a tick and those not regulated are marked with a cross. The 
examples form three groups. Those that are extemally regulated both in their public as 
well as their private dimensions (Germany and USA), those that use the state but suffer 
no extemal scmtiny of their private operations (Canada, Australia and New Zealand, 
though the latter has recentiy opened the door), and Britain, which remains essentially 
unregulated. 
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Table 7.1: Extemal Regulation of Parties in Six Countries (1999) 
Extemal 
Regulation 
Country 
Public Face of Parties Private Face of Parties 
Public 
Donations 
Germany 
;!1JSA'" 
Public 
Funding 
Legal 
Entity 
Intemal 
Affairs 
7 
New Zealand j V^ 
j 
Canada | V' 
Australia 1 V' 
I Great Britain | S^ 
X 
X 
X 
x^  
x^  
7 
7 
X 
X 
X 
Member 
Rights 
_ „ 
"7"'" 
"7""" 
..i„... 
X 
Sources: see References. 
Notes: 
y = Extemal regulation exists. 
X = Extemal regulation does not exist. 
Donations: Disclosure of donations to parties or candidates. In Britain, legislation regulates trade union 
donations to the Labour party, and requires companies to disclose to shareholders donations to parties, but 
there is no public disclosure/jer^e. 
Public Funding: I*ublic fimding for any purpose excluding fi-ee airtime during elections, and for 
Parliamentary duties. In Britain and New Zealand, there are limits on campaign expenditure, and in 
Canada, there are both limits and reimbursement of expenditure, i.e., the state funds election campaigns. 
Legal Entity: German and USA parties have a legal entity. In Australia, Canada and New Zealand, parties 
are registered for fimding, but largely, as in Britain, they may remain private associations. 
Intemal Affairs: Legislation goveming the structure or conduct of parties, including the selection of 
executives and candidates. 
Member Rights: Members rights set out in legislation, or the affairs ofthe party subject to judicial review. 
In Germany, the restoration of the parties and their placement in the Constitution (The 
Basic Law) of the Second Republic was a conscious decision to maintain the party 
system, but to consfrain it in the hglit of fhe totahtarian excesses of die Thfrd Reich.' 
' Neumann, S. [1956] 1975. 'Germany: Changing Pattems and Lasting Problems.' In Modem Political 
Parties, ed. S. Neumann. Chicago: University of Chicago, 376. 
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Legislation govems not only the pubhc face of the parties such as the disclosure of the 
source and size of donations and the pubhc funding they receive, but also their intemal 
affairs, including the selection of candidates and the rights of members to a remedy if a 
dispute arises. Article 21 of The Basic Law reads, 'the parties ... may be freely 
estabhshed. Thefr internal organisation shall conform to democratic principles. They shall 
pubhcly accoimt for the sources and use of their funds and for thefr assets'. Further, the 
Federal Constitutional Court 'has the power to declare that a party constitutes a threat to 
freedom and democracy and is therefore unconstitutional, in which case it orders that 
party's dissolution'. 
In the USA, state govemments 'made thefr ffrst forays into the govemance of party 
activities following the civil war' and accelerated during the so-called 'Progressive Era' 
in order to take power out of the hands of cormpt political machines and return it to the 
people.^ Indeed Justice Scaha's defence of pohtical parties, 'Americans have made the 
regulation of pohtical parties one of the principal tasks of political legislation', is a 
reminder of the dehberate effort of that nation to control the power of political parties by, 
in effect, making them pubhc property. State legislation govems some aspects of the 
intemal affafrs of American parties (for Federal elections) such as the selection of 
candidates through fhe primaries system,^ and the pubhc fimding and donation disclosure 
legislation is Federally administered.*' The extent to which the parties are pubhc affects 
the extent to wliich they can conduct their business in private. Debate about freeing 
parties from regulation, in effect 'privatizing'^ them, and the strategy for so doing, either 
through the courts^ or by legislative change,^ is a major sfream of political discourse. It 
also raises the practical issue of self-regulation and extemal regulation, its 
^ Gmndgesetz, 1949. BasicLaw (German Constitution) Last amended, 1990 (English translation) 
http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/eurodocs/germ/ggeng.html 
' Petterson, P. 1995. The Supreme Court and the Legal Status of Pohtical Parties. Ph. D Thesis, University 
of Mass, 112. 
'* Quoted in Pomper, 1992. Passions and Interests, 116. 
' Lowenstein, D.H. 1993. 'Associational Rights of Major Political Parties: A Skeptical Inquiry.' Texas Law 
Review 71: 1742. 
* Federal Election Campaign Act and the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act administered by the 
Federal Election Commission, (www.fec.gov). 
^ Epstein, L. 1989. 'Will American Political Parties Be Privatized?' Joumal of Law and Pohtics 5(2): 239. 
* Fay, J. 1982. 'Legal Regulation of Political Parties.' Joumal of Legislation 9: 263. 
^ Lowenstein, D.H. 1993. 'Associational Rights', 1741. 
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appropriateness and efficacy. 'It seems impossible to create procedural devices which 
would protect against abuse and yet permit the requisite degree of autonomy [of pohtical 
parties]'.'° 
The confrast with Britain is stark. The pohtical system operates with low levels of 
regulation across the range of activities. The parties in both thefr public face and intemal 
organisation are ahnost entirely private, and subject to a very minor degree of regulation 
and ahnost no scmtiny. The British govemment rejected the 1976 Houghton Report" 
recommendation to fund political campaigns pubhcly, and accepted a second report on 
the matter, the Home Affairs Select Committee Report 1994, which recommended 'no 
1 7 
substantive changes in the way parties are fimded'. The argument, that parties 'are an 
essential part of civic society and the state should be kept at a distance','^ was elegantly 
put in the minority opinion of the 1976 Report. '[W]e think it mistaken and possibly 
dangerous to suggest that any work can be requfred of a pohtical party—by the State, by 
Parhament or by anyone other than its members'. And further, 'Dfrect state aid would 
breach the estabhshed British constitutional practice that organisation for pohtical ends is 
a strictiy voluntary activity'.'"* It appears that, despite arguments to the contrary, and in a 
parallel context, British pohtical Hfe will remain 'based sfrongly on tmst'.'^ 
Germany, the USA and Britain provide the exfremes on the continuum of private and 
pubhc association. Austraha, New Zealand and Canada occupy a middle position. Here 
are examples of parties, which retain a private status but have a propensity to accept the 
largesse of the state as it suits thefr needs. There is apparently less fear and anti-party 
sentiment than is evident in the law of Germany and the USA, but there is no defence of 
the concept of private association which is evident in Britain. Austraha, New Zealand and 
Canada are the asymmetrical types. They are moving towards establishing the pubhc 
'" Harvard Law Review eds, 1963. 'Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations', Harvard Law 
Review 16: 1060. 
" Houghton, Lord, 1976. Report ofthe Committee on Financial Aid to Political Parties. London: HMSO. 
'^Fisher, J. 1997. 'Donations to Political Parties.' Parliamentary Affairs 50(2): 235. 
" Seyd, P. 1998. 'In Praise of Party.' Parliamentary Affairs 51(2): 204. 
'"Houghton, 1976. Report, 75, 78. 
' ' Oliver, D. 1997. 'Regulating the Conduct of MP's: the British Experience...' Political Studies 45: 543. 
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status of parties without the clear rationale evident elsewhere and apparently without any 
thought as to the consequences. 
The New Zealand case is one of 'asymmetrical' law because it accepts'^ intervention in 
its parties' intemal affafrs, but parties do not receive much by way of campaign 
assistance. This is a rather selfless form of asymmetry. It has recently undergone a major 
fransformation with a legislative requirement for democratic procedures in candidate 
selection. The 1986 Royal Commission on tlie Electoral System recommended tliat 'legal 
confrols [be] infroduced, as a consequence of ... voting dfrectiy for pohtical parties as in 
our MMP [Mixed Member Proportional] proposal'.''' A 1995 Department of Justice 
Report on the Electoral Reform Bill analysed submissions, including those from each of 
the parties, and concluded that if the Electoral Law Committee favoured such confrols, 
the 'mles should be such as may readily be accommodated by the pohtical parties'. The 
Electoral Law Committee recommended a new provision, the effect of which 'in terms of 
redress is that some form of review can be sought in the High Court ... seeking a 
declaration that a party's rules or procedures are unlawful'.'^ The MMP system was 
infroduced in 1993 and the related proposal on intemal democracy set out a requirement 
'for registered parties to follow democratic procedures in candidate selection'. 
The Canadian case is closer to the Ausfrahan inasmuch as the status of parties is more 
clearly private,^' yet the resort to pubhc funding clearly imphes a public dimension to the 
parties. This asymmetry is of the more selfish variety. Ausfralia ranks in the middle in 
'* There has yet been no case in the New Zealand High Court that has tested the legislation. For example, 
the case heard shortly prior to the new Act Peters v Colhnge (NZ High Court, 2NZLR at 575,1993) 
conceming the expulsion of Winston Peters MP, the National Party Cabinet Minister, maintained the 
standard position 'that for legal purposes, political parties are private bodies. They have no statutory or 
public duties.' A case heard after the new law involving former members ofthe New Zealand First Party 
failed to proceed because ofthe lack of standing ofthe plaintiffs. (Stevenson and Widerstrom and Winston 
Peters and ORS. NZ High Court Registry CP 29/97). 
'^  Royal Commission on the Electoral System [New Zealand], 1986. Towards a Better Democracy, 
Appendices to the Joumal ofthe House of Representatives H3, 26. 
'* Department of Justice [New Zealand], 1993. Electoral Reform BiU Report, 3 May, 16. (Mimeo) 
'^  Electoral Law Committee on the Electoral Reform Bill [New Zealand], 1993, Report, Second session, 
Forty-Third Parliament, Tabled House of Representatives, 7. 
^"Electoral Act 1993, s. 1 \, Reprinted Statutes Vol. 35, 93. [New Zealand] 
'^ Courtney, J. 1978. 'Recognition of Canadian Political Parties in Parliament and in Law.' Canadian 
Joumal of Political Science 11 (1): 56. 
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terms of the criteria but, most important, only the pubhc face of the parties is subject to 
regulation. There is no regulation of the intemal affafrs of the parties, and httie scmtiny 
by way of the coiuts. Although the Ausfrahan parties are willing to accept regulation for 
the purposes of ensuring that competition between them is fafr, inasmuch as the 
disclosure of donations and the receipt of election funding may be argued to achieve this, 
they accept no scmtiny of thefr intemal affafrs. Thefr intemal affairs, however, produce 
the candidates and pohcies by which they are known. 
The Ausfrahan parties relationship with the state is asymmetrical. The electoral system, 
but not the parties' role in it, is highly regulated. The pam'es are hghtiy regulated in 
comparison to those coimtries where there is a suspicion of the role of parties, but not so 
lightiy regulated that they do not appear in stamte at all. The parties are no doubt happy 
with the position. The situation is, however, not static and Ausfrahan parties are finding 
that they are becoming hable to extemal scmtiny. The gradual encroachment of the law 
on political behaviour is advancing witiiout a formal change to thefr private stams. By 
various means the courts can now be called upon to judge, and provide a remedy, to all 
manner of disputes. The ability for matters to come before the courts depends on a 
number of factors, such as the legal status and rights of individual members as well as 
affiliated organisations and non-members, and the legal stams of the parties arising from 
statute law. 
The Legal Status of Members of Australian Parties 
Where an association in some way confrols a profession, or some other activity which 
'substantially affects a person's livelihood', the courts have been willing to intervene on 
the basis ofthe common law doctrine of resfraint of frade. This is probably the groimd on 
which the Left faction NSW Labor party organiser Damian O'Connor stated, 'any 
individual who can argue that they've suffered economic loss by being denied a seat in 
Parhament because the ALP pulled a rort can go to court'.^^ The matter of Members of 
22 Sievers and Baxt, 1984. 'The Rights of Members', 6. 
^ Sydney Moming Herald, 4 March 1997, 6. 
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Parliament constituting a profession was considered in a recent British case of sexual 
discrimination in the selection of candidates. An industrial tribunal found that the Labour 
party 'unlawfiilly discriminated against two men in the terms on which it was prepared to 
confer on them an approval which facilitated possible future engagement in the 
occupation of being an MP'. There is some likelihood that such a case would be 
successful in an Ausfrahan court because, 'where a person's livelihood ... is affected by 
some... decision of a non-profit association, the courts will assume jurisdiction'.^^ 
Whether more candidates will seek the assistance of the courts is a different issue. If a 
court fmds that a preselection has been conducted in breach of the party constimtion, the 
remedy it may grant is uncertain. For example, if there is a recognition that loss of future 
income has occurred, damages may be awarded. If, however, the court orders a fresh 
ballot, would the candidate run again, and if so would the numbers change? For example, 
on the second ballot (ordered after an intemal investigation) in a 1996 preselection 
dispute in the seat of Murray, the original winning margin increased considerably. In 
otiier words, the candidate who made the complaint was punished by the party, and the 
pubhcity given to the dispute lead to the party being punished by the electorate. While a 
court may exercise a cautionary scmtiny, and a party be held up to public ridicule, the 
lack of a remedy for the complainant may well continue to keep these matters out of 
court. The exception may be a sitting Member near the end of a parliamentary career who 
has less to fear from upsetting the party. Even in this circumstance an offer of fiiture 
preferment may be made in order to induce the person to withdraw the action. Such an 
offer was alleged by Senator Michael Beahan to have him drop his action against the 
Westem Ausfrahan Labor party. Nevertheless, the number of threats of action and the 
number of instances of members seeking legal opinion appears to be rising. 
^'* Jepson and Dyas-Elliott v The Labour Party and ors, 1996. Reported in 1996 Industrial Relations Legal 
Information BuUetin 543, 10. See also Davis, H. 1995. All-Women Shortlists in the Labour Party.' Public 
Law Summer: 207-14. 
^' Sievers, and Baxt, 1984. 'The Rights of Members', 7. 
^ Malcolm Feam. Interview, 30 April 1998. 
^^  The offer made to Senator Beahan and his staff was not delivered, despite his not proceeding with the 
action. Michael Beahan. Interview, 19 November 1997 and correspondence. 
^^  Recent examples include Senator Synon LPA V (Australian Financial Review, 4 September 1998, 4), 
Senator MacGibbon LPA Q (Courier-MaU, 7 August 1998,2), Stephen Mutch MHR LPA NSW (telephone 
conversation vsrith staff member, August 1998). 
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The Legal Status of Affiliates and Non-Members in Australia 
The scmtiny of the courts may be exercised on a wider range of matters. For example, in 
7Q 
Burton V Murphy the court found tiiat the mles of tiie Labor party rested in the hands of 
the National Executive and that they had the power to install, in effect, a new regime in 
the Queensland division. This device has been used numerous times by the party to allow 
the National Executive to determine, among other things, new rules for preselections. The 
mles of the Liberal party were amended in 1994 and 1996 by the Federal Council^^ to 
give some hmited powers to the Federal Executive to, amongst other things, review and 
overturn the selection of candidates. There has been no judicial consideration of these 
federal powers. 
The abihty of a party to reject apphcations for membership is an unportant power over 
candidate selection. More than 500 members of the South Ausfrahan branch of the 
Sporting Shooters' Association attempted to join the Liberal party in that State in 1996. 
The party rejected the apphcations, and one of the failed apphcants took legal action.^' 
The case was dismissed on the basis that a pohtical party had the right to deny anyone 
membership, and that an applicant, as opposed to a member, had no rights in the 
organisation. This is a fundamental power of parties, especially in the face of attempts to 
stack the organisation with new members. The South Ausfralian division of the Liberal 
party greeted the decision with much rehef. As no doubt did all other parties. 
There are three issues of significance for preselection in the relationship between frade 
imions and the Labor party. The right of union members to decide on affiliation with the 
Labor party was canvassed in Taimer^ ^ for tiie Federated Clerks Union in Victoria. The 
rights and manner of election of party delegates of an affihated frade union was an issue 
® Burton V Murphy (1983) 2 QLDR 321. 
"^ LPA 1998. Federal Constitution, Section 40. (f) (ii) and (g) (ii), 13-14. 
'^ Baker v The Liberal Party of Austraha (SA Division) SCGRG 96/1486. 
^^  Tanner and Dan-och No. VI9 (1985) Industrial Law 16 IR 226. Lindsay Tanner MHR is now on the 
Labor fi-ontbench. 
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which was canvassed in Adams^^ for The Amalgamated Metals Foundry and Shipwrights 
Union in Tasmania. The issue of whether and under what cfrcumstances a pohtical levy 
may be imposed on a frade union was canvassed in Williams '^' for the Waterside 
Workers' Federation of Ausfraha, Tasmania. In each case, tiie matters were justiciable 
because of the legal stmcture of the frade union and had major ramifications for Labor 
party preselection. The party has responded to the difficult issue of the behaviour of 
affihates, over whom it can have no confrol, by passing mles specifying various 
preconditions for affihation. For example, there is usually a proof requfrement as to the 
number of union members and that the union membership has consented to affihation and 
levies. The method of the election of delegates, as noted in chapter 4, may be a condition 
of affiliation but only in so much as it can be determined by the union, not the party. 
The Legal Status of Australian Parties 
There is nothing in the Commonwealth Electoral Act that specifies the legal stmcture of 
the party, for instance, that it has to become a legal entity by incorporating itself The law 
of unincorporated associations generally govems the legal stams of pohtical parties in 
Ausfraha. All divisions of the four major parties, save the Westem Ausfralian division of 
the Liberal party, the Western Ausfralian and South Ausfrahan divisions of the National 
party and the NSW and Queensland divisions of the Democrats, are unincorporated. The 
significance of this stams is that the parties are a legal non-entity. Most important the 
rights of members to take a dispute with a party to court are very limited. 
Incorporation has major ramifications for the right of members to take issue with the 
decisions of the party hierarchy. For example, Queensland incorporation legislation states 
that 'the rules of the association shall constitute the terms of a confract between the 
members [and] where a member is deprived ... of a right conferted on him by the rules 
" Adams and Hill No. 1.20 (1984) 8 IR 137. Amalgamated Metals Foundry and Shipwrights Union and 
Adams: and Adams and Hill Nos. L20 and 1.23 (1984) 8 IR 203 / 3 FCR 138. 
^* Williams v Hursey (1959) 103 CLR 30 
^' Fletcher, K. 1996. 'Developing Appropriate Organisational Structures for Non-profit Associations.' In 
Legal Issues for Non-Profit Associations, eds. M. McGregor-Lowndes, K. Fletcher and A Sievers. Sydney: 
Law Book Company, 28. 
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... the Court shall have jurisdiction to adjudicate ... [Further], [a]n incorporated 
association shall be bound by the rules of natural justice in adjudicating on tiie rights of 
its members' .^ ^ Incorporation means having some rules tiiat comply with state law. In the 
case of the Western Ausfrahan Liberal party, members have the right to inspect the 
membership hst. Where membership numbers are the ciurency of party politics, this is a 
significant step. The Westem Ausfralian division of the Liberal party incorporated so as 
to better manage tlie financial assets of the division.^^ The result is that its constimtion, 
which may otherwise have been non-justiciable, becomes an enforceable confract imder 
company law. According to Forbes, 'incorporation makes the intemal rules become a 
legally enforceable confract between the members and the body corporate, and among the 
members themselves'. 
As Fletcher argued, the selection of an inappropriate legal stmcture 'may, unnecessarily, 
expose officers [of an unincorporated association] to personal habihty, add to the costs of 
operation or deprive members confrol over their association's development'.^^ For 
example, the usual device that parties use to hold assets, through tmsts, means that 
individual tmstees must assume primary responsibihty for any obhgations generated by 
the association. The fact that few parties have taken this step would appear to indicate 
that a higher priority is given to the privacy of the machinations of the party than to any 
advantages that may accme in financial matters, or to the legal rights of members. 
Ausfrahan parties have been formally recognised in stamtes''° and in the Constimtion in 
minor ways, and then only quite recently. In a sense, tiiefr right to exist was tested in the 
1951 Referendum"" where the Commonwealth govemment sought to give itself powers to 
make laws in respect of communists where this was necessary for the security of the 
Commonwealth. The High Court decided tiiat the Communist Party Dissolution Act 1951 
was beyond the govemment's powers. The consequent attempt by the govemment to gain 
*^ Sievers and Baxt, 1984. 'The Rights of Members', 11. 
^^  Jeremy Buxton, party oflHcial LPA WA Conversation on or about 30 March 1998. 
*^ Forbes, J.RS. 1996. 'Judicial Review of Polrtical Parties', 14. 
^^  Fletcher, 1996. 'Developing Appropriate Organisational Stmctures', 1. 
'"' The Commonwealth Electoral (War-time) Act 1917 allowed soldiers serving, or who had served 
overseas, to vote for a party rather than a candidate. 
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the powers through a referendum failed, and the Communist party was allowed to 
continue in existence. The term 'political party' first entered the Constimtion in 1977'*'^  
with an alteration which sought to ensure that a casual vacancy in the Senate would be 
filled by a person of the same political party as the Senator chosen by the people. Major 
changes came about in 1983 as a result of the parties seeking pubhc funding for 
elections."*^ For the first time in legislation, pohtical parties were described as: an 
organisation ... the object or activities ... of which is the promotion ofthe election to the 
Senate or the House of Representatives of ... candidates endorsed by it ... is estabhshed 
on the basis of a written constitution ... that sets out the aims ofthe party... [has a] 
registered officer ... usually the party secretary, [and] ... a person shall be taken to have 
been endorsed as a candidate in an election if [inter alia] tiie Electoral Commission is 
satisfied, after making such inquiries as it thinks appropriate of the registered officer."*^  In 
1991, contributions to registered political parties were allowed as tax deductions,''^ 
reinforcing the parties' access to pubhc monies. 
Each of these factors may increase the prospects of intemal disputes being brought into 
the pubhc arena tiirough the courts. For example, it was recentiy reported"*^ that the Labor 
party National Secretary received in his own name, as the registered officer, some 
millions of dollars of public funds due to the party (the same arrangement obtained for 
the nominees of the other ehgible parties) indicating an enormous potential to be a 
subject of dispute. For example, in 1995, a person claiming to be the registered officer of 
the Greens sought the flmds due to the party from the previous election. He failed to 
estabhsh that he was the legitimate representative of the Greens.'*^ Claiming public funds 
could cause some concem for a party which, for example, was in the middle of a federal 
intervention in a State branch that was itself the subject of legal proceedings, as occmred 
*' Constitution Alteration (Powers to Deal with Communists and Communism) Act 1951. 
42 Constitution Alteration (Senate Casual Vacancies) Act 1977. 
•^^ Reid, GS. and M. Forrest, 1989. Austialia's Commonwealth Parliament 1901-1988: Ten Perspectives. 
Carlton: Melboume University Press, 126. 
'" Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918: s.4 (1), s. 123 (b), s.126 (2) (c), S.169B. (1), Reprinted as at 31 
December 1995. 
^^ Income Tax Assessment Act 1936, Paragraph 78(1 Xaaa). 
^ The Austi-alian, March 1998. 
''^  Williams v Australian Electoral Commission and the Greens (1995) 21 AAR 467. 
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with the 1983 intervention in the Queensland branch of the Labor party. The issue of 
who should receive pubhc funding would serve to intensify an afready difficult situation. 
Indeed the long-mnning dispute between the former independent Member for Oxley and 
the (^eensland division of the Liberal party over the distribution of electoral funds 
nartowly avoided court, probably because it was overmn by the politically 'sfrategic' 
litigation that has occurred with a Liberal MP helping to fimd an action by a former One 
Nation member. The action has successfully proved that the party is fraudulently 
registered. ^ ° 
The consequent deregisfration of Pauline Hanson One Nation has stimulated the 
Commonwealth Electoral Commission to recommend^' that it be given express 
legislative authority to 'conduct reviews of the continuing ehgibihty of registered 
pohtical parties', and 'specify the documentation it requfres parties to produce in support 
of thefr apphcation for regisfration and thefr continued right to remain registered'. It also 
recommends that the definition of a member of a political party be expanded to include 
the requfrements for a person to have 'been formally accepted as a member according to 
the party's written mles; joined the party or renewed thefr membership within the 
previous 12 montiis and paid a minimum annual membership fee of $5.00'. Further, 'the 
Act provide the Australian Electoral Commission with the power to set standard, 
minimum rules which would apply to registered pohtical parties where the party's own 
constimtion is silent or unclear'. These matters are still to be considered by the 
Parhament, and in the hght of the audit of the parties' mles, present a potential for 
"^  Burton V Murphy (1983) 2 QIDR 321. 
'*' The Liberal party disendorsed Pauline Hanson (Queensland) after the nominations for the 1996 election 
had closed so her name appeared on the ballot paper as a Liberal candidate. The Liberal party received the 
public fimding for its candidate (Hanson) despite disowning her, and despite the likelihood that much of her 
vote, on which the fijnding is calculated, was expressly not Liberal (Hanson received a swing of 23% with a 
Queensland average to the Liberal party of 8%). 
'" A former One Nation (the party now headed by Hanson) official commenced (27 July 1998) an action in 
the Queensland Supreme Court to argue that the party was not properly registered and should not receive 
$500,000 in election fiinds fi-om the 1998 State election. The action was funded in part by Hon. Tony 
Abbott MHR LPA NSW. The Courier-Mail, 3 September 1998. 
'* Australian Electoral Commission, 2000(b). Funding and Disclosure Report 
Following the Federal Election Held on 3 October 1998. Recommendations 13,14,16. 
http://v«vw.aec.gov.au/pubs/reports/disclosure98/main.htm 
16S 
External Scrutiny: Statutory and Judicial 
extensive litigation if the parties should decide to grant the Commission the powers it 
seeks. 
This is not to suggest tiiat the more frequent appearance of parties in legislation will 
necessarily consfrain thefr actions. For instance, in McKenzie, it was confirmed tiiat 
there was no constimtional impediment to the parties making electoral mles to suit 
themselves. Chief Justice Gibbs remarked in the case that 'Members of Parhament were 
organised in political parties long before the Constimtion was adopted and there is no 
reason to imply an inhibition on the use of a method of voting which recognizes pohtical 
parties provided that the Constitution itself does not contain any indication that such a 
method is forbidden'.^^ 
The reluctance of the courts to intervene in the parties' intemal affafrs stems from the 
1932 case where the Victorian Labor Premier Hogan was expelled by the Labor party and 
sought reinstatement through the court. The High Court in Cameron v Hogan^ "* could not 
provide the Premier with a remedy and decided that political parties were voluntary 
associations over which the court had no jurisdiction. This authority has generally kept 
disputes out of the courts which have maintained the view that 'there is no confractual or 
other relationship that exist between the members of an association and the association 
(where it is unincorporated), or between themselves to give them standing to challenge 
decisions ofthe association'. ^ 
The pohcy expressed in Cameron v Hogan, that the courts will generally refiise to 
intervene in the affafrs of private associations unless it can be shown that a member's 
proprietary rights are affected or that the mles are intended to create legal relations, has 
clearly been in the minds ofthe parties. For example, the 1994 Labor National Platform 
reprinted the 1955 Conference resolution, stating that the party 'cannot concede the right 
" McKenzie v Commonwealth of Australia and others, High Court of Australia (1984) 57 ALR 747. An 
independent Senate candidate, McKenzie objected to the ability of parties to orgamse an 'above the line' 
vote, in which a voter could indicate with a single mark a complete set of preferences. Only registered 
parties could register their ticket for the purposes of above-the-line voting. 
^ McKenzie v Commonwealth at 748. 
'"(1934)51 CLR358. 
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of any member ... to initiate legal proceedings for the purposes of estabhshing the 
constimtional behaviour ofthe Labour movement'.^^ The 1996/97 Labor NSW Platform 
cn 
Stated that 'These rules ... will not brmg about any legal relationship'. It has been 
argued, however, tiiat the very pledge that members make when they join a party to 
uphold the constimtion and mles, meet some of the requfrements of a confract such that 
the courts should seek to 'enforce the confract of membership in the same fashion as any 
CO 
other confract'. Indeed the minority opinion of Duffy J. in Cameron v Hogan indicated 
a sfrong argument for the courts to intervene in disputes within parties. ' [I]n view of the 
exfreme importance to members of the preservation of the rights given them by the rules, 
rights the loss of which may be far more grievous and hurtful than expulsion from a 
social club, and the fact that elaborate provisions are to be found in the mles to state and 
safeguard those rights, I can see no reason for concluding that the parties intended that 
thefr rights should not be dealt with in a Court of justice' .^ ^ 
Baldwin v Everingham^ was tiie first case where a court found jurisdiction over an 
intemal dispute in a pohtical party in Ausfralia.^' In 1991, Mr Baldwin, a member ofthe 
Liberal party of Queensland, claimed that he had been improperly excluded from the 
Selection Council process by the Division Executive, and as a consequence had failed to 
win preselection for the federal seat of Moreton. For the first time a judge distinguished 
ft') 
the Cameron v Hogan High Court decision which had regarded parties as no more than 
voluntary associations and as such not within the jurisdiction of a court. Dowsett J. found 
the dispute was justiciable because the mles of the Liberal party, altiiough a voluntary 
association, were registered under the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918. He concluded. 
" Sievers and Baxt, 1984. 'The Rights of Members.' 4. 
'* ALP, 1994. Platform, 333. 
" ALP NSW, 1996-97. Platform and Rules, 101. 
'* Lmdsay, S. 1987. 'Jurisdiction to Review Expulsion fi-om a Political Party.' Melboume University Law 
Review 16: 346. 
'^ Lindsay, 1987. 'Jurisdiction to Review', 346. 
^(1993)1 QLDR 10,24. 
*' Other than a 'property' dispute. For example, the intervention by the ALP National Executive in 
Queensland confirmed the ownership ofthe party by the National Executive. Burton v Murphy (1983) 2 
QLDR 321. A dispute between two fections of the AD WA as to the use of the name 'Australian 
Democrats' is still subject to litigation. Australian Democrats WA Division Inc and Anor v Australian 
Democrats VIC and Ors. Unreported case WA Supreme Court, 1522 of 1997. 
"(1934)51 CLR 358. 
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'... there is now a significant public interest in the enforcement of the rules of registered 
political parties'.^^ He found that the decision ofthe party executive was confrary to the 
party constimtion, and that tiie selection process had miscarried. A new preselection took 
place. Baldwin, however, did not stand, so his was a pyrrhic victory. 
A second case^ "* involved the Liberal candidate for the Federal seat of Macquarie. In 
1995, Jeanette Thomley was subjected to a 'performance audit' by the Federal Key Seats 
committee and found to be not adequately performing her duties as a candidate. As a 
result, she was disendorsed. The party executive selected a new candidate without a 
plebiscite of local members, claiming that there was insufficient time to hold one because 
of the imminent possibihty of a Federal election. Thomley claimed that this was 
unconstimtional and took the matter to court. The subsequent hearing determined that the 
executive acted within its powers and Thomley had to carry costs of $70,000.^^ 
A thfrd case was that of Gerald Sullivan Labor MLA for WoUongong, who lost a 
preselection ballot in 1999. Sullivan alleged the improper use ofthe N. 40 Rule whereby, 
under prescribed cfrcumstances, the Labor party NSW Adminisfrative Committee may 
forgo a local plebiscite and, in combination with branch delegates, select a candidate. He 
fiirther alleged an improper credentials procedure, which adversely affected the number 
of ehgible delegates to which some branches were entitled. The judge found that the 
Adminisfrative Committee's suspension of the ballot was within the mles and that 
although tiie credential protest should have succeeded, the delegate numbers would not 
have varied sufficientiy to change the outcome of the ballot. Sullivan had to carry his 
costs for the action.^ 
These few cases hardly inspfre an aggrieved member to take a pohtical party to court. In 
addition to the financial risk involved, the courts have only looked to the apphcation of 
the rules. They have not looked to see if the mles have been applied fafrly, or indeed if 
"(1993)1 QLDR at 24. 
^ Thomley and Heffeman CLS 1995 NSWSC EQ 150 and CLS 1995 NSWSC EQ 206. 
" Jeanette Thomley. Conversations, late 1998-eariy 1999. 
*^ Sullivan v Delia Bosca (1999) NSWSC 136. 
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the mles themselves are fafr. These are matters reserved for cases involving the 
interpretation of legislation or tiie decisions of pubhc authorities, or indeed to confracttial 
relations where equity is a consideration. For example, in the Thomley case, tiie 
discretion that the NSW Liberal Executive reserved for itself under the mles was 
exfraordinarily wide. McLelland CJ found that pubhc law principles such as the fafr 
^rn 
apphcation of mles had no apphcation to voluntary associations. This left him with a 
hteral interpretation of the mles such that so long as the executive beheved that there was 
insufficient time to hold a new vote it was within its powers to use tiie emergency 
procedures. The decision in fact enfrenched a very broad power of the executive to 
disendorse a candidate and endorse its own without reference to the membership. In the 
second case, the notorious N. 40 Rule of NSW Labor can be invoked by a simple 
majority of the Adminisfrative Committee to ensiu-e the result that it wants, and not 
necessarily in accord with the local membership. 
While Somes argues that the stams of parties may well change following the 
requfrement for regisfration, Forbes cautions that the provisions of the Act 'have nothing 
to do with the relation of members to each otiier or to the party. They govem a single 
extemal affafr between the Commonwealth and the party as a whole, leaving the party to 
retain the unincorporated character which has traditionally minimised the risk of judicial 
intervention'.^^ Indeed, the simation before tiie most recent cases, Clarke v Ausfrahan 
Labor Party,^° was hardly a major breakthrough in asserting the rights of members to fafr 
dispute processes or democratic outcomes. The Clarke cases, however, have opened to 
pubhc scmtiny the integrity of the recmitment of party members and the processes 
afforded members for the resolution of disputes. The dispute arose over an attempt to 
defeat Ralph Clarke, a former deputy-leader of the South Ausfralian parliamentary Labor 
party, at preselection. Clarke alleged tiiat 70 new members in his area joined the party on 
26 January 1999 but did not pay membership fees personally nor, when invited to, did 
they attend the local sub-branch. The same occmred in other parts of the South Ausfrahan 
^^  Thomley and Heffeman CLS 1995 NSWSC EQ 206 at 9. 
** Somes, T. 1996.'The Legal Status of Political Parties' In The Paradox of Parties ed. M Simms. Sydney: 
Allen and Unwin, 157. 
*^  Forbes, 1996. 'Judicial Review', 11. 
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party. In all, 2,000 members were 'joined' on 26 January, which, in a party with a 
membership of just 3,500, was a veritable stacking spree. The cost of tiiese memberships 
was $42,000, which by extension means that 'the entfre South Ausfrahan branch 
[division] could be purchased for less than $100,000'.''' 
The question that arose was whether the stmggle for power witiiin the South Ausfrahan 
Labor party was played out according to the rtiles of the party. Mulhghan J. found'^ a 
number of serious deficiencies in fhe way in which those responsible for the 
adminisfration of the party had handled tiie issues. He found that the adminisfration had 
allowed 2,000 members to join without the flilfiknent of all the obhgations of 
membership as specified in the rules. He found that when the matter had been drawn to 
thefr attention they had not properly mvestigated it. For example, they had sent the matter 
for consideration to the Rules Committee as opposed to the Disputes Tribunal. MuUighan 
stated, 'I reject the contention that the mles committee was an appropriate intemal 
dispute mechanism ... The complaints concemed actual breaches of the Rules, not the 
'7-5 
need for reform ... The mles committee could not resolve the plaintiffs grievances'. 
Similarly, he rejected the administration's offer to Clarke to raise the matter at a Special 
Convention. 'I do not think the Special Convention ... can be regarded as an intemal 
dispute resolution mechanism'.^'' Further, the adminisfration attempted to make good its 
ertor in aUowing the memberships to stand by proposing a mle change to be put at the 
Special Convention. Mulhghan's view of this procedure was scathing, 'refrospective 
amendments which prejudice tiie interests of a member should be regarded as 
unconstimtional'.^^ Mulhghan ordered that the proposed amendments be prevented from 
being put to the Special Convention. 
With the comprehensive defeat in the ffrst case, the adminisfration attempted to hold a 
preselection convention on the basis not only of excluding tiie 2,000, but also of any other 
™ Clarke v ALP, SASC 365 and 415. 
'^ Ralph Clarke MHA ALP SA Interview, 27 October 1999. 
'^ Clarke V ALP, SASC 365. 
^ Clarke v ALP, SASC 365, 28. 
^^  Clarke v ALP, SASC 365, 29. 
'^  Clarke v ALP, SASC 365, 29. 
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member who had vahdly joined, by aUowing tiie delegates appointed in 1997 to remain m 
place. Clarke also took this matter before tiie court. The decision of Lander J. stated that 
'No Convention can be caUed for the purpose of considering preselection of 
Parhamentary candidates unless delegates to the convention are appointed or elected by 
reference to the entitiements ofthe affiliates as at 30 June 1999'. 
The Implications of Clarke v Australian Labor Party 
There are a number of outcomes from the Clarke victories. There is a Rules Committee 
review, which appears to be leaning towards a recommendation that members 'must earn 
7*7 
tiiefr stripes' before they wiU be ehgible to vote in a preselection. This will entaU the 
twice renewal of a ticket at the sub-branch, in effect tiiree years of fee-paying, and the 
requirement that the sub-branch will have 60 days to lodge with Head Office an objection 
to membership. The pohcy behind the proposed mle changes is to encourage a more 
fransparent process of membership recruitment and renewal. The effect may be to slow 
and regularise the battie for preselection through recruitment. 
There is also a more serious second matter. This is the integrity of association of the 
party. An association that consists of a large number of people who are tmaware of their 
membership, or who have that membership paid for by others, or who have joined 
without any apparent adherence or knowledge of the objectives of the association, wiU 
not instil a great deal of confidence that it is an association of free individuals. When that 
association is a pohtical party and selects candidates to run for public office, the idea that 
it is an association of free individuals is especially important. In the wake of the Clarke 
judgements, and accepting that Ausfrahan parties have to balance the openness or 
exclusivity of thefr membership, they wiU have to provide avenues to voice opinion and 
dissension. Further, those avenues need to be something more than the option to leave the 
party. 
'* Clarke v ALP, SASC 415 at 26. 
" Ralph Clarke, hiterview, 27 October 1999. 
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The exposure to public scmtiny of the party may have a salutary affect on the poor 
behaviour shown by the party officers and lead to a more fransparent competition for 
recmitment. More far-reaching, though, is the fact that the Labor National Secretary has 
alerted the Disputes Tribunal in each branch that they wiU have to consider issues on the 
merits and according to the mles or else be liable to the scmtiny of the courts. As 
mentioned in Chapter four, members of a disputes tribunal will be chosen for thefr 
pohtical aUegiance, and tribunals in pohtical parties can rarely exhibit the standards of 
impartiahty of a court. The Dreyfiis Report to the Victorian Labor party noted that party 
members 'need to be able to take disputes to a Tribunal which is seen to be beyond 
reproach, and that fhe existence of such a Tribunal would in itself act as a detertent to 
breaches of Party mles or otiier unacceptable conduct'. He recommended that a single-
member tribunal be elected by 75% of the State conference vote. But this very method 
was infroduced in the South Ausfrahan Labor party in 1995! It is one thing to have the 
right tribunal; it is another to give members proper access. 
The costs of the court actions, which were awarded against the Labor party, were 
estimated by Ralph Clarke to be weU in excess of $100,000. The party had sought to 
appeal against the decision of MuUighan on jurisdiction but abandoned that course on 
receipt of several legal opinions of the likelihood of faUure. The justiciabihty of party 
disputes is now very firmly based, the management of the contest for power within 
pohtical parties wiU henceforth be scmtiiused by the courts—at least in so far as the 
apphcation ofthe party rules are concemed. 
Once a court has accepted jurisdiction to review a political party dispute, what issues may 
it consider, and how may it deal with them? Following tiie discussion in Forbes^^ a court 
may declare a party decision invahd and resfrain any attempt to enforce it, but it is not the 
court's prerogative to administer the party. For example, a pre-selection may be declared 
void but the court cannot declare a new candidate. Where jurisdiction does exist, review 
depends on a finding that the authority in question did not have the power that it 
*^ Dreyfiis, 1998. Panel of Review, 25. 
*^ Forbes, 1996. 'Judicial Review of Political Parties', 6. 
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claimed.^" Or, if it did, that it was not entitled to exercise it in tiie way, or in tiie 
cfrcumstances that it did, or indeed that it misinterpreted the mles,^' or that there was a 
lack of procedural faimess—a ri^t to be heard, and a hearing from a decision-maker 
who is free from bias. 
The MuUighan judgement goes fiirther than the mere interpretation of words. There is 
also the matter of proper process, the right way to hear a dispute. In tiiat sense, Ausfralian 
parties have ceased to be private associations, an instrument of the state has questioned 
tiiefr integrity. The question remains whether some parties will find an advantage in 
having a legislative base to the party system, as has occurred in New Zealand and 
elsewhere (see Avnon for a survey). For example, the Democrats want the Ausfrahan 
Electoral Commission to conduct the baUots for party preselection, and the review of 
the Queensland Constimtion has raised the issue of a stamtory base for political parties. 
At the end of the day, the remedy that the courts provided Clarice was not sufficient to 
secure a pohtical victory. He subsequently lost his preselection, but at least there is a 
clearer set of mles as to what is and what is not acceptable behaviour. 
Conclusion 
Clearly, entering the confines of essentiaUy private organisations, albeit when they are 
playing a pubhc role, is difficult. It is made easier, though, by the parties' propensity to 
let them into the pubhc arena by producing legislation that dehvers them considerable 
pubhc benefit. The stamtory obhgations of registered parties under the Commonwealth 
Electoral Act may only requfre a proper accounting for election expenses, but there may 
also exist an assumption that the candidates specified under the Act and shown on tiie 
ballot paper artived there under fafr cfrcumstances. 
*" This was the finding in Baldwin v Everingham. 
*' Nonish QC, advice to ALP NSW, 27 Februaiy 1997. (Mimeo) 
*^  Part ofthe allegation in the Beahan case. Michael Be^an. Interview, 19 November 1997. 
*^  Electoral Act 1993, s. 1\,ReprintedStatiites Vol. 35, 93. [NewZealand] 
*'' Avnon, D. 1995. 'Party Laws in Democratic Systems of Government' The Joumal of Legislative Studies 
1(2): 283-300. 
*' Murray, Senator Andrew. 1998. Submission to Senate Finance and Public Administration Committee. 
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If the parties were to lose confrol of thefr intemal processes because of misdeeds or 
incompetence, that could reinforce the argument that they are 'a hindrance to democratic 
processes.'^^ ff the parties manage the system fafrly, but stiU lose confrol, it may diminish 
the contribution that they now make, principally in the management of conflict, acting as 
a guide to past performance upon which the electorate may pass judgement, and selection 
of candidates. Perhaps the parties should ensure that thefr mles are pubhshed as they 
register with the Ausfrahan Electoral Commission. This would ensure an informal 
external scmtiny and perhaps forestaU any more formal extemal scmtiny. 
The USA and Germany may have a history of distmst of parties; Ausfraha may not, but 
may still end up with its parties being subject to extemal confrol. Bochel and Denver 
observe that 'In a few political systems the importance of candidate selection is 
recognised to the extent that rules about it have been incorporated into election law...' 
QQ 
For ahnost half a century, US observers have proposed changes to thefr party system m 
the name of responsible govemment, which would look remarkably hke the Ausfralian 
system. Ausfralia may be wimessing a de facto shift of confrol to extemal bodies; it is 
unclear who, if anyone, wiU be the beneficiary. 
^ Queensland Constitutional Review Commission, 1999. Issues Paper: for the Possible Reform of and 
Changes to the Acts and Laws that Relate to the Queensland Constitution. Brisbane: QCRV. 
" Jaensch, 1994a. Power Politics, 244. 
** Bochel, J. and D. Denver, 1983. 'Candidate Selection in the Labour Party: What the Selectors Seek.' 
British Joumal of Political Science 14: 45. 
^ American Political Science Association, 1950. 'Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System.' 
American Political Science Review, 44 (2), 1-14. Pomper, 1992. Passions and Interests, 147. 
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Australian Parties: To Regulate or Not? 
The legitimacy of the major parties in Ausfralia to preselect candidates for public office 
has rarely been called into question—although Rawson's' observations ofthe Labor party 
'machine' ofthe 1950s and 1960s come close—because the parties have been treated as 
essentially private associations. The one clear exception has been the call by Queensland 
Premier Peter Beattie to have fiiture preselections of the Labor party in Queensland, 
conducted by the Ausfralian Electoral Commission.^ The status quo of parties being 
freated as private associations remains intact. If, however, the parties have become 
public, at least in so far as their role in selecting candidates for public office is concemed, 
then their role may become vulnerable to the scmtiny of others, even on behalf of their 
own members. Legal intervention could have a democratic impact, by fransferring power 
from the leaders to the members. Then again, it could make the parties vulnerable to a 
level of scmtiny inconsistent with their successful competition for power. The parties will 
have to think carefiilly about leaving themselves vulnerable to extemal intervention, 
otherwise the flavour of debate that is current in countries with a more interventionist 
system will take hold. For example, in the USA, Lowenstein argues 'both the stmcture 
ofthe mles affecting the parties and the question of who sets these mles should ordinarily 
be resolved in the give-and-take ofthe political process,' however, 'if and when groups 
within a party act oppressively against one another, judicial infringement of party 
freedom of association ... to prevent such oppression may well be called for'. 
A Case for Intervention in the Parties' Candidate Selection 
Lowenstein's argument is that the limits to democracy are reached when one group acts 
oppressively against another. Presumably, oppressive does not mean simply that one side 
wins all or most ofthe time. The desire to share power is different to the necessity to give 
' Rawson, D. 1966. Labor in Vain? A Survey of the Austialian Labor Party. Croydon: Longmans, ch. 2. 
^ Reported in The Courier-Mail, 2 December 2000. 
^ Lowenstem, D. 1993. 'Associational Rights of Major PoUtical Parties', 1771, 1787. 
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everyone a say on all matters. The difficulties for public policy in setting mles for fair 
play for political parties are not ortiy that the parties concemed make the laws, and that 
certain kinds of 'oppressive' behaviour may be unavoidable or not amenable to mle 
changes, but also that standards of behaviour are a matter of judgement. The investigation 
of the integrity of the preselection process of the major parties provides some basis on 
which to judge the standards of behaviour. The results of the audit of the mles and 
behaviour of Ausfralia's major parties suggest that extemal intervention may be 
wartanted. This, despite the parties' considerable efforts at self-regulation. What form 
such intervention should take is unclear particularly as all forms of oppressive behaviour 
are not equally amenable to remedy by the imposition of mles. There are dangers to the 
broader political system when mles of behaviour are imposed on parties. An important 
one is the loss of public tmst that extemal scmtiny presumes. Nevertheless, the major 
parties have a privileged and protected role in parliamentary politics. With such 
advantages, there should be a price to pay. 
The broadest conclusion to be drawn from the audit ofthe parties' mles is that there are a 
number of faults in the integrity ofthe selection processes of each ofthe major parties in 
Ausfralia. These faults are a lack of competition between the constituent parts of the 
party, unfafr procedures in the ballot and breaches of freedom of association. Some ofthe 
faults are more serious than others and some are more amenable than others to a formal 
remedy. The three elements of the integrity of preselection—competition, fair process, 
integrity of association—generate a number of critical issues for the parties' management 
of preselections. 
First, competition between the constituent parts of the parties is clearly at risk where 
some voters have a privileged position. This occurs in the following circumstances: 
• Any mle that allows established practice to be overmled without clear safeguards 
for the members inevitably fransfers power to the already privileged. This is 
clearly anti-competitive and some of the worst abuses of democratic practice 
occur under such mles. 
• Where a group of voters is allowed to join the party on a group basis. In the case 
ofthe Labor party this is particularly so with the affiliation of frade unions. Trade 
unions bring with them numbers, organised for other purposes, which translate 
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directly into ready-made voting blocs. Their power derives from the method of 
the selection of their delegates to the fomms of the party. The ability to caucus 
carmot be at fault per se, for example, the discipline of parties is a fimdamental 
element ofthe stability of govemment. However, the fact that there is no choice in 
the selection of delegates to a party forum and that the union secretary controls 
these as of right, is anti-competitive. A remedy is to force unions, as a condition 
of affiliation, to elect their delegates directly from the members ofthe union on a 
proportional representative basis. 
Where some voters have special voting rights—^those in special branches or with 
particular attributes— t^he result is anti-competitive. If intemal ballots are to be 
fair, there should be no instances where a member receives more than one vote. 
Measures such as affirmative action for women should at least be acknowledged 
to have temporary status only. Privileged sections of the vote rarely change the 
mles once they have achieved power. What may commence as an affirmative 
measure may end as an oppressive measure. 
Similarly, the number of voters whom a delegate represents should be equal. The 
custom of allocating the same number of delegates to electorates regardless of 
their membership is clearly against the principle of one-vote, one-value. Less 
clear-cut is the practice of assigning members to electorates based on branch 
membership, rather than residence. The House of Representatives system is 
clearly based on residence in the electorate, voting rights do not extend beyond 
the boundary. The system of ignoring branch boundaries, common in the Liberal 
party, is at odds with the system for which it selects candidates. It intensifies the 
potential for interest group representation as opposed to party representation. 
Voting for delegates at Armual General Meetings is tantamount to a breach of 
one-vote, one-value inasmuch as the effective vote is very low in such 
circumstances. The practice is common in the Liberal party and is not a sound 
basis for the election of delegates. The better practice is to have, unambiguously, 
a separate vote for delegate positions. 
Although voting systems produce different but equally defensible outcomes in 
terms of representation, any that allow for a wirmer-take-all outcome should be 
discouraged. Parties such as the National party and the Democrats may not need 
to accommodate different views in other than an individualistic way. However, as 
177 
Australian Parties: To Regulate or Not? 
political parties at their essence are meant to aggregate and compound a variety of 
views into manageable parts, a proportional voting system is far more likely to 
produce representation of a vanety of views. 
At any point in the preselection process, including the composition of panels, where an 
unfair advantage may be obtained, the measures employed should be abolished. In the 
instances above, each is amenable to remedy by new mles and procedures. Competition 
for power within the parties, where it is based on the weight and composition of 
constituent parts, can be improved. 
Fair intra-party electoral procedures are clearly at risk in the following circumstances: 
• Simple matters like the use of the secret ballot or proper access to the roll of 
voters are fundamental, and yet some of the parties fail to make adequate 
provision. The electoral procedures are the most obviously amenable to standard 
mles of behaviour and the parties' refusal to fall into line with commonly 
accepted procedures is a major weakness. This is also an area where the parties 
have agreed on mles for the public but not themselves. 
• One element ofthe electoral processes is the right to a fair hearing in the event of 
a dispute. This matter is beginning to be remarked upon by the courts and in time 
may well force the parties not only to have the proper stmctures and procedures in 
place to hear disputes, but to use them. The courts are particularly expert in this 
area and may be best placed to fiilfil that role. 
The free association of members is clearly at risk in the following circumstance: 
• Where members are recmited to a party without their explicit consent, or in their 
ignorance ofthe objectives ofthe party, or by payment of membership by others. 
The parties have, by and large, pointedly not established mles to ensure that members pay 
their own membership dues or that they understand the consequences of their actions in 
joining a political party. The various attempts to slow the pace of recmitment ignore the 
basis on which it occurs. This is perhaps the most serious weakness in the self-regulation 
of the parties. If the party members fail to distinguish themselves from party voters, the 
rationale for the party and its privileges in public elections is significantly weakened. A 
party that consists of some 'super' activists and others who are members in name only is 
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a serious matter. This is not to argue that parties, like many volunteer organisations, do 
not rely greatly on the energetic few. They almost inevitably do. Some members will be 
better competitors than others. The problem is not the competition for members, but the 
abuse by the privileged few ofthe integrity of free association. More acutely, a publicly-
funded party where the need for members has declined is especially vulnerable to falling 
into the hands of a few. Power may always be in the hands of a few, but where it does, it 
should do so within fair rules of play, and with recourse. 
There should be clear and unambiguous mles in every party to ban the payment of an 
admittance fee. Only Westem Ausfralian Labor and the South Ausfralian Liberals have 
such a mle. The Labor mle is much diminished, though, as the local branch member has 
virtually no vote in the election of candidates. The Labor party has made a major change 
in this area by recentiy adopting new mles at its 2000 National Conference, to be 
implemented by all divisions, by June 2001. 'It is an abuse of Party mles for an 
individual or group/s to fund Party membership for other individuals or groups of 
individuals who would otherwise be unwilling to pay their own subscriptions'.'' It 
remains to be seen if this mle is clear and effective in its application. 
There are matters at the heart of preselection politics that are not amenable to remedies 
by changes to the mles. The ways in which people choose to band together for support 
and for convenience, or for resources or for ideological reasons are not only difficult to 
regulate, they are not necessarily undemocratic. The entire party system is based on the 
dynamics of group politics and on the interplay of the people and their careers, causes, 
and the dedication, enthusiasm and talent that they bring to politics. The existence of 
factions is much lamented by members of political parties who are not members of a 
faction, and sometimes by those who are! These devices for career development and for 
collecting and wielding power are parts of the competition for power within the parties. 
Competition is a critical element of democracy; the existence of factions may indicate 
that competition is alive and well. Where there is evidence that competition is so highly 
organised that it is oligopolistic or even monopolistic, then critical judgement can be 
passed upon the behaviour of factions. More important is how the factions come to 
accumulate and maintain power. If they do so by unfair means, then the remedy lies in 
ALP, 2000. Rules, Rule 16a. (photocopy) 
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undoing the means, not attacking the factions. Factions are a microcosm of the party 
system and they can be subjected to the same scmtiny as the parties. However, if within a 
faction, matters are agreed between members as to how positions are to be distributed or 
votes to be taken, there can be no investigation unless and until the matters affect the 
formal part ofthe party mles. 
At another level, if power is obtained only by the extraordinary exertion of time and 
energy, the matter cannot be said to be anti-democratic, ff members of a party are willing 
to defer to more experienced persons in the party, that is, to hand power to someone else, 
it is difficult to call the action anti-democratic, ff, however, a person or group 
accumulates power because there are devices which give them an unfair advantage at the 
outset, for example because they have two votes, or a bloc of delegate votes as of right, 
the matter can be put right. 
The ethos of the major parties was distinguishable in the analysis of the integrity of the 
parties. At the local level, too great a confrol by the local politician has a popular 
democratic appeal, but in fact it is the most easily manipulated and probably subject to 
the most common of poor practices in rigging branch emolments. A degree of sharing 
power with the rest of the party is to be encouraged, as is a degree of scmtiny from 
outside the electorate. A party, such as the National party, with a dispersed constituency, 
and where seats are few and relatively safe, will have little practice at the business of 
preselection. The tendency will be to leave matters to the executive managers of the 
party. Indeed, where the ideological divisions are apparently few, the focus of the 
electoral panel and management will be on the candidate as a representative, not as the 
most prolific recruiter. An ethos of the peer group selecting the 'best' candidate is best 
suited to selection based on judgement of interests rather than superior resources. How 
this can be achieved must be a matter of mles and leaming. Certainly it is not encouraged 
in parties where there is real incentive to recmit members with no regard to the 
contribution of the member than as a vote in a plebiscite. These matters are inevitably 
value-laden. There is no democratic ethos outside of competitive stmctures, fair 
processes and organisational integrity. Except that a party that strives towards a 
considered deliberation, as opposed to a contest of resources or recmiting, is less likely to 
sfretch the limits of organisational integrity. It is more likely to maintain a distance from 
the electorate that allows for a distinction between party voters and party members. In 
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that distinction lies a key rationale for the monopoly of the selection of members of 
parliament to be in the hands ofthe parties. These matters of ethos are important and can 
be gleaned from the observations of the participants, but they are not matters that can 
change without the assistance or in the absence of mles. An agreement by all parties to 
constmct a well-balanced and well-established peer group panel requires the sort of 
assurance to all the interests concemed and the sort of protection that only laws (mles) 
can enforce. 
The limits to the democratic practice, especially within the confines of a free association, 
are relatively clear. Certain guideposts can be agreed to show the way to good practice, 
but there comes a point when the game begins and some win and some lose. A too strict 
set of mles or definition of democratic practice may be inimical to competition within a 
party; it may deflect a party from the broader competition with other parties—an 
important business. 
Possible Forms of Intervention in the Affairs ofthe Parties 
There is an argument that some form of extemal intervention in the affairs of the parties 
is warranted. If so, the question is what form it should take. On the other hand, there may 
be ways in which the parties may forestall intervention. They clearly have the power to 
avoid legislative intervention, but there may be actions they can imdertake to answer the 
critics, not simply ignore them. 
The Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters report into the 1998 Federal Election^ 
discussed two matters that relate to the intemal operations of parties as they affect 
preselection. First, the Committee noted the Australian Electoral Commission's 
suggestion that the Commonwealth Electoral Act should clarify party membership status 
for the purpose of party regisfration. It suggested, 'that a person must be accepted as a 
member of the party by the party's own mles, have joined the party or renewed their 
membership within the previous 12 months and paid a miiumum annual membership fee 
^ The Jomt Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, 2000. 1998 Federal Election: Report ofthe Inquiry 
into the 1998 Federal Election and Matters Related Thereto. Parhament of AustraUa. 
http://v\ww.aph.gov.au/house/committee/em/elect98/report.htm 
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of $5'.^ The Committee recommended (Recommendation 50) that the definition of a 
member of a political party in the Act be expanded to include the requirements that a 
person must, 'have been formally accepted as a member according to the party's mles, 
remain a valid member under party rules, not be a member of more than one registered 
political party unless the parties themselves have sanctioned it, and have paid an annual 
membership fee'.^ The Opposition committee members opposed this recommendation on 
the groimds that they were 'concerned that this intmsion into the ability of parties to draft 
their own mles may not be appropriate, and that any such provision, may unless they 
o 
were very carefiilly drafted, have unintended consequences'. The major issue is whether 
the words, 'have paid an annual membership fee' imply that the member pays the fee and 
not another person on their behalf It is no surprise that the Opposition (Labor) members 
were wary of this recommendation as so much of the challenge to the integrity of their 
association comes in the form of'sign-ups'. 
Second, the Committee noted the Australian Electoral Commission's view that 'most 
political party constitutions are scant, and inadequately address the intemal fimctioning of 
membership-based orgaiusations'. In fact, many ofthe parties' constitutions are not scant 
at all; they are the constitutions of long-lived and mature organisations. They may, 
however, not be adequate as guides to good democratic practice. It was the view of the 
Commission and agreed by the Committee that the Commission should not have the 
power to impose itself upon the intemal operations ofthe parties or to impose a definition 
of what is a democratic stmcture. The Committee was satisfied that the current approach 
for regisfration whereby the parties lodge their constitution was adequate. This was not 
the view of the Democrats who wish for a regulatory regime similar to that for 
corporations. They argue that the common law has been inadequate as a form of scmtiny 
and that the Commonwealth Electoral Act does not address the intemal mles and 
procedures of political parties. The Democrats want to expand the Main Report 
recommendation (Recommendation 52) that political parties be required to lodge a 
constitution with the Ausfralia Electoral Commission that must contain certain minimal 
elements. Among other things they seek: 
^ JSCEM, 2000. 1998 Federal Election, 135. 
^ JSCEM, 2000.1998 Federal Election, 136. 
* JSCEM, 2000. 1998 Federal Election, 160. 
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'a) The Commonwealth Electoral Act be amended to require standard items to be set out 
in a political party's constitution, in a similar manner to the Corporations Law 
requirements for the constitutions of Companies; 
e) The key constitutional principles of political parties should include: the conditions and 
mles of membership of a Party; how office-bearers are preselected and elected; how 
preselection of political candidates is to be conducted; the processes that exist for dispute 
resolution; the processes that exist for changing the constitution. 
f) The relationship between the party machine and the party membership requires better 
and more standard regulatory, constitutional and selection systems and procedures, which 
would enhance the relationship between the party hierarchy, office-bearers, employees, 
political representatives and the members. Specific regulatory oversight to include: 
scmtiny ofthe procedures for the preselection of candidates in the constitutions of parties 
to ensure they are democratic; all important ballot procedures within political parties to 
be overseen by the AEC to ensure proper electoral practices are adhered to'.^ 
The Democrats are particularly scathing of the 'scourge of branch-stacking and pre-
selection abuse' and suggest that a 'Member or Senator who has won their seat through 
branch stacking or pre-selection abuse can be seen as morally cormpt'.'° To counter the 
problem, they recommend 'that the JSCEM and the AEC give closer scmtiny to branch 
stacking and pre-selection abuses (Recommendation 6.9)'" They seek, in particular, to 
use the public principle of 'one-vote, one-value', and further recommend 
(Recommendation 6.10) 'that the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 be amended to 
ensure the principle of 'one vote one value' be a prerequisite of political party 
processes'.'^ They suggest that if such a principle were franslated into political parties, it 
would mean that no member's vote would count more than another's and that this may 
rid the parties of 'undemocratic and manipulated pre-selections, delegate selections, or 
balloted matters'.'^ 
The elements for the constitution of each party as set out in (e) above are not 
confroversial. Each ofthe party constitutions contains each ofthe elements. The elements 
^ JSCEM, 2000. 1998 Federal Election, 177. 
'" JSCEM, 2000. 1998 Federal Election, 178. 
" JSCEM, 2000.1998 Federal Election, 179. 
'^  JSCEM, 2000.1998 Federal Election, 179. 
" JSCEM, 2000. 1998 Federal Election, 179. 
113 
Australian Parties: To Regulate or Not? 
contained in (f), like the overseeing of party ballots by the Ausfralian Electoral 
Commission, are a different matter entirely. Further, 'the relationship between the party 
machine and the party membership requires better and more standard regulatory, 
constitutional and selection systems and procedures' (emphasis added). What is a 
democratic weight of balance between branch members and unions, between local branch 
members and all other members, between members and the central executive? What is an 
insufficient number of members in a local district that would satisfy the Democrats that 
the division executive should select the candidate, only consulting the locals? It may be 
possible to specify some of the basics of procedure as per the Commonwealth Electoral 
Act and some elements of free association, such as the self-payment of a joining fee, but 
the balance or weight of votes is very difficult. The principle of one vote, one value is 
easy for a small party like the Democrats but a real problem for the larger parties. The 
notion that the Australian Electoral Commission should oversee 'important ballot 
procedures' is a very large step indeed, certain to cement the view that the electorate does 
not tmst the parties. Still, the fact that the discussion is abroad''* stems directly from some 
considerable weaknesses in the integrity of the association of some parties and follows 
closely the discussion ofthe public fimding of parties. A less invasive legislative solution 
is to have the Federal legislation insist that a party be incorporated in order to register for 
federal fimds. Incorporation provides a ready-made standard of scmtiny. It would provide 
certain rights to members but stop short of specifying mles ofthe association. 
The analogous organisations to political parties are probably not corporations, but 
industrial, frade imions, and employer organisations. The real precedent is the legislation 
covering trade unions and employer organisations. The Workplace Relations Act 1996,'^ 
(and its predecessor the Industrial Relations Act 1988) have specified since 1988 that all 
elections for office in registered organisations, frade imions and employer bodies, must be 
conducted by the Australian Electoral Commission unless exempted. Before that, the 
AEC conducted elections for registered organisations at their request, and has done so 
''' A former Commonwealth Electoral Commissioner, Professor Colm Hughes, has suggested that where 
'candidates [of parties] registered with the Australian Electoral Commission are to be chosen by 
membership votes, those elections should be conducted by the oflBcers ofthe AustraUan Electoral 
Commission.' His remarks were contained in his submission to the Parliamentary Committee on Electoral 
Matters, and reported m The Sydney Moming Herald, 15 November 2000. 
'* Workplace Relations Act 1996, Section 210. 
184 
Australian Parties: To Regulate or Not? 
since 1949.'^  The objects ofthe Workplace Relations Act lie in 'ensuring that employer 
1 n 
and employee organisations ... are representative of and accountable to their members'. 
Further, they are meant to 'encourage the democratic confrol of organisations'.'^ Further, 
the Committee endorsed the principle that 'the public interest is best served by funding 
industrial elections from the public purse and providing for such elections to be 
conducted by the AEC. They fiirther recommended that a menu of 'model mles' be 
developed.'^ The infroduction of model mles by compulsion was roundly condemned by 
many of those who made submissions to the inquiry. The Ausfralian Chamber of 
Manufactures argued that 'such diversity as remains is the very minimum which is 
necessary for organisations to have in place rules ... which reflect the needs and character 
and culture ofthe organisation'. The Ausfralian Coimcil of Trade Unions submitted that 
'standardisation denies membership control of their own organisations and will be 
unlikely to provide any greater certainty or faimess in the electoral process'.^' In 
recommending the changes to compulsory AEC conduct of elections, which happened in 
1988, the Hancock Report, argued that such compulsion 'should enhance the confidence 
ofthe community and members of organisations in the conduct of ballots'. 
The four major political parties have legislated to ensure the democratic process in the 
key volimtary associations in industrial relations. They have done so, it appears, to 
enhance the confidence of the community and members in the conduct of ballots. There 
can be few more important ballots than those which determine who is to carry the party 
label of a major Ausfralian party. It is almost the only road to parliament. Why then 
would the parties not do the same for themselves? Clearly, the Democrats want the 
parties to be scmtiiused by the courts using a highly prescriptive legislative model. Such 
a model would incur all ofthe debate not only about the freedom ofthe parties to govem 
their own associations, but also the issues raised earlier about the measures of democracy. 
It is highly unlikely that the parties will agree to such an intmsive regime, though a 
'^  Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters, 1997. Report ofthe Inquiry into the Role ofthe 
Austialian Electoral Commission in Conducing Industrial Elections, Parhament ofthe Commonwealth of 
Australia, 7. 
'^  Workplace Relations Act 1996, Section 3. 
'* Workplace Relations Act 1996, Part IX. 
'^  JSCEM, 1997, Industi-ial Elections, 3. 
°^ JSCEM, \991, Industi-ial Elections, 14. 
'^ JSCEM, 1997, Industi-ial Elections, 15. 
11 
Hancock, K. 1985. The Report ofthe Commitiee of Review into Australicm Industiial Relations Law and 
Systems, AustraUan Govemment PubUshmg Service. Vol 2, 144. 
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govemment at some point, needing the support of the Democrats, may begin to allow 
further specification of the regulations to be adhered to in the process of party 
regisfration. 
The discussion ofthe rationale for intemal democracy is not simply part ofthe argument 
about whether democratic preselection is essential for democracy. An oligopoly in party 
competition is a rationale for some remedy consistent with the assumption of stable 
democracy. The rationale for intemal democracy rested also on the role of the party and 
the status of the parties. The electorate tmsts the electoral process to deliver good 
govemment, whether it tmsts parts of the political system to behave is altogether 
different. McAllister's study of the public's and politicians' perceptions of ethical 
conduct among legislators in Australia suggests that 'popular tmst and respect for 
politicians and their role has rarely been lower'.^ ^ Moreover, it concluded that, 'contact 
with pohtical parties diminishes elite [politicians] support for standards of conduct'.^'' Is 
political life in Ausfralia based sfrongly on trust as Oliver^ ^ asserts it is in Britain, or is it 
based on competition? Or rather, do the voters tmst the competition between the parties 
as a sufficient form of regulation or do they require tmst in the integrity ofthe parties as 
well? There is a strong case to suggest that the still predominant feature of electoral 
politics, loyalty to the major parties, is heavily dependent on three features: the electoral 
system of single-member electorates, compulsory preferential voting and public funding 
are all props for the major parties. Each prop also tends to be a barrier to the successful 
entry of new parties. 
Is there a way for the parties to reprivatise? If they ceased to accept public funds and 
abolished compulsory voting, would the grounds for public access to their intemal 
regimes be any less compelling? In the first instance, almost certainly so. Apart from the 
mdiments of complying with electoral procedures, nothing is required of the parties by 
way of legislation other than that which arises from their regisfration for public funds. 
However, there are other groimds for members of private associations to enforce certain 
minimal rights through the courts. This is certainly so for those parties which are 
^^  McAllister, I. 1998. '"Keeping the Bastards Honest": PubUc and EUte Perceptions of Ethical Conduct 
Among Legislators.' A Paper Prepared for the Australasian PoUtical Studies Association meetings, 
Christchurch, New Zealand, 28-30 September, 17. 
'^* McAllister, 1998. "Keeping the Bastards Honest ... ',18. 
" OUver, 1997. 'Regulating the Conduct of MP's ...', 543. 
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incorporated under state law, it may be so where an action can be brought where a 
person's livelihood may be affected. There is a distinction, nevertheless, between the law 
as it applies to voluntary associations and that which applies to public legal entities such 
as companies or govemment bodies. The judges do not have the leeway of interpreting 
legislation as it applies, for example, in administrative law. In hearing matters on disputes 
in political parties, they are left with the literal interpretation of the party mles. Apart 
from the issue of allowing for a member to have a matter heard in a court of law and for 
the matter to have been accorded a proper hearing within the party, the court can neither 
provide a remedy, apart from the hearing, nor interfere with the mles ofthe party, even if 
they are patently undemocratic. There are two entirely different dialogues taking place. 
The judges can make sense ofthe mles, they cannot set the mles. The parties may lose 
the ability to interpret some of their mles as they affect the resolution of their disputes, 
but they maintain an absolute power over the establishment and nature of the mles. The 
Democrats want to change the parties from private associations, where certain procedural 
rights ortiy may be upheld by the courts, to public entities, where mles have to abide by 
principles as laid down in legislation. Rules that will provide a prescription of what is and 
is not democratic behaviour. 
To retum to Bartolini and Mair's discussion, the steady allegiance and firm mles have 
made stability the predominant feature of Ausfralian politics. To some extent, that part of 
the stability concemed with the role of parties and the formation of govemment is 
contrived. The parties are not the organisations they once were. They are smaller relative 
to the electorate and they are part-owned by the electorate. The system of single-member 
electorates and compulsory preferential voting herd the vote towards the existing 
historically advantaged major parties. The system is designed to ensure stability beyond 
that which may exist in the electorate, as expressed by the loyalty of the voters to the 
major parties. 
Furthermore, it is clear that the parties are performing less but being paid more from the 
public purse. The education system and the media have taken up their former role of 
educating the electorate. They no longer have to get out the vote; they do not even have 
to raise many of the fimds that sustain them. They barely represent the cleavages of the 
*^ Bartohni and Mair, 1990. Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability, 4. 
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electorate. It is more likely that the electorate is squeezed into an old shoe, one that fits 
the electoral system rather than the electorate. The suggestion is to see if the parties' 
internal democracy could compensate for these shortcomings in the competition between 
the parties, whether the asymmetry of the Ausfralian system is re-balanced by the 
integrity ofthe intemal scmtiny ofthe parties. Self-regulation is a major task of political 
parties; they spend a great deal of their time managing the contest for preselection. The 
management of their procedures appears orderly and mature inasmuch as they each hold 
regular forums within which mles are discussed, often based on investigations and 
reports. Their machinery for deciding preselection contests and settling disputes is in 
some cases exfraordinarily highly sophisticated, in others mdimentary, but in all cases to 
suggest that the parties are able to manage the processes reasonably well and in the main 
fairly would be an accurate assessment. Nevertheless, from time to time, parties have 
acted in a less than fair manner and these matters have not only come to public attention, 
they have been formally brought before the courts. 
The audit suggests that the parties fail on a number of counts the test of democratic 
election of candidates. Most important is the failure in some of the parties to come to 
grips with instances where the parties are no longer free associations. This occurs where 
people are signed-up to parties with little or no knowledge, without paying for 
themselves, without any commitment to the party as an association. These problems with 
free association coupled with the tendency to lock up competition and not to sustain fair 
procedures are a real blow to the legitimacy of the parties. Perhaps the only thing that 
stands between the parties and the loyalty of the electorate is the electorate's lack of 
knowledge ofthe intemal operations ofthe parties. 
An Acceptable Remedy? 
An argument can be made for some form of extemal scmtiny of parties' procedures for 
selecting candidates. The dangers of extemal scmtiny are that they may damage the very 
freedom of association that is a precondition of democracy. Are there lessons from 
comparable democracies on the question of extemal scmtiny of parties? The degree of 
strife and instability exhibited in Germany and the USA is not present in Australia. The 
degree of faith in the Ausfralian system may even be higher than in Britain, so there does 
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not appear to be the necessity and certainly not the likelihood that Ausfralia will willingly 
or consciously work towards a higher degree of extemal scmtiny ofthe parties. 
If the parties were to lose confrol of their intemal processes because of misdeeds or 
incompetence, their behaviour could reinforce the argument that they are 'a hindrance to 
democratic processes'.^^ If the parties manage the system fairly but still lose control, it 
may diminish the contribution that they now make; the management of conflict, acting as 
a guide to past performance upon which the electorate may pass judgement, and selection 
of candidates. Clearly, entering the confines of essentially private organisations, albeit 
when they are playing a public role, is difficult. It is made easier because the parties 
produce legislation that delivers to them considerable public benefit. The strict confract 
between the registered parties and the Commonwealth may ortiy require a proper 
accounting for election expenses, but there may also exist an assumption that the 
candidates, specified under the Commonwealth Electoral Act and shown on the ballot 
paper, arrive under fair circumstances. A possible remedy recognises both the right of 
private association and the harm that public confrol of preselections (for example, 
primaries) can do to the organisational integrity of parties, but seeks greater public 
scmtiny ofthe intemal affairs of party candidate selection. 
Presently, the parties registered under the Commonwealth Electoral Act, principally to 
receive fimding for election campaigns, only have to lodge a copy of their constitution 
with the Ausfralian Electoral Commission. These documents are not available to the 
public. A reasonable compromise on the tension between the extemal scmtiny of parties 
and the maintenance ofthe privacy of association would be, as a condition of regisfration, 
to make the party constitutions available to the public. If the parties' candidate selection 
rules were to be made available to the public so that voters may judge for themselves the 
faimess of the processes, the parties would in so far as their formal practices are 
concemed, be more likely to comply with basic democratic standards. Of the possible 
options ojDen to Australia's major parties—reprivatise, a highly prescriptive regime of 
extemal scmtiny, continued court scmtiny of disputes or make public their mles as a 
condition of regisfration for public fimds—^the latter two seem the most practical. It 
27 Jaensch, 1994a. Power Politics ... , 244. 
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would enhance democratic practice, maintain the tmst in parties and ensure their freedom 
of association, itself an important element of democracy in Australia. 
While the major Australian political parties maintain a near-monopoly of parliamentary 
representatives and their party labels remain valuable, the comj^ etition for the right to 
wear them will be a legitimate field of interest to those concemed with the integrity of 
parties and their role in a competitive democratic system. Future work in this area will be 
to monitor the behaviour of the parties, hopefiilly with their coojieration and with an 
abundance of data. The source of the data will be the documents they lodge with the 
Ausfralian Electoral Commission, made available to the public. 
Australia's major parties, the electoral system and the electorate have delivered Ausfralia 
a stable electoral system. The principal players— t^he major parties—have been well 
rewarded for their considerable work. Much of that work is now 'sunk capital'. The 
parties are mere vehicles for new agendas and careers. If they are to continue to do the 
job into which they grew, in an environment when the challenges from other forms of 
private associations in the electorate are at their greatest—the associational revolution— 
they should take the opportunity to consolidate their position through a legitimacy 
derived from public scmtiny. 
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Date: / /. Confidential 
Preselection - candidate questionnaire 
Alert interviewee - prepare to provide copies of any media coverage. 
Prepare to provide a detailed description ofthe contest with 
Reference to party mles, including the number of party 
Members involved. 
Copies of any documentation circulated to members. 
The interview will be tape recorded, but is entirely confidential. 
Candidate's background -
Name: Partv: 
Seat: Margin: 
Date endorsed: Age at time of contest: 
Trigger for contest: e.g. redistribution. Occupation at time of contest: 
Year joined partv: Year left partv: 
Years of continuous membership: Any other contests? 
Ever member of another party? Name: 
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Any other family member joined a party? Stand for pre-selection?: 
Positions held in party prior to contest: Member of other organisations: 
192 
Sfrategy -
1. Who recruited you to the party? 
2. With whom did you work most closely? 
3. Did you join a' group' prior to the contest? 
4. Subsequentiy? 
5. Did you choose the seat, or someone else suggest it? 
6. Who was involved in your decision to contest? 
7. How confident were you of pre-selection? 
Exfremely | Very | Somewhat Not very Not at all 
8. Why? 
9. Who was your main opponent? 
10. Who was most influential in determining the outcome? 
11. What were the most unportant factors in determining the outcome? 
12. Why do you think you were chosen/defeated? 
13. How many new members did you or your team recruit? 
14. What work did you put into recmiting between elections? 
Process-
15. No. Of candidates: any persuaded to withdraw? 
16. Result of ballot multiple? 
17. How many voted in the local plebiscite and/or electoral college? 
18. How many members were not eligible to vote? 
19. Describe the process ofthe contest bv reference to the partv mles: 
20. Was your result dependent on the outcome of other contests? 
21. Did you expect to be given another chance? (If defeated at the election): 
22. Were State or Federal party officials involved at any time? 
23. Have you successfiilly avoided a contest? 
Dispute procedures -
24. Was a dispute notified? 
25. If so, how was it handled and by whom? 
26. Was any legal action threatened? 
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ALP National Executive Decisions, 1983-1995 
1995 Senator Beahan Westem Australia, appeal against preselection rejected. 
ACT Branch, Peter Staples appointed to inquire into Canberta by-election. 
1994 South Australian branch. Senate ticket determined. 
1993 South Ausfralian branch, mles on preselection panels determined. 
ACT Branch, Special Conference ordered to change the preselection panel. 
1992 Cunningham NSW, disputed votes scmtinised and counted. 
Watson NSW, appeal rejected. 
Tasmanian branch. Senate ticket overtumed, and determined. 
All Ministers in the Keating govemment and the Speaker endorsed. 
1991 National mle for boundaries for eligibility to vote determined. 
1990 Organisational Review Committee, review of preselection mles in NSW. 
1989 Liverpool, NSW State seat, nominations process conducted. 
Victorian branch, preselection panels mles suspended following redistribution. 
1988 Queensland branch, preselection panels mles reviewed. 
1987 Bowman Queensland, ballot determined. 
All Senate tickets determined. 
1986 Rules goveming distribution of votes among affiliated unions determined. 
Victorian branch. Senator Button endorsed number one. 
South Ausfralian branch, union affiliation mles determined. 
1984 Queensland branch. Senate ticket determined. 
Certain NSW and Queensland Members endorsed. 
Queensland branch, formula for union representation determined. 
1983 Northem Territory State seat. Aboriginal candidate endorsed. 
ACT branch, preselections supervised. 
All Senate tickets determined. 
Sources: ALP National Secretariat, Canberra. Minutes of National Executive 1983-1994, and Senator 
Michael Beahan for his 1995 appeal. 
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Index of Transcripts, Notes of Interviews and 
Documents from Candidates and Biographies 
1. Tony Abbott 
5. Bronwyn Bishop 
9. Neil Brown 
2. Neil Andrew Peter Baldwin 4. Michael Beahan 
li 6. Julie^ishop 7. Neville Bonner 17. eville e I 8. Ron Boswell 
10. David BrovmhiU I 11. Graeme Campbell 
13. Bamey Cooney 
. . ^ t 
17. Gilbert Duthie 
21. John Hewson 
...JL 
14. Rosemaiy Crowky 
i87Aian'Griffit"hr 
j 12. Don Chipp 
I 15. Noel Crichton-Browne U 6 . Kay Denman 
r \9. Bob Hawke if 20. David Hawker 
25. Colin Hollis 
"29. Deanne Kelly 
33. Brett Mason 
37. Peter McGauran^ 
i 45. Christopher Pyne 
49. Chris Schacht 
I! 53. John Stone 
I \ 57. Tom Uren 
22. Noel Hicks 
[ 26.JohnJHyde 
f ib . Cheryl Kemot 
34. Stuart McArthur 
38. David McGibbon 
j 42. Gavm O'Connor 
\ 46. Graham Richardson 
\ 50. Anne Scott 
\ 54. Jeanette Thomley 
J27. 
'il'5. 
;[1 
.[43. 
?47. 
IIL 
I 59. 
I 24. Kelly Hoare 
I 32. Lou Lieberman 
I 36. Graham McDougall 
1^40. AlanMissen 
Peter Howson 
Michael Johnson 
Michael Kroger 
Jim McClelland 
Daryl Melham 
Andrew Peacock 
Alan Rocher 
Tony Smith 
Andrew Theophanous j 56. Kelvin Thomson 
John Woodley \ 
^i^a^ivi^nTvin M 
'^^4. Chris Puplick 
52. Billy Snedden 
Source: 
Author selection. 
Notes: 
There were 41 interviews conducted with candidates and with several activists. There were various 
accompanying documents. There were seventeen pohtical biographies with relevant and mostly 
contemporary material on preselection. One description ofthe Julie Bishop preselection as told by Noel 
Crichton-Browne. 
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